Globalization and Hindu Radicalism in India جهانی شدن و رادیکالیسم هندو در هند

In The Name of God

University of Tehran

Faculty of World Studies

Department of Indian Studies


Thesis Title

Globalisation and Hindu Radicalism in India



Seyed Mostafa Mostafavi



  1. Heshmat Sadat Moinifar



  1. Seyed Sadrodin Moosavi Jashni



  1. Ali Naqi Baqershahi


A dissertation for the Graduate Studies Office in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Indian Studies

15- September 2014



There are two most excellent virtues none above them; the belief in the almighty God and benefiting people and there are two most wicked vices none beyond them; polytheism and hurting people. 

                                                                            The great prophet of Islam Mohammad (pbuh)


 Religions are not for separating men from one Another, they are meant to bind them.

                                                                                                                                   Mahatma Gandhi


 The need of the moment is not one religion but mutual respect and tolerance of the devotees of different religions. We want to reach not the dead level but unity in diversity. Any attempt to root out traditions, effects of heredity, climate and other surroundings is not only bound to fail but is a sacrilege. The soul of religion is one but it is encased in a multitude of forms. The latter will persist to the end of time. Wise men will ignore the outward crust and see the same soul living under a variety of crusts[1].              

                                                                                                                                  Mahatma Gandhi


 “No democracy can long survive which does not accept as fundamental to its very existence the recognition of the right of minorities”[2]                                       Franklin Roosevelt




Inevitable conflict between religious groups is an insisted academic view (C.S.W, 2011) and plural-diversified Indian religion-culture case also shows such a fact, but this study maintains that the globalisation trends have reduced communal tensions by radical Hindu elements against minorities[3] in India. At the root of Indian subcontinent’s partition, it can recognise a kind of distinctive antagonism between Hindu[4] and Muslim[5] (and other minorities, like Christians[6], even Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains[7] and others[8], especially Muslims) as two major communities of India. Therefore, it affected India’s communal atmosphere with long history of religious pluralism and tolerance.

 whose cause is the same, occurs in different sites. The continuation of hatred for a long time has caused brutality and cold-hearted actions against Indian minorities who are taken hostage by communalists only for political goals. An endless violence whose price is paid by poor, backward and innocent minorities.

Nevertheless, it is about more than one decade that this process is being reduced or at least its risen trend is going to stop and long communal violence seems to have opened many Indian eyes; as well as some Muslim’s leaders who now realize that they should focus on the real difficulties of their people, like poverty and marginalization... It is the only path to follow whatever the interference of politics and politicians, who are more than ever able to play dangerous games. The price of democracy is indeed extremely high, that paid by Indians during and after the independent struggle against foreign occupiers. In addition, globalization effects helped Indians to know their real problems and take distance from politicized religious leaders, who are following their goals and abuse people’s religious sentiments to gain power.

 This research is important because the world speaks of India as a ‘superpower’ during upcoming thirty years and as Carrier (2012) cautions to be ready to confront Hinduism, when Hindu nationalism is on the rise there, not in decline. The objective of the present study is to discuss the effects of globalization on Hindu radicalism. The main hypothesis of this research is that globalization reduces Hindu radicalism. The hypothesis, which studied through documental and historical-analytical method.



Radicalism, Hinduism, Globalisation, Hindutva, Sangh Parivar, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Minority, Lok Sabha, Saffron





 To my wife S. Ebrahimi for her Support, Kindness, Compassion, Encouragement, Understanding and Sacrifices that helped me to move ahead and writing this thesis. In addition, to my daughters and son who have been patient with my post graduate studies.



I should like to thank all my professors at the Department of Indian Studies; Faculty of World Studies; The University of Tehran, for their support and advices that helped me learn many things.

      Special Thanks to my supervisor Dr. Heshmat Sadat Moinifar (Head of the Department of Indian Studies, Faculty of World Studies; The University of Tehran) who led me steadily and to my advisor Dr. Seyed Sadrodin Moosavi Jashni who kindly helped me to write this thesis.

In addition, I should be thankful to Dr. Ali Naqi Baqershahi who as referee, refers me to improve my thesis’s weak points at final step.

 In addition, I would like to thank my late father and mother for their efforts in raising me in to the person I am today.


Table of Contents

Chapter One. 1

  1. Introduction. 1

Main Research Questions. 4

  1. Hypotheses. 4
  2. Methodology. 5

Literature Review.. 5

Delimitation and limitations of the study. 6

Definition of Key Terms. 8

Chapter Two: Hinduism and Radical Hinduism.. 12

  1. Introduction. 12

Who is Hindu and what is Hinduism.. 14

Radical Hinduism.. 18

Identity and radical Hinduism.. 24

Communalism and the radical communal force in India. 28

The atmosphere of communal riots sites. 31

Hypersensitive communal areas against Indian Muslims. 34

Using religious faith for gaining power. 55

Indian Nationalism and radical Hinduism.. 61

The various schools of Hindu nationalism/traditionalism.. 65

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). 65

The All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh party (BJS). 72

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): 81

The communal force’s election performance. 85

All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh party: 85

Bharatiya Janata party (BJP): 87

New communal and Hindutva forces. 90

  1. Conclusion. 92

Chapter Three : Globalisation. 95

  1. Introduction. 95

Definition of globalisation. 97

Globalisation: a positive or negative impact. 99

Cultural globalisation and India. 102

India joining the globalisation process. 108

The effects of globalisation process on India. 109

Radical Hindu’s reaction to globalisation. 120

  1. Conclusion. 124

Chapter Four:   Indian Voting Behavior. 127

  1. Introduction. 127

Radicals’ representative vote gaining in Lok Sabha during the last 3 decades. 129

Seventh Lok Sabha (1980 –1984). 130

Eighth Lok Sabha (1984–1989). 131

Ninth Lok Sabha (1989–1991). 131

Tenth Lok Sabha (1991–1996). 133

Eleventh Lok Sabha (1996–1998). 134

Twelfth Lok Sabha (10 March 1998 - 26 April 1999). 135

Thirteenth Lok Sabha (10 October 1999 – 6 February 2004). 135

Fourteenth Lok Sabha (17 May 2004 – 18 May 2009). 138

Fifteenth Lok Sabha (18 May 2009–18 May 2014). 141

Sixteenth Lok Sabha (16 May 2014–16 May 2019). 142

  1. Conclusion. 147

Chapter Five: Conclusion. 150



List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

RSS:           Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

BJP:           Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party)

VHP:          Vishva Hindu Parishad

SJM:          Swadeshi Jagaran Manch

 INC:          Indian National Congress

 UP:           United Provinces (to 26 January 1950) and thereafter Uttar Pradesh

 RS:           Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament)

 LS:            Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament)

 HMS:       Hindu Mahasabha

 BJS:         All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party

 ABVP:     Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad

 AIADMK:      All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

BMS:      Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh

 BSP:        Bahujan Samaj Party

 BVP:       Bharat Vikas Parishad

 CPI:        Communist Party of India

DMK:      Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

JD (S):     Janata Dal (Secular)

JD (U):    Janata Dal (United)

NDA:     National Democratic Alliance

 SCs:        Scheduled Castes

 MP:       Member parliament

 SP:        Samajwadi Party

 STs:       Scheduled Tribes

TDP:      Telugu Desam Party



List of Tables and Graphs

 Figure 1:    People killed in communal clashes (2005‐09)

Figure 2:    Communal with more than 100 deaths from 1967 to 2002

Figure 3:    Communal riots from 2003 till 2012

Figure 4:    The BJS performance in different general elections for LS

Figure 5:    Cable TV coverage in India

Figure 6:    The Market Pie (Revenue %) 2010 in India

Figure 7:     The BJP performance in different general elections for LS during last 3-decades

Figure 8:     Graph of BJP, INC and CPI in different LS elections India from 1952 to 2009

Figure 9:     National and regional parties, 1991-2009 (in % of valid votes) from 1991- 2009

Figure 10:   Vote share of Congress, the BJP, multi-state parties and, regional parties since 1991

Figure 11:   Vote share of the Congress, the BJP and regional parties since 1991


Chapter One


Asia as birthplace of major world religions[9] is facing with religious confrontation, which takes countless lives. In this great ancient continent, the followers of Islam and Hinduism as two great world religions, as neighbors[10] had been influencing each other, for long centuries until now. India as an ancient civilization, is the second world most populous[11] and the seventh biggest country. India also “has been on a path of forging a high-profile power status since the days of the Cold War, demonstrating an impressive record in terms of GDP[12] growth, military capacity, high-tech production and exports, labour force potential, and a rapidly expanding service sector. India’s status as the largest democracy in the world (Efstathopoulos n.d., 2011)” as a rising nation with a radically different religions and cultures[13], as it transformed and is transforming by modern sciences, technology, economics, and ideology are the factors that bold it in the world’s eyes. India is the birthplace of Hinduism and “emerges as a potpourri of religions[14] and cultures in 21st century (Mostafavi, 2013)”; so now is considered as one of the symbols of tolerance and cultural diversity in the world. At the same time, India is facing some communal confrontations by those who threaten its religious pluralism and secular system[15], although these national values are clearly recognized by Indian constitution.[16] Today, world common sense as well as global organizations have “an emphasis on the need for tolerance not only between societies, but (also) within them as well (Stenou & Keitne, 2004).” This research is an attempt to shed light on such problems and effects of globalisation trend on this religious, political and social confrontation in India.

 With those statues that India has, the way India faces its problems and resolves them could have effects on the future direction of humanity. Religious conflicts as one of the sources of inter-nation and inter-group conflicts have been existent in the world from the age-old and South Asia[17] is much habituated with such communal violence. “In world size also 90 per cent of UN peacekeeping operations since 1989 have been deployed to disputes that have a significant internal conflict component (Desker et al., 2005).” During 20st century and first decade of 21st century India has seen more bloodshed and destruction of life and property due to communal disharmony, sectarian conflict, political terrorism and religious fundamentalism; the clashes which threaten peace and coexistence among different ethnical, cultural, religious elements there. The existence and continuation of prolong clashes among Indian religious, ethnical, cultural, and castes elements threaten peace, harmony and security in plural, secular, democratic, diversified community of India; and ultimately threaten “human security[18] (that) centers on people, concerns universal threats, and emphasizes their elimination and prevention (Mashru, Ram, 2013).” Human security as thoughtful value points to individual safety and wellbeing.

Integration of independent units of the world together is the core result of globalisation trends and “since globalisation brings humanity in to ever-increasing contact with religious differences, the commitment to a cosmopolitan vision requires Hindu theologians to affirm the necessity of caring not only about ‘their own’ but about those who are different. Transnational dynamic of globalization in the postcolonial atmosphere, has brought religious difference close to home. “The religious other is neighbor, colleague, and friend whom we meet in our complex hybridity and whose presence may positively alter our theological reflection (Fletcher, 2008).”

The research focuses on the Radical Hinduism which is based on ‘Hindutva doctrine’, especially the BJP as the first Indian National party[19]; which is politically representing this Ideology; seem to be influenced by the globalisation trend in the world and India as well. The effect of globalisation on the world and the world phenomenon on globalisation, is a two way road so, “the emergence of a new form of globalized Hinduism (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006)” is a 21 century’s phenomenon. This study believes that “religion and culture are not contained in the bounded landscape of nations, but they flow, change, and take influence from encounters with other forms of religion and culture in a dynamic setting (Fletcher, 2008).” So in the following pages will have a look on the Hinduism as well as radical Hinduism and its organs in Indian and their activity, power and its limitations.


Main Research Questions

  • What effects globalisation has had on the voting behavior of the supporters of radical Hindu political parties?
  • This study seeks to examine; what effects globalisation has had on interaction between Hindus and followers of other religions (Islam, Christianity…) in India.

In this regard, the last 3-decade Indian voting behavior will be studied.



Because of globalisation, Hindu radicalism is moving towards moderation. Moreover, because of globalization’s impacts, people are distancing themselves from radical Hindu parties and radical Hindu parties are losing their political base.



This thesis applies documental, historical and analytical method to study the questions and to examine the hypothesis. This method involves seeking out and extracting evidences from original archival documents such as government records, Hindu organizations documents, newspapers, articles and personal diaries and books.


Literature Review

The study has found no such Iran-based study; but a Delhi-based study has done by Anita Bhela[20] who focused on the impact of globalisation on the religion, culture, and identity of Hindus in India. The result of this study published in ‘the Asia Journal of Global Studies (AJGS)’ Volume 4, No 2 dated to 2010-11 with the title of ‘Globalisation, Hinduism, and Cultural Change in India’. It studied and described how Hinduism, over epochs, adapted to outside influences and retained its unique character, but the sudden onslaught of globalisation in our era is threatening its core values, traditions, and beliefs. Consequently, religion in India is being disestablished and cultural identities are being dissolved. On the other hand, this study has no strong focus on radical Hinduism or the effect that they took of globalisation or the effect that Indian voting behavior has taken from this process. B. D. Graham from the University of Sussex also had worked on National Hinduism after India independent. Its focus was on the history and performance of All Indian Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) till the fourth India general election for Lok Sabha (LS). He brought his gathering in his book ‘Hindunationalisam and Indian Politics, The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh.’ However, it is not a complete work in this regard also.

 Monalisa Gangopadhyay in 2010 worked on a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with the title of ‘Hindutva Meets Globalization: The Impact on Hindu Urban Media Women’ in Florida International University and she focused on women. Meera Nanda[21] is another Indian scholar who paid attention to this matter and her research’s result is gathered in her book ‘God market: How Globalization is Making India More Hindu’ which published in 2009; her research shows that religiosity is going to expand in India and as well as the world, secularism, and globalisation don’t decline it. Notwithstanding secular India, Hinduism is now as a de facto state religion of India. She did not focuse on the effect of globalisation on voting behavior of Indians.


Delimitation and limitations of the study

This study will fuscous on two socio-political active elements in India; the pro-Hindutva groups, as radical Hindu element in Hinduism, who are challenging with religious minorities and exclude them altogether. In addition, downgrade them as second-class citizens; Indian minorities are under the attack of this extremist movement. Finally will study the effect of globalisation waves of this confrontation and the reaction and behavior of Indian voters toward this process, after independent of India from the British colonists in 1947 and mostly during the last three decades.

This research has no comparable one, so it should provide material that it needs in this regards. The research somehow is a statistic-based study, but it is very hard to get reliable statistics about India. India is very poor in the organization, which is statistics provider in every society; and it is a common problem of any social study in India. Moreover, although Hindutva activists are very active in India but they try to hide their activity in systematic and organized form, so a study of such an organization’ activity is hard. On the other, side “as with most ethnic conflicts, systematic information on where and when Hindu-Muslim riots have taken place is hard to find.  State governments keep riot commission reports secret or delay their publication for years. The central government instructs the state news media to provide no inflammatory information on riots, which in practice often means no information at all. It is nearly impossible to obtain the exact death toll of each riot as statistics are dependent on police records (Graff & Galonnier, 2013).”

Broad history of religious and cultural radicalism in India which makes oxymoronic terms like Hindu nationalism, Hindu supremacism, Hindu fundamentalism, Hindu terrorism, and Hindu evangelism a reality (Carrier, 2012) and its result in the shape of physical brutal clashes there that affected history of this civilized country. So at least its 20th and 21th century is full of cruel communal incidents, lead this study to a social problem there, therefore the study of its trend put itself at the core of this paper’s goal. A range of confrontation among radical Hindu and Indian minorities (especially toward Indian Muslims) were happened which is not possible to be focused on all of them in such a paper; so this study will consider two of main recent such clashes as sample, and will study the effect of this two over Indian voting behavior in next election after clashes, toward Hindu moderate repressive, the INC and Hindu radicalism representative, the BJP. The Babri mosque communal case and the Gujarat riots in 2002 will be the index for this research.


Definition of Key Terms

Culture as a formless concept is “the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”(Bliss n.d 2008) or as in anthropology and sociology, culture generally defined as “a way of life, or the ideas and habits that members of a community transmit from generation to generation. In this sense, culture, as Tylor (1871) defined it more than a century ago, “is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society, the total heritage of a society in (Bhela, 2011).”

Cultural diversity “is the variety of human societies or cultures in the world. Cultural diversity includes (but is not restricted to) language, race, ethnic background, country or region of origin, dress, values, religion and associated practices, social and community responsibilities, sexuality, disability, family and political views. In 2001, UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. The Declaration describes cultural diversity, the ‘common heritage of humanity’ ‘Taking into account the new challenges linked to globalisation , the Declaration focuses on the concept of cultural rights which should be applied among and within States, and emphasizes the dynamic nature of all cultures as they draw strength from their own traditions.’ … ‘The Declaration emphasizes the need to assist developing countries in promoting their cultures and creating secure, competitive cultural industries at national and international levels’ (Bliss n.d, 2008)” in this respects “India‘s large and diverse population makes it arguably the most pluralistic society in the world. India is a multicultural country indeed. (Sica, 2012).”

Religious pluralism: “the problem and opportunity of the simultaneous presence of different religious traditions within a single society (Mclennan n.d., 2011).”

Communalism “is the term used in India, and more generally throughout South Asia, to denote the politics of religious sectarianism (Chattopadhyay, 2009).” It usually “referred to the identification of political interest with religious community. Nationalist historiography has understood communalism as a product of British divide-and-rule policies (Rajagopal, 2001).” (In Sociology) loyalty to the interests of one's own ethnic group rather than to society as a whole. In the context of the Indian subcontinent, communalism is used to refer to persistent antagonism and conflict between religiously defined communities, primarily Hindus and Muslims, but also extending to Sikhs, Christians, and other religious groups. Communalism in India possesses distinct features; it is nevertheless in some ways similar to the concepts of religious fundamentalism, ethnic chauvinism, ultra nationalism, and political extremism.

Communal riot is an event which is identified as a communal riot if (a) there is violence, and (b) two or more communally identified groups confront each other or members of the other group at some point during the violence.[22]

Hindu nationalism:  Nationalism refers to the feelings of attachment to one another that members of a nation have and to a sense of pride that a nation has in itself the desire of the members of a nation to control and govern the territory in which they live.

Believers of Hindutva and other Hindu fundamentalist groups argue that, the Hindu nation dependeds upon an acceptance of India as both fatherland and holy land. Notwithstanding, Hindu nationalists do not deny others (the Indian Muslims, Christian…) but they say the people like them might regard India as their fatherland but they looked outside India for the sacred places of their religion and therefore did not regard India as their holy land.  On the other hand, Hindu nationalists do not deny other Indian religions, they have some reservations on possible disclaim of India as a holly land by other Indian religious communities which only accept India as their fatherland and devoted their religion to other countries.

 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar[23] as Maharashtrian tradition, Aurobindo Ghose and Bepin Chandra Pal as Bengali tradition, Lala Lajpat Rai as Punjabi tradition … was the icons of Hindu nationalist movements in India. As Peterson[24] (1999) defined, “nationalism is a particular manifestation of political identification… [That] is problematic from the vantage point of those within the nation who share least in élite privilege and political representation, especially those whose identity is at odds with the projected image of homogenous national identity. Nationalism has three significant facets: “liberation[25], exclusivity[26], and domination[27] rests on the promotion of uniformity within the group.” “Hindutva-style Indian nationalism is predicated on keeping the core of the nation a pure Hindu homogenous structure (Gangopadhyay, 2010).”

Hindutva is a religious, racial and cultural entity in which Hinduism as a religion formed but part of a whole. It stressed the need for Hindus to transcend their differences (biological and social…) and to realize their essential unity.  Awakening Hindu sangathan, the organization of the Hindus. One of the main group in this regard is the RSS. “Hindu nationalism has its ideological origins in the British colonial period. In 1923, writer and activist Veer D. Savarkar coined the term “Hindutva” to describe the historical, political, and spiritual essence of being Hindu. Savarkar envisioned Hindutva a political and cultural identity more than an explicitly religious one, and advocated for the creation of a Hindu Rashtra[28] based on Hindu traditions and values (Aoun et al. n.d., 2012)” Hindutva means the Indian culture way of life; But this term in 1980s used by Sangh Parivar[29]  like VHP[30], RSS, BJP, Bajrang Dal… as political term. “The rise of Hindutva discourse in contemporary India is marked by the desire to further entrench Hindu male-defined traditions as well as a militant Hindu chauvinism.”[31]

Minority “is defined as a subordinate group whose members have significantly less control over their lives than members of a dominant or majority group, which is substantially translated into unequal treatment and less power. Types of minority group can be defined based on their character: religion, culture, ethnic, gender. (Sica, 2012).” Minorities are the non-dominant group with a distinct identity. UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1977, define minority as, “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members being nationals of the state-possess ethnic, religious or linguistics characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditional religion or language.”[32]



Chapter Two: Hinduism and Radical Hinduism


Religion plays an important role in human’s life. It “not only provides us a spiritual meaning in life, but also identity, loyalty and association. These elements, present the nexus between religion and politics (Desker et al. 2005).” Religion has a deep root in Indian life, India is constitutionally formed as a model secular state with no official faith and “despite secularists’ attempts to keep religion out (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006)”; in this secular community, secularism does not have such a role and religion has strong existence there; and “Hinduism has become the de facto religion of the ‘secular’ Indian state; secular state has never shied away from celebrating Hindu religious symbols in the public sphere—all in the name of propagating Indian culture (Nanda, 2009).”

 In addition to, most of India’s social facilities are at service of religion. The “traditional media[33] were used for Indian religious practices… affect religion itself… These media keep religion very much in the public eye (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006).” Moreover, later on, new forms of modern media, like TV channels and the Web has taken at the service of religion practice. The construction of religious identity in India is very strong and has deep historical root. “The era of globalisation  as a direct result of the transnational dynamic that brings religious difference into ever increasing contact (Fletcher, 2008)” but some radical religious elements define “others” as a problem and change this contact to clashes and confrontation. Scholars like Eliot, T. S. (1948) believes that “no culture can appear or develop except in relation to a religion.” In India case, religion, philosophy, arts, sciences are directly come together, Indian culture takes deep and fast effect from Indian local religions; and its culture has strong religious base there. “In India, the religious, aesthetic, and social life spheres traditionally formed a cohesive whole (Bhela, 2011).” On the shadow of world integration during a vast communicated world, the cultural exchange happened, and put Indian culture on the changing process in this regard. So although “The religious ethos in particular was equally a treasure trove for the rich and poor, educated, and illiterate; all participated in the vision, though at different levels. The erosion of religion in such a context, therefore, amounts to the erosion of culture. Consequently, India is witness today to extreme trends of individuals either abandoning their traditions wholesale, or reacting fanatically with a protective rigidity, fearing an erosion of their identity. Both these extreme reactions, however, are inimical to the organic growth and sustenance of culture (Bhela, 2011).” Therefore, globalisation have faced India with world waves of change that has positive and negative effects on them. Positively is going to relax injustice religious-based social phenomenon like casteism, and negatively is relaxing strong eastern family-based society there.


Who is Hindu and what is Hinduism

This study’s subject is the re-vision a kind of Hindu religious activist groups which are using special approach of Hindu cultural and philosophical systems and thought as it’s socio-political base in favor of their strategy and activities; but first of all the question is, who Hindu[34] is and what Hinduism is. Although some believe that “Hinduism proceeds from the heterogeneous nature of the beliefs and practices it labels. Heinrich von Stietencron writes that “[t]here is hardly a single important teaching in Hinduism which can be shown to be valid for all Hindus, much less a comprehensive set of teachings (Sweetman, 2004)” and “Hinduism is seen more as a way of life than as a religion (Overgaard, 2010).” This kind of view consider it as diversify of practices and beliefs, which named Hinduism as a whole. But Hinduism is a notoriously difficult term (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006). Hindu as a first decade of 19st century English term, was coined by British writers (Safra and Aguilar-Cauz, 2006). It has roots in a Persian word Hindu[35](Agarwal, 2006), which, refers to immigrant people who were settled and lived around Indus river[36] but it is generalized to all people (immigrant and aboriginal) who became the axis of a community who culturally were Aryan[37] and worshiped Aryan or the barrowed local ancient gods and goddesses which were adopted from indigenous ones in the Indian subcontinent; their holy ritual language was Sanskrit and they believed in a kind of social classification of people, based on purity and pollution in religious practices, race and occupation; so the four main castes[38] were the core of the society and social system which, divides aboriginal people who were at the service of these pure Aryan castes. Today the RSS[39] as one of the main Hindu activist groups is “the fountainhead of Hindutva (Kanungo P., 2003, page 3293)”, announce this term as “the word cannot be defined (Deoras, n.d.,2006)“ and give an inclusive definition for Hindu, and include “all, except the Muslims, the Christians, the Parsis and the Jews come under its purview and that it was applicable to Sanatanis[40], Lingayat[41], Arya Samajists[42], Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists and even others who did not come under any of these categories (Deoras, n.d.,2006).” Therefore, Hinduism, sometimes is using as a big umbrella term, referring to any and all forms of subcontinent-born religions; “Many of which share few if any common features. It was used to describe all sorts of beliefs and practices, from simple nature worship to the most highly sophisticated ritual and philosophical systems (Lochtefeld, 2002).”  Nevertheless, there is a reality that the Buddhism, the Jainism, the Sikhism do not know themselves as Hindu. In addition, the history of religion shows that they were revolutionary movements against Hindu rules, or fundamental reforms against Hinduism; Even among Hindu sects, some like Lingayat denied fundamental Hindu rules. About Sikhs that also feel threat from an “open Hindutva agenda (Sidhu & Fil, 2010)” against itself; they consider themselves as “a revealed and revolutionary, whole-life Theo-Political (piri-miri) system” That “any apparent similarity between Sikhi (Sikhism) and other world religions are the universal human values, which are integral in Sikhi. Sikhi is an independent system with own distinct ideology, institution and identity (Sidhu & Fil, 2010).” Therefore, Sikh’s post-independent movement opposed with such an inclusive theory that said, “Sikhs were already Hindus and, unlike Muslims, did not need to renounce their faith and accept their ancient cultural attachments to become once more an organic part of the Hindu nation (Graham, 1990).”  “But the Sikhs not unnaturally found such an attitude patronizing, given their sense of being a distinctive and self-sufficient religious community (ibid).” So their separatist movement to have separate Sikh country was started. 

In addition, in Buddhism the story is also the same; and while Hindu religion announce the Buddha[43] as Avatar[44] of the Vishnu[45]; on the other side Buddhism show itself beyond a religion. “While one could scarcely be both an orthodox Christian and, say, a Muslim or Hindu at the same time, it is perfectly possible to be a Buddhist and at the same time have recourse to and make offerings to Hindu gods, or other local gods of one’s culture (Williams & Tribe, 2000).” 

The difference between Hinduism and Buddhism are enormous, for instance while Hinduism is full of gods and goddess, Buddhism has no god; it is godless. “Buddhists deny completely the existence of God (ibid)”; but Buddhism is open-minded about its followers; “There is no problem in Buddhists making offerings to Hindu gods, with requests for appropriate favors (ibid).” Although the Buddha as well as Buddhism was born in India and maybe Buddha in some parts of his life, before enlightened, were Hindu; and also some Hindu organizations like RSS, and some Hindu intellectuals like professor S.Rahdhakrishnan[46] know Buddhism as “offshoot of Hinduism (Jayaram, V  n.d., 2012),” but, many Buddhists reject it and said, “the Buddha was born in Hindu Family as Christ born in Jewish family (Jayaram, V n.d. 2012)” the difference of Jewish and Christianity is the same as Hinduism and Buddhism.

The story about Jainism also is the same, and they tried the best to use official documents, to clarify that they are not Hindu. Jainism consider itself as a unique identity among Indian religions “It is clear that Buddhists are not Hindus and therefore there need be no apprehension that the Jains are designated as Hindus. There is no doubt that the Jains are a different religious community and this accepted position is in no way affected by the constitution[47] (Patil n.d., page 3).”


Radical Hinduism

Under such a vast and at the same time, narrow definition of Hinduism, when this paper speaks of radical Hinduism, it refers to groups that have been brought together under the Hindutva agenda; an assemblies of Hindu organizations and parties which politicalize Hinduism and hinduize politics. Especially the BJP, which “considers itself to be a party of ‘Hindu Nationalism’; its ideology is called Hindutva, defined not in terms of the Hindu religion but as Indianness. The party points to the original meaning of the word Hindu, coined by Arab conquerors to refer to all the people living in India. However, critics have labeled the BJP a Hindu fundamentalist or even a Hindu fascist party (A. & James, 2007).” Nationalist movement of India was one of the outcome of Indian fighting for freedom from the British Empire’s colonial system, which is started from 19st century and reach to its zenith in 20st century, that India became an independent entity in 1947[48]. Long foreign control over all Indian aspect of life by outsider like British, lead them to start the process of identity seeking, and among these identity seekers, some elements chose return back to ancient Hindu religion and cultural-social glory. Therefore, they started to re-define a situation and society again. Indians were divided in two main category religiously and culturally. The Indians who are the followers of Indian-born religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism which they name them Hindu (Deoras, n.d. 2012), and the religion which their holy lands are located outside of Indian territories (like Islam, Christian, Parsis, Jewish…) are the others. The opponent of “anti-colonial movement” were aware of diversity in the Indian side, and the natural potential of inter-clash among them; so colonizers started to use “divide and rule policy” to take control of colonized people. The colonists during their domination on India, for saving the process, polarized Indians long time before independent movement; even their “colonial census, polarized religious identities in the subcontinent (Kanungo, 2003).” Therefore, during independent struggles, this schismatic movement that had roots in early colonial time; lead Indians to face with partition of India based on religious dualism. The contention of this movement took anti-minority character; at the time that “the rationale of Hindutva is primarily based upon the reification of enemy symbols: the demonization of minorities like the Muslims and the Christians as the 'other' (Kanungo, 2003).” During India partition and post-independent era, Indians were facing with cruel clashes based on this doctrine, that leave so many lives of Indians; which the last one is the Muzaffarnagar riots between Hindu activist majority and Muslim minority[49] in August 2013; and the two previous ones were in 2008 Orissa state clashes between Hindu activists and Indian Christian minority. And in 2002 “Gujarat, India experienced a traumatizing episode of communal violence in which Muslims, a religious minority, were actively (and systematically) targeted. It is widely believed that the state government, run and influenced by extreme Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) groups, is at least partly responsible for this (Malik, 2009).” The BJP under control Gujarat government had faced with international reaction, toward its communal violence. Hindutva propagates a limited vision of the saffron brotherhood and its Catholicism does not even embrace all the Hindu sects and traditions, but is confined only to the believers in the Hindu Rashtra (Kanungo, 2003).” Therefore, Indian scholars like Pralay Kanungo[50] had evaluate, “what we saw were the ways in which structures of pre-colonial legitimacy were reinvented by colonialism, acquiesced to by the nationalist and the post-colonial leadership/discourses, and appropriated by an identity-seeking Hindu upper caste-middle class (Kanungo, 2003).” The expanding middle and upper-middle classes[51], who are predominantly upper caste Hindus and estimated to almost 250 million[52] are “the Hindu Right’s core support[53] groups (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” With this explanation, the BJP have appeared as the “the political arm of RSS, the organization trying to push the country towards ‘Hindu Rashtra’ through its agenda of Hindutva (Puniyani n.d., 2013).” The BJP is one of important and main elements of this paper’s radical Hinduism; because “Ideologically, the BJP is strongly aligned with the concept of Hindutva (Aoun, Danan, Hameed, Mixon, & Peter, 2012).” While “Hindutva groups range from legitimate political parties to extremist terrorist organizations (IRPP, 2010).” Hindutva politics “was concocted out of a territorial and rhetorical construction that actively saw and continues to see the Indian nation in cultural terms as being an organic and homogenous Hindu whole, which is threatened by the Occidental and Muslim Other (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” Radicalism among Hindu element is not a new phenomenon, it has root to British colonized India era; when the termer of Hindutva term; “Savarkar historical narratives[54] served to unify Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs—all considered part of the Hindutva community, they also designated Christians and Muslims as foreigners (Aoun et al. n.d., 2012).” Although post-independent Indian constitution defined it as a secular, plural, democratic country, but some radical Hindu nationalists, speak of Hindu Raj[55], the goal that opposed by Hindu intellectuals like Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar[56], who wrote as early as 1940, “If Hindu raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country… it is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account, it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu raj must be prevented at any cost (Ambedkar, 1940).” On the other hand, Hindu raj was opposed by late Mahatma Gandhi[57] also; when he said:  “Hindustan belongs to all those who are born and bred here and who have no other country to look to. Therefore, it belongs to Parsis, Beni Israelis, to Indian Christians, Muslims and other non-Hindus as much as to Hindus. Free India will be no Hindu raj, it will be Indian raj based not on the majority of any religious sect or community, but on the representatives of the whole people without distinction of religion. I can conceive of a mixed majority putting the Hindus in a minority. They would be elected for their record of service and merits (Chaturvedi n.d., 2013).” [58] Hindutva has its distinct perspectives and interpretation of Hindu religious icon as “many images of Ram[59] today, in particular those promoted by Hindutva, may be of the warrior king, ready to fight, but for many he remains an object of devotion and love (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006).” Hindu radicalism puts out-India territories religions as “others” and tries to establish India as a homogeneous homeland for Hindus. They wants to throw out religious difference for the purposes of unifying the nation. Therefore, they speak of conversion[60] of Hindu to other religions and they start and point to reconversion[61] them again[62] and it caused clashes. The RSS consider itself as the guardian of Hindu religion and they announced, “To allow a Hindu to get converted to Christianity is tantamount to making him religious intolerant and uprooting him from his social, cultural and familial ties and transform him into a potential secessionist.”[63] Thus it define a mission for RSS when they said: “Let us not allow this proselytizing poison to enter our locality, whatever benign mask it may put on (Site, 2000).” But it is a belief that identities is not formed within a boundaries of national and cultural containers, “identity is formed in contact zones of fluid cultural traffic that engender not static religious identities over against one another, but hybridity that dissolve the boundaries between “us” and “them.” This was the case in colonial contexts and now in our contemporary world of globalisation ’s transnational dynamic (Fletcher, 2008).” It can be said that their war against “others” has a cultural base; although as the famous notion that “'wars begin in the minds of men' (Stenou & Keitne, 2004).”


Identity and radical Hinduism

Religious conflict (Hindu-Muslim communal riots…) as an attempt to rank cultural, economic and political factors in South Asia, have a kind of identity-seeking characteristics. As the communal or sectarian leaders need to identify an enemy or a problem that need to be resolved, this enemy will play a mobilizer role for their force’s activating. The most dangers-full kind of radicalism is the religious one, this kind of “haters can turn into religiously-motivated killers (Desker et al., 2005).” When political accusations or hatred add to religious radicalism it will be crueler than other kinds, and its dehumanization aspects will be more noticeable. From 1980s onwards, religious identity-seeking, became one of the basis for mobilizing people for election purpose in India by Hindutva forces (although this process started in 1950s by them). During this decade and after that, it entered more actively in Hindu radicalisms’ strategies in this regard. Based on the core notion of the ‘Hindu Nation’ that “became strongly predicated on the purifying of the female body of the nation by removing the impure bodies/thoughts of the outsiders[64] (Gangopadhyay, 2010)”, so religious communal riots used it as electoral motivator and activator tools with more political desire than religious desire in its movement. When religious radical forces come to power, this political-religious dehumanization takes nation-state level feature and will be separated all corners of the country. The obvious case of such situation can be seen in the 2002 Gujarat Hindu-Muslim riots and its post-riot consequence; that the out-group[65] or targeted people faced with more limitations and problems. The Indian Gujarati Muslims were on Hindutva attackers’ pressure from one side and undesired government to protect them, from the other side; so it is depends on religious or political desire that, which kind of ground decisions will take place. Sometimes religious desires play causal role in generating conflict and sometimes religion plays as the only necessary condition provider to conflict and sometimes plays a central role in the formulation of policies. Although Hinduism by itself does not generate violence and even it can evaluate as a non-violent lifestyle, but radical Hinduism is a reality in Indian society today. And radical Hinduism should be considered as a reaction to foreign power’s interfere in Indian subcontinent or world political balance, making by the world powers in the Middle East, East of Asia and especially in South Asia. Particularly British rule during colonization over there, and it is a mirror image of radical Muslims’ movement like Wahhabi-approach activities there; the most important cause is Hindutva politicians’ political desires in this regard. The social radical forces who come to exist in late 19st and early 20st centuries, show that colonial time have been prepared good situation for the birth of such a socio-political phenomenon. In a normal situation, a member of the community should know ‘self’, then his /her culture, and then being open to other’s culture. However, radicalism will come to exist when somebody does not recognize the others and their rights. “Understanding and valuing ourselves is the first step to valuing others. If we have a positive sense of self, we are able to be more open and accepting of diversity (Bliss n.d., 2010).” This is one of the problems that Hindu radicalism has; “the social imaginary exists in a mutually productive relationship with social actors and is thus either reproductive or transformative of their social identities and relatedly their powers, interests, and practices (Muppidi, 2004).” In different discourse and context a social term, take exact meaning as ‘Kentucky Fried Chicken’, in the American context, has associations with fried chicken and fast food. In the Indian context, the same term has associations with Imperialism, Westernization, and modernity (ibid).” This is a threat that social context have felt. “A few decades ago, it was still possible to leave home and go somewhere else: the architecture was different, the landscape was different, and the language, lifestyle, dress, and values were different. That was a time when we could speak of cultural diversity. However, with economic globalisation, diversity is fast disappearing. The goal of the global economy is that all countries should be homogenized (ibid).” Globalisation is threatening to erase the differences between “our” places and “theirs.”  “Implicit in this articulation of resistance to economic globalisation and its presumed homogenizing of the world are some very troubling assumptions of culture, identity, political community, and practice (ibid).” So losing own social identity is the character of this century and it leads some social forces to reject other identity to protect their identity. “Political movements have taken up the theme of human integration and translated it into projects of political and cultural internationalism (Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 2000)“ and a localization reaction were taken up for culture and consider it against this process. New world has “linked to economic and ideological forces that are also relevant for shaping a given social totality (Bhela, 2011).” By the Industrial Revolution, and its following changes, new world started. When new technology has come and shaped socio-political atmosphere different from the past, new human needs, desires and aspirations also shaped. Aside of new technology, and while technology shapes human's social context, the context that eastern[66] dominated forces (like the temples forces) has no role in it; at this time paradoxical atmosphere has come to exist and the reactions came up. At the same time Large Hindu community have excluded from fast transferring world, so while that “an important account of contemporary globalisation refers to the exclusion of the majority of humanity; the majority in large parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America who are excluded from life in the fast lane, (Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 2000)” they also had a reaction to it, and they are searching for an offender person, organization or thought, in this regard. Therefore, it is war of Identity for the Third world Nations. “The introduction of English[67] as a ‘superior’ and international language has created or aggravated cleavages in society. The problem is not with the language alone, but with the fact that it is a language, which is ‘alien’, in the sense that it does not share a common culture with languages indigenous to India. Not only English is imposing its culture on the Indian people but also there is a counter-movement going on as well, a cultural “hijacking” of words of Sanskrit and Hindi origin. Like the adoption of English words into Indian languages and increased usage of English in India in general, the acquisition, adaptation and translation of Sanskrit and Hindi words into English is also contributing to the erosion of Hindu religion and culture (Bhela, 2011).”

Communalism and the radical communal force in India

India history had recorded the most brutal massacres, savage killings, treachery, arson, loot, murder, dishonoring of women, and killing of children during subcontinent’s partition in 1947. Inhuman such a communal riot became a moral imperative of that time. The political partition has disturbed the Indian social fabric (Panda n.d., 2013). Subsequently Indian policy-makers as well as “the Congress[68] having agreed under pressure of circumstances to this partition it was hoped that the country would be rid of communal disharmony[69] (Graham, 1990).” Muslims as the biggest Indian minority lost their position after British raj, then after independent and the partition of subcontinent. Partition decline Muslim population “from approximately one-third of pre-partition to one- sixth of post-Partition India (Engineer, 2008).” They lost their weightiness there and announced by communal forces as the most guilty of this situation. The remain Muslims’ leaders in India after partition’s “common commitment was to communal harmony, composite nationalism, and secularism, with a strong emphasis on education (ibid)” for Muslims. On the other side “secularism, as currently interpreted in this country, however, is only a euphemism for the policy of Muslim appeasement. The so-called secular composite nationalism is neither nationalism nor secularism but only a compromise with communalism of those who demand price even for their lip-loyalty to this country[70] (Graham, 1990).” Although globalizing world success, depends on ability to preserve a balance between religious freedom and harmony in diversity, especially in secular India; but the diversity in Indian culture and religion and their socio-economic conditions make Indian society a suitable backyard for communal riots and sectarian conflicts. This is the dark side of modern India “regarding the divisions of land and society in India – including religious communalism, casteism and poverty. “The long history of India invites the question: had that harmony ever really existed? (Robb, 2002)” although communal riots traced to the British rule time and it continues during the pre-independence and post-colonial era; it’s deeping time mostly dated back to British rule era; “There have been many incidents of riots recorded during the course of British rule and even before that. For example, in Ahmedabad,[71] there were riots in 1714, 1715, 1716 and 1750. Nevertheless, according to Bipan Chandra[72], communal tension and riots began to take place only in the last quarter of the 19st century, they did not occur in India on any significant scale until 1946-7.  Before that, the maximum communal rioting took place during 1923-26. Communal riots that took place from the 1960s to the 1980s follow a particular pattern. They have mostly happened in urban towns, which are either industrial belts or trading centers with the economy largely based on a particular occupation. Most of these places had a considerable percentage of Muslim population who’s political or economic interests clashed with those of the Hindus (Rajeshwari, 2004).” During freedom struggle and also after that, India social context made a situation that the congress was the representative of ‘moderate Hinduism’ such as it explained as anti-communalism by Mahatma Gandhi[73] that “Congress alone claims to represent the whole of India. It was ‘a determined enemy of communalism in any shape or form’; indeed, it represented ‘all the minorities’(Robb, 2002).” Apart from the massacres of the Indian who wants to migrate to Pakistan and Bangladesh or India, during the partition of subcontinent, the assassination of M. Gandhi by a Hindu extremist in 1948 was a cause to bring religious communalism directly on combat and “secularism encouraged (ibid).” “There is no logic in the opinion that, sectarianism belongs to or is a part of medieval period or has begun from the medieval period. Sectarianism is recent event. Its roots are seen in the modern colonialism and its social, economic and political structure (Kalu, 2012).”  An economic crisis happened in the mid-1960s and the value of the rupee[74] had dipped to an all-time low by 1966, and there was unprecedented inflation. The country was dependent on the United States for its supply of wheat. Agricultural production also declined. The consequent unrest led to unprecedented gains for opposition political parties. In many states in North India, INC lost power at the state level for the first time. Opposition parties formed united fronts and coalition governments in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The Hindu chauvinist BJS[75] Party, precursor of today’s BJP, enjoyed power for the first time as part of these coalitions. Opportunistic politicians used anti-Muslim sentiment and official machinery to spread Hindu chauvinist or “Hindutva” ideology. Communal riots became a tool for consolidating Hindu mobilization across castes and regions (Engineer, 2008).” After the partition of India, the Babri mosque demolition by radical Hindu in 1992 was the biggest communal riot in India which was not an attack on a mosque only and it evaluated “as an assault on the collective self (Desker et al., 2005)“ of Indian Muslims. And the three-domes most historical mosque “like symbols of India's traditions of tolerance, democracy and secularism, the three domes were smashed to rubble (Dalrymple, 2009).” The disaster that have been continued till now and especially “people, in Northern India, were saturated with the violence they had experienced (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b,p22).”

The atmosphere of communal riots sites

Look at several communal sites show a kind of inactive Indian authorities to protect communal forces’ targets as it emphasize in “the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom characterizes police response by ‘indifference and inaction’ (IRPP, 2010).” Authorities turn a blind eye at the time that some of the communal riots continued for weeks or even months. 2002 Gujarat communal riots is a the best example for it; this brutal holocausts of Indian Muslim minority were started on 27 February and continued till the end of April 2002; or communal attacks on Christians in Orissa[76], in August 2008 continued for over eight weeks. So in most of them, the authorities in state or center level had enough time to have appropriate action. On the other side most of juridical files or governmental actions about communal riots had no end and although India has a long history of sectarian tension and violence, including several major incidents in recent decades that still await appropriate investigation and resolution. As it clear by this tactic practically, Indian authority give enough time to communal rioters to result in their goal during the time they need. The most shameful, inhuman, brutal and Indian Muslims holocaust where happened as for example in 2002 Gujarat riots. vast brutal massacres and butcheries of innocents women, children; massive attack to families and burning family alive in their houses together; looting victim’s properties in shops and house… sexual violence was used on an unprecedented scale and gang rape of very larger number of Muslim or Christion women in front of their family eyes, and disembowel pregnant women; burning houses, mosques, shops, properties, bodies of death victims, churches, graveyards, shrines, cars or minority’s hospitals, schools, and social services… Muslims were burned alive in their homes, scalded by acid bombs or knifed in the street, have been happened for months; and the authorities in some case were helped communalists as in 2002 Gujarat riots; official documents were at reach and the service of rioters to find Muslim properties and house’s addresses and in some cases police attacks were reported against communal victims; or after communal attacks police refused to register the ‘First Investigation Report’ (FIR) against rioters by victims. “The expectation of immunity for Hindu extremist attackers is a major contributing factor in violence against India’s religious minorities. In some cases, the victims are held in police custody for extended periods of time, sometimes without food and water, or enduring physical abuse; especially in BJP-dominated states (ibid).” The situation will be more worth in this atmosphere of cruelty against minorities, when media propagate some kind of propaganda and Indian “Muslims are routinely attacked as ‘anti-nationals’ and ‘terrorists’ as ‘criminals’ and ‘anti-social elements’, and as ‘traitors who partitioned the country’. Muslims are alleged to be loyal only to Pakistan and, thus, a threat to India’s national security. The common slogan of Hindutva militants is ‘there are only two places for Muslims— either Pakistan or the cemetery[77]’ (Engineer, 2008).” Anti-minorities communal riots is not limited to Muslims and Christians; the Sikh’s history recorded some communal riots against them also.

Communal hypersensitive areas for the Sikhs were Northeast states of India like Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. For instance in response to the attack on the Sikh’ ‘Golden Temple’ in Amritsar[78], Sikh bodyguards assassinated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, leading to substantial anti-Sikh rioting and violence. October the 31, 1984 until November 4 the capital city of India (Delhi) faced with communal riots, which targeted Sikhs who alleged to the assassination of Prime Minister, claiming 3000 lives.

Communal hypersensitive areas against Christians[79] also show some communal riots against them. The worst post-independence case of communal violence faced by Christians took place in Orissa in December 2007, The Christian community and its places of worship were the principal target of attackers, a massive series of over 800 anti-Christian attacks was launched and five Christians were killed in the violence, while 730 Christian homes and 95 churches were destroyed. Throughout 2007, there were coordinated attacks on churches in Karnataka over the Christmas holidays, resulting in damage to 100 churches, 700 Christian homes, and 22 Christian businesses. Christian Solidarity Worldwide reports that, in 2007, there were 3-5 attacks on Christians in India weekly, excluding the Orissa violence.  August to October 2008, the violence which started and continued for over eight weeks. At least 50,000 were displaced and 90 killed. In August to October 2008, Karnataka has continued to see the highest rate of incidents of communal violence against Christians of any state in India. Including brutal murders and rapes, widespread destruction of churches, properties, and forcible conversions to Hinduism. VHP was heavily implicated in the 2008 anti-Christian violence in Orissa. Southern Rajasthan and western Madhya Pradesh are emerging as areas with increasing rates of anti-Christian violence. In 2009, attack resulted in the death of three Christians.


Hypersensitive communal areas against Indian Muslims

The most affected and targeted Indian minorities by communal forces are/were Muslims[80]. Therefore, it can be said communal forces’ goal threat security and future of Muslims, other minorities and secularism, multiculturalism, and tolerance there. “Reduces non-Hindus to the status of second-class citizens has been the fond dream of the Hindu right (Nanda, 2009)” is the result of communal forces works now.  Now Indian Muslims are suffering “from growing cultural hostility and physical violence, the results of the growth of extremist Hindu chauvinist ideology known as Hindutva (Engineer, 2008).”  The Indian subcontinent independence in 1947 followed by the inability of the Indian freedom strugglers in INC and of the Muslim League[81] to reach an agreement, and then partition with the ensuing massacres and exchange of populations happened, the event has had heavy long-term consequences. To their mutual detriment, both India and Pakistan continue to defy each other dangerously. For India, the secular model, advocated by Nehru[82], which was meant to ensure peaceful coexistence between religious communities, seemed to have worked. However, after some fifteen years, the situation deteriorated. Local economic rivalries, political games, and international tensions brought a new awareness of difficulties and discriminations; violence erupted in many places; And Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, J&K… changed to communal hypersensitive areas for Muslim minority in India and the most affected states in this regard. Most of these states are located in or around the ancient Gangetic area which is historically where the Hinduism by ancient


Aryans was entered and expanded in India; so it can be said that Hindu nationalism which Hindu communalism is the result of it, has a geographical sense that has roots in historical mythology of Hinduism. Most of the Hindu communal operations and organizations are located in that area and then expanded to the south and east of India, which had less such an activity with them until now. “In the 1990’s, an increase in violence against Muslims and Christians and the increased political power of Hindu nationalist, anti-minority organizations, among them the BJP, both signaled the growth of extreme Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva (IRPP, 2010).” The following data is referring to the most affected area by communal: 

West Bengal: The communal riots in 1964; March in Calcutta[83] on the reaction on attack to Hindu in Bangladesh as the result is reported 400 death. On 1992; December 7 until 12, Calcutta was seriously affected by the Ayodhya demolition Babri mosque, and the poor Muslim slum of Metiabruz was set at fire, 35 death were left.

Bihar is another important communal site as in Jamshedpur[84] city in 1964; March communal riots as reaction to attack on Hindus in Bangladesh were happened which the official death amounted 51 persons but the actual figure was much higher. On 1979, April 11 also this city was witnessed another communal riot that one hundred and eight persons lost their lives, 79 Muslims and 25 Hindus. Ranchi[85] on 1967; August 22 till 29 experienced communal riots, following anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh which official reported 184 deaths, among them 164 Muslims and 19 Hindus. Bihar Sharif[86] on 1981; April 30 till May 5 faced with the communal riots, that official accounts 52 deaths, but other estimates it from 80 to 150 - 200 deaths. One of the most remembered riots in India's post-Independence history occurred in Bhagalpur[87] and its 250 adjacent villages, related to the Babri Mosque case on 1989; October 22 until 28 that according to official records, 396 people died, but it is likely that more than one thousand people lost their lives. Hazaribagh on 1989; April 16 until 20 witnessed communal riots, that claimed 19 lives according to official sources (but around 100 by unofficial accounts). Sitamarhi[88] on 1992; October 2 till 9 communal riots broke out which unofficially the actual death figure might amount to 65, of whom 58 were Muslims and seven Hindu.

Rajasthan is another affected state. The communal riots in Kota[89] on 1989; September 14 based on the Urdu newspaper, Tulu-e-Subh were took 26 lives (22 Muslims and 4 Hindus). Udaipur on 1990; October 3, had witnessed communal riots, one person was killed. Jaipur on 1990; October 23 had witnessed communal riots, the violence claimed around fifty lives. On 1992; December 7 until 9 also communal violence in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition resulted 60 lives.

Orissa is one of the affected states with communal riots against Muslims and Christians as in Rourkela[90] communal riots in March 1964, in reaction to attacks on Hindu in Bangladesh; claimed two thousand (mostly-Muslims) were killed. Other reported figures, probably exaggerated, put the total at five thousand deaths. The communal violence in Bhadrak[91] and Soro on 1991; March the 24 occurred in the usually quiet state of Orissa (which had not experienced any communal riots since 1964) 17 persons were killed.



: The communal riots on May-5 1974 in Delhi[94] took place as a result eleven persons lost their lives. On 1987; May 19-22 Delhi based on the events happening in Meerut triggered communal violence; reports put the death toll at 15, among whom 12 were killed in a shooting by police. On 1990; November 14 this city communal riot left ten lives. On 1992; December 10 communal riots left between sixteen and twenty people died.Assam is a Northeast Indian state, which were under communal riots operation. The March 1968 communal riots in Karimganj[92]after an argument erupted between Hindu and Muslim teenagers, merely over a cow. The violence claimed 41 Hindus and 41 Muslim lives. Communal attack on Muslims in Nellie[93] on 1983; February 18 based on official accounts reported 1,383 deaths. Other reports put the death toll from 3,300 to more than 4,000. The communal violence in Nagaon, Dhubri, Doboka, Jamunamukh on 1992; December 7 to 8 related to the Babri Masjid destruction, the districts of Nagaon (75 deaths by official counts) and Dhubri (12 deaths) were particularly affected. While official estimates put the death toll for the entire state at 87, the media estimated that 100 to 300 people perished in the violence. The town of Doboka (18 deaths in December 8) was particularly rocked by the violence after a provocative speech by a local Congress leader. Retaliation took place on December 9 in the town of Jamunamukh, claiming around 20 lives.

Maharashtra is an active Hindutva communal violence state as Bombay on 1984; May 17-18 faced with communal clashes, the total death toll according to some accounts amounted to 278. In addition, 1,115 people were injured. An inquiry led by Asghar Ali Engineer reported 500 deaths in Bhiwandi (400 Muslims, 100 Hindus), 104 in Thane (all Muslims), and six in the industrial township of Bhayander. The great majority of those killed belonged to the poorest segments of the population. On 1989; February 24 related to Ayatollah Khomeini issued a call to all Muslims declaring that the author Salman Rushdie should be killed for the publication of his book ‘The Satanic Verses’; a strike was organized by some Muslim groups in Bombay, official figures put the toll at eleven dead. On 1992; December 6 until 12 following the demolition of the Babri Masjid result the actual death probably amounted to more than 400. Other sources report “at least 1,400 people had been slaughtered in Bombay alone (Dalrymple, 2009)” in this event. on 1993; January 6 till 20 the second phase of the Bombay riots commenced on January 6 the violence was claimed to have taken more than 1,500 lives. On 1993; March 12 in retaliation for the Bombay riots of December 1992 and January 1993, a series of bomb blasts occurred in different areas of Bombay resulting killing 257 persons and injuring 713 others according to the Srikrishna Commission. The communal riots on May 7-8 1970  Bhiwandi[95] resulted 164 deaths (142 Muslims and 20 Hindus) Irfan Engineer reported over 600 people were killed in major riots in Bhiwandi, Jalgaon, and Mahad and these riots shock Muslims’ confidence in Indian democracy (Engineer, 2008). On 1984, May 17-18 also this city with Bombay were faced with new communal riots reported 500 deaths in Bhiwandi (400 Muslims, 100 Hindus). Pune[96] and Solapur on 1982, February 15-18 witnessed communal confrontation. Aurangabad on 1988; May 17-20 communal riots happened; in all, the riot claimed 26 lives according to newspaper reports.

Uttar Pradesh: The regions, which located around Delhi and Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, had formed the central area of the Gurkani Empire (1526–1857) and the Indo-Persian culture takes its center there. But after independent “in the 1950s there was no political party based exclusively on the Muslim community in Uttar Pradesh and the great majority of Muslims gave their allegiance to the INC with its philosophy of cultural pluralism (Graham, 1990).” Muslims demand for saving their Urdu language and resistance against it by communal forces, was at the center of communal disputes in UP in the 1950s and 1960s. Communal forces in the political field like Purushottamdas Tandon put emphasize on this issue, as Tandon as an Acting President of the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee, was reported to have stated at Sultanpur in June 1948 “The Muslims must stop talking about a culture and civilization foreign to our country and genius. They should accept Indian culture. One culture and one language will pave the way for real unity. Urdu symbolizes a foreign culture. Hindi alone can be the unifying factor for all the diverse forces in the country.”[97] This Muslim demand by communal forces evaluate as “the harmful seeds of the two-nation theory” and as an “anti-national tendencies arising under cover of Urdu”[98] the harsher statement released by BJS Central Working Committee, Delhi, on 8 May 1954 and announced Urdu “the language of no region in India, it being only a foreign and unacceptable style of Hindi with a foreign script and a foreign vocabulary imposed on India during a period of foreign domination and now being supported by some communal elements.”[99] Upadhyaya as one of the main BJS’s leader also announced, “Urdu, in spite of its recognition in the constitution, and its birth in India, has been a vehicle of Muslim separatism. It is Indian in the same sense, as 'Pidgin English' is Chinese. Its script, phraseology, most of the grammar, prosody are all, foreign. Its spirit is foreign. It has no grass roots and therefore people who claim to speak Urdu has no roots in the soil. For this reason, alone, it had become a symbol of separate Muslim nationhood, which the Muslim League advocated. If some Muslims persist in sticking to Urdu, it is simply because they do not want to give up their old communal outlook.”[100] Aligarh[101] had open violence in October 1961 and it was the most serious eruptions of communal violence in northern India after Jabalpur riots (in M.P) since partition in 1947. It separated in other districts like Chandausi, Moradabad and Meerut[102], which left near 50 lives. In 1990; December 7 until 10 large riots broke out again, a report claimed the death toll to be 150 or 200. The Aligarh Muslim University student union claimed 500 dead. Meerut Besides following 1961’s Aligarh riots, on 1982; September 29 until October 2 also witnessed communal riots that killed near one hundred people, most of them Muslims. On 1987; May 18 until 23 for the opening of Babri lock, this city erupted and during some days, the total death reached to 225; but the actual figure might be much higher, probably around 400. On 1991; May 20 Meerut communal riots resulted Around 30 people died in the violence as per official records (more than 50 according to unofficial sources). The communal tension among Muslims and Hindus in Banaras (Varanasi) [103] on October 22 until 23, 1977 resulted ten casualties. Two days of communal violence in Varanasi On 1991; November 8 and 13, left between 15 and 50 people dead. Agra[104] in 1990; December 16 violence took place, the media reported 11 lives lost, but according to Engineer there had been 22 victims. Khurja[105] on 1990; December 15 until 23 and on 1991; January 31 until February 5 witnessed communal violence, in the first riot, which started on December 15, seventy-four people lost their lives (62 Muslims and 12 Hindus). This second phase of violence lasted until February 5, claiming 22 lives (18 Muslims and 4 Hindus). Sambhal[106] on 1978; March 29 was witnessed communal riots resulted twenty-five were killed in these riots, among them 22 Hindu victims. Moradabad[107]after Aligarh communal riots, on 1980; August 13-14 also was witnessed communal riots again that based on a Muslim group report put the death toll at 2,500. The communal violence in Kanpur[108] in 1990; December 10 to 15 erupted and according to official sources, the toll amounted to 20 deaths. On 1991; May 19 again riots took place in Kanpur and twenty people were killed. On 1992; December 6 to 11 the industrial and communally sensitive city of Kanpur was also badly affected by the post-Babri Masjid violence. According to official sources, 11 people died during four days of rioting in the town. Tensions rose in Badaun[109] in 1989; September 28, over the issue of Urdu-slated to become Uttar Pradesh's second official language. The riot claimed 27 lives according to some media reports. Other accounts assessed the total at more than 60 killed. Violence also spread to the countryside. During an attack on the Kasganj Kashipur train, 13 passengers were killed by a mob. Other sources put the death toll of this attack at 24. Muzaffarnagar on 1988; October 8-11 witnessed communal riots related to Babri case, the highest figures reported totaled 60 dead from the Muslim community and 27 victims from the Hindu community, bringing the total death toll to 87. Bijnor[110] in 1990; October 30 until November 2 witnessed a very serious riot, which broke out due to the Babri Masjid issue, unofficial sources reported 200 death. Colonelganj[111] in 1990, September 30 after the BJP leader, Kalyan Singh’s addressing about the Ram temple in Ayodhya communalized; communal riot happened and resulted some deaths, the official amounted it to 42, but unofficial sources reported around 100 and other sources more than 300 deaths.

 The usually peaceful Saharanpur[112] in 1991; March 27 was the site of serious communal riots, the violence claimed 12 lives officially and more than 40 according to media reports. In Mau[113]on 2005; October 13 till 14 communal riots which newspapers reported 14 casualties. In Gorakhpur [114] in 2007; January 27 until 29 communal riots the Imam of the mosque was killed in the violence, along with two other people. Lucknow [115] a peaceful city relatively unfamiliar with Hindu Muslim violence, but unfortunately known for Shia-Sunni[116] clashes, in 2006, March 3 violence started when they forced Hindu shopkeepers to close their shutters. Their procession was then stoned and a riot erupted, in which four persons were killed. Faizabad /Ayodhya inn 1990; October 30 to November 2 Hindu ‘kar sevaks[117]’ tried to attack the Babri mosque in which, the police opened fire and twenty-six “kar sevaks” were killed.

The Babri mosque communal case:

The Uttar Pradesh as one of the Indian hyper-sensitive post-Independent communal battlefield between 1987 till 1992, on 6 December 1992, witnessed destroying the mosque subsequently “leading to riots across the country that left 2,026 dead and 6,957 wounded (Rajagopal, 2001)” that after Hindu-Muslim riots during Indian partition[118] was the biggest one. It was witnessed the Sangh’s network of organizations campaign “for the destruction of an old mosque on the spurious claim that it had been built by destroying a temple on the exact spot where Ram, a mythic hero, had been born. This campaign was the centerpiece of their struggle for power (Chattopadhyay, 2009).” It was the time that leadership of political wing of the Sangh’s networks (in BJS and then BJP) was under control of some leaders like L.K Advani and A.B Vajpayee[119], so “in 1978-79, communal violence erupted again (Graff & Galonnier, 2013a).” The new BJP with the leadership of the two ex-BJS had new strategy for gaining political end, so 1980s turned to a “fateful and bloody period. Tensions had been simmering but, with the perilous decisions taken in February 1986, (the “Shah Bano case” and the unlocking of the Babri mosque), clashes turned to bloody riots, an occurrence which became distressingly commonplace. This situation was largely the consequence of the BJP's new attitude and its fresh strategy much more offensive than its earlier more moderate stance (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b).” This situation was continued till December the 6th, 1992 which it has witnessed one of the biggest communal operation and as a result, the Babri mosque which was one of the oldest Indian Muslim monument site, that its built dated to 1528 (C.E), when the founder of the Indian Gurkani Empire release its making mandate, for a political gain was brought down and as a result of this communal operation by Hindutva forces “violence erupted, even in Calcutta, and took a tragic turn in many places. Bhopal was bad, Surat awful, Bombay tragic, with horrifying murders, followed by systematic massacres (ibid).” And as result of “the events at Ayodhya established the legitimacy of Hindutva among the Hindu middle class as representing Hindus under threat from outsiders, and led to rising electoral support for the BJP (Ogden, 2009)” and this “liberal middle class, provided the backbone of the nationalist movement (Hansen, 1999)” later. With this act by Hindu hard liner, the Muslim “historical, social and legal identity was systematically demolished[120](Lal n.d.,p5).” This issue reveals the matters of question like identity, hybridity, cultural diversity and different, moral conduct, secularism, otherness. The case that starts from Faizabad, a small ancient town in UP and spread all around India and took so many lives. Although this communal operation started based on ‘divide and rule policy’ of some British raj’s members theoretically; but practically was started in 1949 when “a small icon of Ram was smuggled into the mosque during the night, after which the mosque was closed off to all worshippers. Hindus and Muslims, for fear that conflict over the site would re-ignite the communal passions that had led to horrific carnage following ‘Partition’ the previous year. For more than 30 years, the issue was largely dormant, until its revival in the mid-1980s by Hindu activists, in large part for increasing popular support for the Hindu nationalist movement and its political wing, the BJP. Further aggravating matters, in 1987 the mosque was re-opened by judicial fiat to Hindu worshippers, likely at the behest of INC leadership, who hoped to fracture the Hindu ‘vote bank’ being cultivated by the BJP (Blakeslee, 2013)” Throughout the 1980s, a series of campaigns organized all around India to bring greater attention to the temple issue. L.K. Advani pilgrimage of Ram’s Chariot[121] Yatra[122], long TV serial based on the mythology of Ram[123], late 1980s eruption of Muslim separatist movement in J&K which supported by India’s rival Pakistan, Shah Bano[124] legal case, reservation for backward castes in education institutes and jobs… prepared a good situation for radical Hindu nationalists to be done what they promised to their followers. Hindu nationalists had made a situation that “even the BJP’s major political opponents would only say that a Ram temple should be built without disturbing the mosque. (And) the Congress Party, chose to support rather than confront the movement, and offered the BJP little hindrance in its attempt to shape a Hindu nationalist agenda (Rajagopal, 2001).”

Karnataka[125]: Ramnagaram, Channapatna, Kolar, Davengere, and Tumkur in 1990; October witnessed communal violence that left 46 people dead according to the official count. On 1992; December 6 until 13 the state of Karnataka was the worst hit of the four southern states by the post Babri mosque demolition violence. The media reported 73 deaths in the state. Hubli[126] on 1994; August 15 Violence erupted on Independence Day in Hubli. The town had suffered from communal tensions for quite some time over the Idgah Maidan, a piece of open land held by the ‘Anjuman-e-Islam (AEI)’, a Muslim organization. The police resisted and opened fire, killing six people. This riot remains a symbol of the communalization of the South of India. The communal riots in Bangalore[127] on 1994; October 6 till 8 claimed 25 lives according to official sources, while unofficial estimates put the death toll at 40, and, on occasion, as high as 100.

Tamil Nadu: Tensions in Coimbatore[128] on1997; November 29 until December 1 and 1998; February 14; had increased between the Hindu and Muslim communities over the recent successes of Muslim businesspersons in the town. Violence erupted on November 29 leading to the death of 18 Muslims (8 in police firing) and 2 Hindus. On 14 February 1998, a series of bomb blasts occurred in Coimbatore in which around 50 persons were killed and 200 injured.

 Andhra Pradesh: The communal tension on 1978; March 31 April 4 in Hyderabad[129] erupted after 3 decades peace and fifteen persons were killed. On 1981; July 12 until 20 also fresh riots erupted in this city for eight days, forty people were killed, and three hundred injured. On 1983; September 7-9 this city again faced with communal riots; As a result, the violence claimed 45 lives, according to official figures. Unofficial estimates put the actual death toll at 70 and the number of those injured at more than 200. On 1984; July and September again this city faced with such communal tension, the number of dead reached to twenty. On 1990; December 7-17 communal riots were happened that official reports established that 134 people had been killed and another 300 injured in these riots. However, the actual toll possibly amounts to 200 or 300 deaths.

Madhya Pradesh: On 1961; February 4-9; the first major-scale riot between Hindus and Muslims in post-Partition erupted in Jabalpur[130], unofficial accounts put the death toll at more than “400 people in a major riot and many injured. The riot shock the secular foundation of the country, no doubt the main factors behind the riot were economic, social, and political rather than religious (Engineer, 2008).” The demolition of the Babri Masjid also triggered the large-scale riots in Bhopal[131] on 1992; December 7 until 15 that the media reported more than 175 deaths. The atmosphere in Indore[132] had become communalized on 1989; October 14, ever since the «Shah Bano case» erupted. The «Babri Masjid/Ram janmabhoomi issue» the clashes result some riots that unofficial reports say that the actual figure might be between 35 and 50 deaths. On 2008, July 3-4 was hit by communal violence again lasted for two days, eight lives were lost, of which, seven were Muslims.

Gujarat:  On September the 18 till 24 1969 Ahmedabad witnessed communal riots “that took the lives of more than 2,000 people (Engineer, 2008)”; Communal tensions had been rising since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, and Anti-Pakistan feelings rapidly transformed into anti-Muslim resentment. Incidents multiplied from mid-1968 onwards. More than one thousand -or even two to three thousand- people lost their lives. The large majority of those killed were Muslims (about 80 percent). This capital city on 1985; March 18 25; April 15 29; 1986; July 9-14 faced with communal clashes which claiming more than 200 lives. In 1990, violence took place in the communally sensitive state of Gujarat. In Ahmedabad, several people lost their lives in April and in October (between 30 and 40 victims). The spark for these riots was provided by the L. K. Advani-led Ram Rath Yatra, which started in the town of Somnath. The towns of Baroda, Anand, and Surat also were affected. Baroda[133] (or Vadodara), on 1982; October 22-30 communal riots lived near 50 people. Godhra[134] in 1980, October until 1981, May was witnessed series of communal riots about ten lives were claimed. Surat[135] on 1992; December 6 till 12 witnessed horrific communal violence which claimed 180-190 lives according to media reports. However, for other sources, even a figure of 200 dead. The violence produced nineteen thousand new refugees. The usually peaceful city of Surat accounted for nearly two-thirds of the death toll in Gujarat, (Fifty-eight persons also died in Ahmedabad). The 2002 communal riots case; when communal politic and communal ideology join together and take place in ruling stage, it make a disastrous, planed and systematic kind of violence which will be so strong that, it prepare atmosphere of fear, suspicion, hatred and tension that “even secular persons to organize self-defense on communal lines and to join hands with communal forces to defend their lives and property[136].” Even authorities in state and center levels also are affected by this condition and they don’t show any appropriate reaction to such pogrom; so during Gujarat[137] communal riots at the time that Gujarat state authority were belong to BJP and their position was clear, but among center levels such as INC men also cannot see good reaction to such vast brutal butcheries of Indian Muslim minority at the time that Gujarat Muslim were under a such situation the Indian “parliament was in fact suspended for nearly a week, the most concrete statement that emerged out of the proceedings was India defense minister George Fernandez’s astonishing assertion that there was nothing new about women being raped in communal conflict (Kabir, 2002)” and he just sealed and reemphasized to the being of a reality of barbarian atmosphere of ‘rape culture’ during such an incident. The Communal propaganda is like a virus, which cannot be easily eliminated from the people’s psyche; the communal forces in India make a situation that “sometimes a tiny incident becomes a great cause of conflict between the communities. This confrontation among the people of two different communities has been one of the major peace-breaking phenomena in India (Dwivedi n.d.,p1).” In the Gujarat riots like the UP riots (where the Babri mosque case happened), the BJP was on power at the state level, and as a result communal force used legal capacity for their communal operation. In Gujarat, case “within 24 hours, a systematic pogrom broke out. Using voter lists and sales tax records, houses and shops of Muslims were attacked (Chattopadhyay, 2009)” and one of the worst sectarian riots in India since ‘partition’ were formed, “over 2000 Muslims were killed and tens of thousands forced into camps for months. A very larger number of Muslim women were gang raped (ibid).” This riots were break out in the aftermath of burning the ‘Sabarmati Express’ train at Godhra in Gujarat province on 27th February 2002 when some unidentified people set fire to this coach which caused the death of fifty-nine kar sevaks or Hindutva volunteers who were active to build the Ram temple at Ayodhya. “In retaliation, a bandh[138] was called the next day by the VHP. Soon thereafter, Gujarati Muslims from all socio-economic backgrounds were made the victims of prolonged violence in ‘revenge’ for the Godhra incident. Houses were burnt down, business establishments ransacked, women raped and butchered in front of their families. These events continued for a number of months while the rest of India and indeed the world looked on (Kabir, 2002)” “Five hundred and twenty-seven mosques, madrasas (religious schools), dargahs (shrines), and graveyards were destroyed. The violence left behind 100,000 refugees, including 10,000 Hindus. Sexual violence was used on an unprecedented scale (for India). Women were gang-raped and pregnant women were disemboweled. Christians were also targeted in the riots. Incidents of violence went on until the end of April 2002.The entire state of Gujarat was rocked by violence. Sixteen of its twenty-four districts were affected. The violence then spread to rural areas where, it is estimated, 1,200 villages were targeted (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b).” Following this event not only BJP state's political leaders in Gujarat government had no priority to prevent Hindu-Muslim riots but also “various fears were expressed by the BJP government and its Sangh affiliates about the 'lesson' that needed to be taught to the Muslims (Sengupta n.d.,p2).” And “every report on these events indicated that the riot was well-planned and sponsored by the BJP-led Gujarat administration and its chief minister, Narendra Modi (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b).” However, why Indian ruling men did not have suitable reaction to such event, “first, decades of corruption, criminalization, politicization and a general lack of state capacity have left Indian state governments too weak to prevent riots. Second, Indian state governments are unable or unwilling to protect minorities because they systematically under-represent them within their governments, police forces and local administrations. Lastly and most importantly, the degree of party competition affects the value governments place on attracting 'Muslim swing voters', which effects whether or not the government will order the respective administrations to protect the minorities (Sengupta n.d.,p2).” The minority protection is evaluate by Hindu nationalism as anti-national and the myth of the foreign[139] hand. “Terms more appropriate for Gujarat 2002 than ‘communal riot’ might be ‘pogrom’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ Gujarat 2002 suggests, moreover, that these institutions have been actively subverted to serve the patently undemocratic agenda of Hindutva. (Kabir, 2002).” The Gujarat BJP’s works and its aftermath followed only just days after the BJP lost or fared relatively poorly in elections in several Indian states, including UP[140]. “The ‘Other’ required by this process of self-definition is today the Muslim and in some cases, such as Gujarat itself, the Christian, both groups who are seen as non-indigenous to India. Once all oppressed groups have been othered, marginalized, or contained, Hindu majoritarianism, speaking the language of Hindutva, seeks to take over the entire space of the nation itself (Kabir, 2002).” “After the shock administered to the country by the Gujarat pogroms, the violence refused to die down. Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that, because of the absence of major riots over the last decade, and because of the much-reduced number of casualties (the statistics of the Home Minister are quite optimistic), the underlying violence has really disappeared (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b).”


The graph is shows 2003 until 2012 communal incident across Indian[141]

Figure 3. communal riots from 2003 till 2012


On average, 130 people died and 2,200 were injured in communal violence each year. Incidents were reported from 24 of the 35 states and union territories. The maximum number of incidents occurred in Maharashtra (700), followed by Madhya Pradesh (666) and Uttar Pradesh (645). Most of the Northeastern states (except Assam) and union territories (except Delhi) did not see any incidents of communal violence. During 2005-09, 648 people were killed and 11,278 injured in 4,030 incidents of communal violence.[142]


Using religious faith for gaining power

History of contemporary India shows that both, the communal and constitutional forces[143] use religious faith regarding their political objective. As during freedom struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi and INC, domination was full of Indian religious concepts to mobilize people. Gandhi had realized this capacity well and he “had been very successful in using the language and imagery of the bhakti movements to build up support for Congress amongst the middle and Harijan[144] castes in the 1920s and 1930s (Graham 1990,p51).” The Hindu upper-castes also gather on this base and made political parties based on religious faith later; because India is a big, multi-religious society that inequality and discrimination among the society levels are visible there, therefore religion can be used for political ends and, in the same vein, politics can be used for religious ends. it’s a reality that preserving religious harmony is in danger all the time and ensuring it, is very hard there.

Radical and non-radical and religious or non-religious forces use religion as a tool to gain power and wealth in some parts of the world. The mobilization of religious identity becomes an effective tool in securing or retaining material interests. When a politician use religious terms in a political speech, he is playing to his voting base in his religious capable society and he tries to make a voting bank for himself or his party or thought. It will be possible while religious identities may be as a dimension of a person’s outlook and sense of self; so “when embedded in social, political, economic, and other material realities, these religious identities can be mobilized for a variety of purposes (Fletcher, 2008).” Arjun Appadurai[145] charts the potential dangers of projecting a singular identity: “When these identities are convincingly portrayed as primary (indeed as primordial) loyalties by politicians, religious leaders, and the media, then ordinary people self-fulfillingly seem to act as if only this kind of identity mattered (Fletcher 2008, p403).” According to Christophe Jaffrelot “Bhagalpur, the criminalization of local politics has exploited the foundation laid by Hindu nationalists at the national level to employ religious riots for their own local political ends. Regards to India, riots tend to be planned since there is a strong correlation between riots and the electoral calendar. In contrast, terrorism is a tool of the weak and Muslims who are an underclass in India generally utilize it (Desker et al. 2005, p11,13).” Among communal forces in India, some groups chose RSS methods of tight discipline and executive control and some of them used political party’s method or be more open-style of party operation to work toward gaining power. “This chronology reveals that communal riots are not caused spontaneously and also that they are rarely caused by religious animosity. They arise due to conflicting political interests, which are often linked to economic interests. A clear relationship between communal riots and politics was established for the first time in 1946, when the ‘Muslim League’ gave its direct action call on August 16, 1946. There is a significant change in the pattern of communal riots since the 1990s. This brings forth the shifts that have occurred in the nature of communal riots in India. Moreover, the aim is to underline that religion in most of the cases is not the reason why communal riots occur. The reason for the occurrence of communal violence has been different in the two different phases.  During the time of ‘the Partition’, it was the clash of political interests of the elite of two different communities, which resulted in communal riots. However, from the 1960s until the late 1980s, the local political and economic factors played a very important role in instigating riots. The emergence of Hindutva politics in the last two decades has been a cause of communal riots in this phase where the local factors have also helped in instigating riots. Moreover, the major riots occurred when the Congress was in power in these states or during the short and uncertain phase of the Janata Party coalition rule at the Centre. Riots in this phase might have occurred in the villages or rural areas like the ‘Bihar Sharif’ riots, but they have often remained unreported. Therefore it is important to distinguish this phase from the 1990s during which the BJP and its sister organizations have been active in instigating communal riots. Communal violence since 1990s needs to be seen in the light of the changing political equations in the country. The decline of the Congress and the emergence of the BJP as a strong political force resulted in shifting patterns of communal riots. Communal violence in the last two decades is a result of the manipulation of the religious sentiments of people by the Hindu right-wing organizations for political gains. The politicization of the Mandir-Masjid[146] issue and the subsequent demolition of the Mosque gave the BJP the opportunity to consolidate its vote bank. Nevertheless, in the process, the controversy created a communal divide, and frequency of riots increased during this time. Since ‘Partition’, never before has one particular incident resulted in the emergence of violence in almost all the states. From the 1960s until 1980, local factors played a very important role in the emergence of riots, but since the late 1980s, this trend seems to be changing. Communal violence has always occurred when the BJP has wanted to expand its base. In the recent years the South Indian states, particularly Kerala and Tamil Nadu, have also witnessed communal violence and are slowly growing into communally sensitive areas. This is primarily because of the recent entrance of BJP in the political arena of these states. Apart from Godhra, the other incidences of communal violence in the 90s have been minor, yet they cannot be dismissed. These eruptions of communal violence have not been spontaneous, but are organized, and often have the support of the local administrations. The state support to riots is a long established feature in India, yet the state has never been such an active participant in the violence before the Gujarat riots. Communal violence has entered a new phase with the Christians and members of other minority religions being made the victims of planned attacks. Communal riots in this decade have been both urban and rural features, but the extent of damage is always greater in the thriving centers of trade and commerce. Tribal population in the rural areas is being forced to get involved in the attacks on Christians and Muslims by bringing them within the Hindutva framework. Apart from economic reasons, the call for Hindu unity, which is primarily a means to achieve political advantage, is the main source for communal violence in this decade. Godhra was indeed the first major communal riot that got such a wide media coverage particularly from the satellite channels. Therefore the media now needs to be more responsible, considering the influence that it can have over the masses.  It is time that the media stopped any kind of biased reporting as it can further encourage the communal elements to instigate the masses. Political parties have always had a hand in instigating and exploiting communal violence to meet their electoral interests. Though communal riots are condemned in various quarters, there is still complete inaction both from the administration and from the ruling governments in many states. Though religious festivals and processions are generally the starting points of communal riots, still sufficient security is not provided during these times. There is also not much response against incidents of communal violence from the civil society. Till the time the political parties which instigate communal riots are voted to power, the incentives to combat communalism will not be able to develop fully (Rajeshwari, 2004).” On the other hand there is a fact that most of the communal Hindu radical organizations are leading, ruling and founded by high-caste (against lower castes or classless people named Dalit[147]) member of Hindu society especially Brahman social group[148] and Hindutva doctrine also theorized by them. So one of the reasons which lead this Hindu class to this position was relaxing caste-based Indian society during Muslim rule, British rule and as a result less financial fund; this alert during freedom struggle after independence motivate this class to fund some political religious-based organizations to follow previous interests; They used democracy as capacity to following such agenda. But higher castes were made a very small minority of Hindu society and although they were very influential class, but in democracy you need voter to move ahead and the motivation of Hindu masses established on a kind of Hindu nationalism and other making; for this purpose, “after independence, Hindutva extended its appeal to a section of the Hindu middle class (Engineer, 2008).” This ‘other’ during freedom struggle was Muslim-British and after independent is changed to Indian Muslim (minorities), so communal operation in India is based on political-religious affairs founded and becoming strong. It can say “discourse of Hindutva rests on two issues overlooked within Indian historiography: the political economy of the temple and the relationship between state, religion and capital (Kabir, 2002)” and it is one of the motivation of such movement in contemporary India. “the organizational practices and the techniques of political mobilization employed by most of the Hindu nationalist organizations are deeply structured by the constitutive difference between ‘middle-class society’ and the communities of ‘the masses,’ upon which the govern-mentalities of the modern Indian state are founded (Hansen, 1999).”


Indian Nationalism and radical Hinduism

Indian community is trying to create a balance between unity and diversity in religion, culture…; “the unity in diversity concept is especially true of India (Bhela 2011,p97).” Indian diversity in language is an example in the world but they “share a common culture based on Brahamanical[149] Hinduism, which in turn is based on the Vedas and the Upanishads (Bhela 2011,p98).” Indian nationalism “was not systematically communal - it looked at the British as the opponents, not the Muslims (Chattopadhyay, 2009)” and in 19st century came to exist “as a form of cultural resistance to colonial rule”[150] but some Hindu radical elements like RSS changed the direction to Indian minorities and “clearly saw the Muslims, rather than the British, as the enemies. Muslims were portrayed as the eternal ‘Other’ of the Indian nation, their permanent enemies, seeking always to harm them (Chattopadhyay, 2009).” As this study’s subject is about a socio-political phenomenon that relate to identity and identity-seeking character of an Indian group; and nationalism as an important 20st century political phenomenon also representing same character so the necessity to have a look at nationalism in India is clear. Nationalism related to “how the nation sees itself” and “how communities see themselves and others (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006).” Hindu nationalism refers to the very beginning of Indian history, when Hindus constituted an organic community that gifted them an essential spirit, which enabled them to develop towards an ultimate form. It provides the foundation of ancient Aryans civilization throughout India that empower Hindu to protect himself from Buddhism[151], it helped them to be the survivals under Muslim rule and later the British colonizers. Indian Hindu Nationalist movement considered Hinduism as a cultural force, which could give the right conditions to them. ‘Subcontinent Partition’ was as wake upper phenomenon so they believe that “if we do not fortify the Hindu foundations of Bharat we stand in danger of losing one part after another even as we have already lost Sind, Frontier, one-third Kashmir, one-half Punjab[152] and two-third Bengal[153].”[154]

 Although nationalism flourished during Indian struggle against British rule over their country; but “the age of the nation’s  peak time, was the period of 1840 to 1960 (Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 2000)”, and “the height of the nationalist movement (was) in the 1930s and 1940s (Dwyer, 2006)”; the “articulations that differentiated the Indian nation (the Self) from the British Empire (the Other). The cultural imagining of the Indian nation thus had a lengthy history that predated its specific juridical empowerment (Muppidi, 2004).” Extremely powerful fueling the nationalist movement toward British was that Indian feeling about colonists “not being completely aligned with the nation; they were draining or bleeding the Indian nation to enrich other lands. This one-way relationship between the state and the nation established the British as different from other rulers. Self-Other relationship distinguished the colonizer, the exploiter, the foreigner not by race or color or degree of exploitative taxation, but by its location outside the territorial boundaries of the nation (ibid).” This self-other division of colonial time finished on 15 august 1947, postcolonial Indian nationalism was started, and it changed during the time especially after economic reform in early 1990s “facilitated economic restructuring within a postcolonial polity was a very creative act of political agency. This creativity lays in the deliberate re-articulation of Indianness (Hindutva) from a predominantly territorial conception to an increasingly de-territorialized one. The social meanings of Indianness have been gradually freed—juridically—from a territorial anchoring (ibid).” There is a reality that “all nations imagine themselves as unique on some count or other. Arguably, that is the very condition of their nationness (ibid).” This other-making follow by an arrogance and radical degree of it attack ‘others’. But most of the political movement which has Hinduism base related to a kind of the Brahmanic tradition in Hindu religious thought, so can say that “Hindu nationalism began from a restricted intellectual base and drew support mainly from upper-caste Hindus (Graham, 1990).” Human integration as character of globalisation and one of the result of modernity make the Hindu nationalism threaten and in radical Hinduism the nationalism is going to change to chauvinism and this is threatening human destiny. In this, regard “nationalism was one ideology that increased its popular recognition and allegiance from about 1920, but it sent out confused messages in regard to community or class allegiances. It was a platform and an end in itself rather than a program for government. It attempted to subsume all other, sectional political identities: the priority of the anti-colonial struggle was unity and independence rather than any class agenda or any one political philosophy (Robb, 2002).” Regarding Indian nationalism, two trends can be recognized ‘moderate nationalism’ and ‘radical nationalism’, the otherness of nationalism are the other nation outside Indian subcontinent generally, as the history of nationalism in last decades of the 19st and first half of the 20st century pointed the colonizers as otherness to fight against them. However, after freedom this political nationalism changed its otherness to Indians who are not Hindu and start fighting against them.  Even during freedom struggle, this kind of nationalist forces was not active toward colonists as they were against non-Hindu Indian. Because of cultural heritage, a nationalist known an inhabitant of Bharat as a Bharatiya; and its culture, which determines his capacity for national awareness, not his religious beliefs. As Atal Bihari Vajpayee argues in 1961, “the Muslims or Christians did not come from outside India. Their ancestors were Hindus. By changing religion one does not change one’s nationality or culture.”[155] The situation is probably somewhat different in other types of nation states, particularly those that, in diverse ways, affect a more intimate connection between religious affiliation and national identity (like Hindu nationalism in India, Islamic nationalism in Pakistan, or Jewish nationalism in Israel). The interpretation of Indian nationalism that give Hinduism a major role in the fashioning of Indian identity, religion will be highlight so the atmosphere for religion confrontation among Indian religion will be provide.


The various schools of Hindu nationalism/traditionalism

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS):

In Hinduism, “perhaps the clearest case of fundamentalism is RSS (Salzman, 2008).” “Like the Phalange[156] in Lebanon, the RSS was founded in direct imitation of European fascist movements (Dalrymple, 2009).” The extremist Hindu nationalist movement, the Sangh Parivar chief organ is RSS, which believe “Hindutva alone can provide effective remedy to all the problems facing the nation and the world today (Bhagawat, 2013).”[157] An organizational structure, which was established in Nagpur in 1925; and it, has a number of subsidiary and associated organizations. “The original constituency from which the RSS emerged in the 1920s and 1930s were Maharashtrian Brahmins, especially the Chitpavan Brahmins, from whom most of the leaders of the RSS were drawn (Hansen, 1999).” As its leader was quoted in May 2013 RSS is a multi-functionary organization “to some it (RSS) appears as a national sports club, to others a national music club, a national martial arts organization etc. Many think that the Sangh is a party that participates in many movements. While it is true that the Sangh does all of the above, it is none of these (Bhagawat, 2013).” The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) is the religious and cultural wing of the Sangh Parivar; it effectively operates as an agency for grassroots mobilization[158]; As Praveen Togadia[159] quoted, at the time that “over 90 per cent of Hindus are religious” Hindutva forces used this opportunity to “convert that religiosity into a hindu vote bank (Nanda, 2009).” The Bajrang Dal, is the youth wing of the VHP, is often involved in violence against religious minorities. The RSS by themselves have some local militia, which follow their leader’s desires, for example, the Patit Pawan[160] “regards itself as a sort of a ‘rapid task force’ of the Hindu community—a militant organization entirely geared to agitations, street fighting, and prompt action on small and big issues. It sees itself as an organization that provides justice for those Hindus who are otherwise deprived of it in a hostile establishment. The organization claims that at any time in Pune[161], within a few hours, it can gather five thousand young men ready for action (Hansen, 1999).” Other branches of the Sangh Parivar include the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA)[162], and the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP)[163]. The BJP is the principal political wing of the Sangh Parivar. Its hold power solely in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh, and to form part of coalition governments in Bihar, Jharkhand, Nagaland, Punjab and Uttarakhand. “Thus there was a systematic coordination between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings of the Hindu nationalists, with statements made by the one designed as counterpoint to the other. BJP political leaders, for instance, could moderate the militancy of the activist wing for the benefit of the national press. Contrarily, the same political assurances could be reinterpreted by RSS cadre at the grassroots as necessary lies for a genuinely subversive cause.

What made the Hindu nationalists distinctive was their ability to slide across different sectors of society, and to dispel the perception of any one branch as ‘communal’ by dispersing the question into a host of subsidiary functions and organizations, cultural, religious, and political. But it was in their joint operation that Hindutva actually took shape (Rajagopal, 2001).” In 2010, the RSS claimed to have held 39,823 daily meetings in over 27,000 locations during the previous year.[164]  It operates through a large network of pracharak[165]. “An all-male[166] organization, the RSS is founded upon paramilitary skills, ideological training and supreme loyalty to the Hindu nation. The organization insists upon the racial purity and the racial superiority of India’s Hindus, leaving critics to denounce the RSS as being essentially fascistic in nature (Ogden, 2009).” The Sangh’s Hindu nationalist ideology which “Hinduism is the default ‘way of life’ for Indians (C.S.W, 2011).” The RSS “seemed most likely to follow Hindutva doctrine in India. Sadashiv Golwalkar[167] believe that “a nation was the product of a number of factors, including a sense of territory, racial unity, religion, culture and language, but that the factor of special importance was religion (Graham, 1990).” As he wrote later, “our race-spirit is a child of our religion and so with us culture is but a product of our all-comprehensive religion, a part of its body and not distinguishable from it.[168]” “All those not belonging to the national i.e. Hindu race, religion, culture and language, naturally fall out of the pale of the real ‘national’ life.[169]” his central argument had recognized the servitude of the Hindus stemmed directly from the weakness of their national consciousness so their main goal should be to regenerate the nation and he suggests Hindu society against all its enemies (the Muslims as well as the British) for restoration of a sense of nationality. Toward minorities, he recommended that “the foreign races in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence[sic] Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and must lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment - not even citizen's rights. There is, at least should be, no other course for them to adopt. We are an old nation; let us deal, as old nations ought to and do deal, with the foreign races, who have chosen to live in our country (Graham, 1990).” By the ending of British ruling in India in 1947, the RSS’s otherness emphasize more on Muslim and the otherness were shifted from British occupier and colonist to Indian subcontinent’s Muslim at the state level toward Pakistan/Bangladesh and Indian Muslim inside the country and evaluated them as a constant danger for India as well as other minorities like Christian, Jaw, Parsis, Communism… as were seen as a threat to the corporate solidarity of Indian society. The RSS known itself as the only way to meet the challenge of ‘communism’ and the only ideology which can harmonies and integrate the interests of different groups and classes to avoid any class-war. “The RSS were careful not to associate themselves too closely with any one regional tradition of Hindu nationalism (Graham, 1990).” However, most of the Hindu political organization were in contact and influenced form RSS. “From when the RSS first was established and till today the working style of the organization was like a Brahmin—silent work, no attack, goal achievers. This is typical Brahmin style (Hansen, 1999).” It typical style lead it to use other Hindutva capacity to gain the organization goals. The Sangh Parivar’s philosophy is anti-democratic at its core; despite participating in electoral politics, the Sangh Parivar has never believed in democracy. The Indian Constitution is democratic and secular. It does not permit the state to promote identity or culture, nor does it permit the state to discriminate between citizens based on caste, creed, religion, gender, or culture. It gives each person the freedom to practice, profess, and propagate the religion of his or her choice or refrain from doing so. The minorities in India have a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The state cannot interfere in the administration of institutions run by the minorities, nor can the state discriminate against educational institutions administered by minorities in giving aid. Hindutva implicitly stands against the spirit of the constitution, its secularism as well as its assurance of equal rights for all the citizens. This is what Hedgewar[170] had to say; “I have thought out a scheme based on Hindu Dharm[171] Shastra[172], which provides for standardization of Hinduism throughout India... However, the point is that this ideal cannot be brought to effect unless we have our own Swaraj[173] with a Hindu as dictator like Shivaji[174] of old, or Mussolini[175] or Hitler[176] of the present day in Italy and Germany.  However, this does not mean that we have to sit with folded hands until some such dictator arises in India. We should formulate a scientific scheme and carry on propaganda for it (CAC, 2002).” “The Hindutva organizations do not limit themselves to using propaganda to spread hatred and stereotypes of minorities. In their over 40,000 shakhas[177] (branches), they have also trained men in wielding lathis[178]. VHP regularly organizes distribution of tridents, justifying these as a religious symbol, though they are in fact lethal weapons. Some of the Hindutva groups have provided illegal arms training to their cadres (Engineer, 2008).”  “The typical RSS family sends its young boys to shakhas at the age of six, and in conjunction with the domestic atmosphere, the so-called ‘Sangha culture’[179] becomes effectively in-grained in the identity of these individuals as a culture marked by unsurpassed moral stature, honesty, hard work, decency, cleanliness, respectability, and devotion (Hansen, 1999).”

The “significant other” of the RSS’s alternative civil society in Pune remains, nonetheless, the Anglicized establishment from which it has been excluded, while the immediate cause of fear and object of hatred, as always, is the Muslim community not necessarily local Muslims in Pune but the ‘abstract Muslim’ who stands in as an objet petit à for the more immediate experiences of ‘lower castes’ encroaching upon the once-secure world of the upper castes (Hansen, 1999).” “The indisputable fact that the RSS emerged from an urban upper-caste environment has led both scholars and political opponents to view the RSS as a manifestation of an alliance between Brahmins and banias (merchants, businessmen), determined to reassert the supremacy of the twice-born castes in the face of mounting lower-caste political assertiveness (Hansen, 1999).”

The RSS by using the capacity of dual membership that had been providing by its cadres at other Sangh groups leadership-level or the lower level of them by its organized members and its organization, had been controlling and leading these kind of groups; the best example of this strategy are the BJS[180] and the BJP[181]. The RSS had expected to work closely with this kind of groups but not as their political body, as a distanced moral voice, exercising moral pressures and guidance. The RSS refused to provide work force to a party not fully controlled by itself. The electoral or campaign policies and tactics, which force the BJP likewise to adopted Gandhian socialism or membership of the Muslims in such a political parties and so on, are not the phenomenon that such RSS can tolerate to be done, so they prefer to take enough distance from political parties and play critical role. The RSS, with “around 40 million members, more than 50,000 branches, 18,000 schools and 100 affiliated organizations” is an organized cultural-political system that one of its activist is Mr. Narendra Modi who is as prime minister of India from the May 2014. As Christophe Jaffrelot predicts Modi may well "do anyway what the RSS has wanted to do for decades because he is perfectly in tune with their ideology.[182]"


The All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh party (BJS)

 BJS was the foundation of now BJP. It form in 1951 and finished in 1977. The BJS were strong in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. BJS is one of good examples of the political parties which was recruited by main radical communal forces like RSS and had been used regarding to gain their political goals. BJS’s history shows how this kind of political party’s capacity controlled and took at the service of such main Indian radical Hindu players. The Hindu Mahasabha (HMS)[183] was an organization for high-caste Hindus and as one of the pillar of religious orthodoxy (Graham, 1990) in India, on the side with the RSS, the Sanatana Dharma Sabha[184] … and the Arya Samaj[185]. The leader of HMS felt the necessity of a new all-India political party to challenge INC party rule over independent India without any delay, so in the late autumn of 1950 they start to discuss this concern; as result BJS (Indian People's Party) made itself ready and suitable for challenging the congress by preparing itself as an open and accessible to middle-class politicians, which was willing to combine a controlled form of Hindu nationalism with economic and social liberalism. For this purpose and based on a Hindu nationalism goals, the party formed in 1951 and tried hard to present itself as a vehicle of universal Hinduism. The leader and the founder of BJS, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee[186] apparently believed that middle-class liberalism, which was formed during British Raj,[187] was compatible with Hindu traditionalism, if not with Hindu nationalism. The party’s manifest shows relatively moderate looking to Hindu problem, so concern to Hindu nationalist grounds; they expressed of the equal rights for all Indian citizens 'irrespective of caste, creed or community', and regarded to forging policy “the Jana Sangh feels that the partition of India was the biggest tragedy that could fall on the country; believes that the future welfare of the people of India and Pakistan demands a reunited India, and it will work towards this end, keeping this as its goal and aim[188]. So “while others appeared to foreshadow a militant Hindu nationalist organization, motivated by hostility towards Pakistan and towards the Muslim minority in India (Graham, 1990)” the party showed itself as a liberal party, willing to work within the parliamentary framework, to place itself at the center of opposition to INC. The central issue during the first years of establishment the party, especially after Dr. Mookerjee's death, was whether executive authority of party would remain with Mookerjee’s relatively Hindu moderate willing and to continue his approach, or would pass to a younger group of leaders who were convinced of the virtues of organizational discipline, close ties with the RSS, and an activist and militant expression of Hindu nationalism. In 1966, Balraj Madhok[189] appointed as the party president who was faced with fourth general election; But From 1955 onwards effective power rested with the party's central secretariat, headed by Deendayal Upadhyaya[190] and supported by a hierarchy of young and zealous organizers who were much closed to RSS. This group, by holding the party to an isolated position in the party system, effectively ignored the chance of appealing to the moderate sector of Hindu traditionalist opinion[191] and the equally important chance of representing those groups, which were opposed to the Congress Party's economic policies on liberal grounds. It was only in the mid-1960s that fresh efforts were made to explore the possibility of a national-democratic alliance, which would bring the party into closer touch with its close groups. The Nehru named Hindu nationalist as well as Hindu traditionalist as ‘communalism’ and therefore one of the important internal otherness for ruling India INC or the constitutional forces as whole, was Hindu communalism that he felt “there is almost nothing in common between the Congress approach and the Communal approach.”[192] As he evaluated them in 1953 and mentioned “I consider the Communal approach to India's problems, or to any other problems, as inherently bad, narrow and injurious to the individual, the group and the nation.”[193] Opposition stand against constitutional forces’[194] policy toward the most India important issue like J&K[195] issue raised the communal forces’ question of why the Indian constitution should not be applied in full to J&K area, for instance. The party also was speaking of “the rebuilding of Bharat on the basis of Bharatiya 'Sanskriti' [culture] and 'Maryada' [rectitude] and as a political, social, and economic democracy granting equality of opportunity and liberty of individual so as to make her a prosperous, powerful and united nation progressive, modern and enlightened, able to withstand the aggressive designs of others and to pull her weight in the council of nations for the establishment of world peace[196].” “From the very beginning the object of the party's leaders was to avoid sectarianism, but it was hard to believe it as Nehru himself said in a letter to Swami Atmanand that “nobody 'has ever considered the Jana Sangh as an organization following Gandhian methods or indeed peaceful methods and that they have a different reputation and are considered a narrowly communal body (Graham, 1990).” Because the believer of such party said “the new party - if it is to serve and save the Nation - must be Hindu in purpose, plan and policy (Graham, 1990).” The BJS party used the terms 'Bharat' or 'Bharat Varsh' “as a way of evoking not only the Vedic and Aryan background of the Indian nation but also the idea that this nation was based on cultural as distinct from purely religious values (Graham, 1990).” The difference between INC and BJS were clearer “whereas the Congress leaders were inclined to foster a political order which was generally liberal and pluralist in form and reflected the social, regional and linguistic diversity of the country, the Jana Sangh was disposed to emphasize the need for the state to build up a sense of national unity and therefore to set limits to the expression of dissent and of social, linguistic and regional differences (Graham, 1990).” These policies and movement welcomed by RSS and some RSS’s recruited member also were involved in BJS. Its commitment to Hindu nationalism also attracted the support of the young RSS workers, so in the states and district levels the organization was firmly in the hands of RSS men and the strength and durability of their networks of supporters gave RSS’s men an important advantage over rival groupings within the party; at leader level also the exclusiveness of the RSS element in the party obviously spoke of the difficulty of bringing them into full accord with the ideals of the BJS. With this capacity, the RSS could influence its internal affairs of the BJS party. It is even more difficult to estimate the extent to which the Jana Sangh relied upon RSS workers to supply the core of its party activists. RSS organizers founded the most energetic and disciplined element within the organizational framework proper. “The RSS preferred to control the party through informal networks and strictly regulated debates (Hansen, 1999).” The RSS influence over BJS made problems for party’s leaders later; RSS’s interfere in BJS was so visible to Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee that he was well aware of RSS attempt to dominate BJS. Mauli Chandra Sharma[197] as a successor of Mookerjee also was aware of the differences of age and outlook, which separated him from these RSS organizers in his parry. Apart of RSS cadres in BJS, the party’s depend on RSS fund, made its leader under pressure. RSS leaders also wanted to keep BJS financially dependent on their organization. Lack of funds was a real source of concern for the party in its early years and that the RSS had a vested interest in preventing the party from obtaining an independent means of financial support. On the other hand, non-RSS leader of the party also was in the favor of saving its secular nationalism and unflinching faith in democracy as it mentioned in BJS’s statute. In 1954 confrontation between pro- and anti-RSS wings in the BJS raised at its top and finally some important member of Jana Sangh were left the party and in 1956 they formed National Democratic Front (NDF) and Mr. Sharma also resigned and attended to Congress, he described RSS role “like the Nazis in Germany” and believed that “the RSS was gradually working its way into the political arena through the Jana Sangh (Graham, 1990)[198].” Deendayal Upadhyaya as Golwalkar[199]'s 'right hand' took the control of BJS that continued till 1965 and “within a period of four years, the RSS had succeeded in building a party structure and establishing its dominance at all levels in the internal apparatus (Hansen, 1999).” He appointed two assistant secretaries to help him; as Atal Bihari Vajpayee from Uttar Pradesh was placed to cover the party's northern units. Ending the Portuguese colonizing over Goa in 1955 was a best opportunity for new pro-RSS leader who took control of BJS, to highlight their leadership capacities, showing their ability toward the Congress ruling at center and reputation in public eyes as nationalist… so BJS’s agitation in this regard was well done; and next step was 2nd general election in 1957, although they failed to establish itself as a major opposition grouping in the house, but among those who returned to the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee established himself as a skilful debater capable of sharing with Upadhyaya the task of stating the party's policy positions. In 1959, when the first clashes with Chinese forces happened in northern Indian border, it provided another opportunity for Hindu nationalists to recruited another topic aside of minorities, Kashmir, India partition issue, hence without losing time BJS leaders raised the India Communist Party[200] issue as so-called pro-China force in India. Therefore, as it is clear to consider the Indian left wing as second rival of communal force, aside with Congress in India came to target by them; 1962 China-India border confrontation made an anti-congress position for BJS to raise. Indian national language was the other subject that BJS claims “Hindi should be not only the official but also the national language of India.” This issue in Punjab and UP were under especial emphasis of the party so some observers spoke of 'Hindi imperialism' threat non-speaking Indian; an attempt to impose a language to the rest of Indian society, Hindi language as a northern mother tongue to southern for instance. So the extension of BJS organization in the southern states of India was hampered by its claim that Hindi should become the language for 'all the official purposes of the union', which clashed with the strong southern preference for English. One of the party's real problems in establishing itself outside the Hindi heartland[201] was its lack of financial resources. “By the 1960s it was quite clear to the party that it had overestimated the potential support for Hindu nationalism in the north. Despite the enthusiasm of the Hindu elites for the task of restoring the Hindi heartland to its former pre-eminence, the great mass of ordinary Hindus were not easily moved by appeals to advance the cause of Hindi or to revive the ancient traditions of the region (Graham, 1990).” The campaign for the abolition of cow-slaughter at the end of 1966 was another Jana Sangh political movement, as an honor and a commitment to one of the oldest and most emotional causes of Hindu politics. In this case, they brought all their forces to impose this to all Indian citizen irrespective that they believe in such religious rule or not. In economic field also the party by using Hindu society foundation like joint family, the “first move to establish a trade union which was both professional and patriotic was made in January 1955, when its third national session proposed the formation of a 'national labour organization' which would 'rise above the argument of class-struggle, think from the point of view of national integrity and keep aloof from the un-Indian tendencies of Capitalism and Communism' (Graham, 1990).” In 1960s the leader of party like Upadhyaya believe that the Jana Sangh should present as a center party open to ideas of reform and improvement as well as to those of nationalism and political liberalism. After Upadhyaya sudden and mysterious death in 1968, Vajpayee took over as president and served along with L. K. Advani as leader of the party, and the entire strategy was drawn in a populist direction. In 1977 BJS which at that time was in the hand of Atal Bihari Vajpayee[202] and Lal Krishna Advani[203] joined hand with several other parties which opposed to rule of the INC and formed the Janata Party[204] and then in1980 they formed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which is going on today and it is one of India's largest political parties. Separating from Janata Party started when Morarji Desai demanded that the former Jana Sangh members should give up their membership in the RSS in order to continue as fully-fledged members of the Janata party and dual membership controversy came up. The defeat of the Janata party in 1980 and the disenchantment within the RSS with the Janata experiment resulted in the formation of a new political affiliate of the RSS, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in April 1980. This party, led by Vajpayee and his populist wing, claimed to be the true inheritor of the ‘spirit’ of the Janata Party.


Lok Sabha Election period

BJS Seats gaining

Percentage of whole votes

1st Lok Sabha general election, 1951



2nd Lok Sabha general election, 1957



3rd Lok Sabha general election, 1962



4st Lok Sabha general election, 1967



5st Lok Sabha general election, 1971



6st Lok Sabha  general election, 1977




Figure 4: The BJS performance in different general elections for LS


The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP):

 The BJP root and history: the BJP’s history dates back to the Indian freedom struggle and after Independence; when Hindu nationalists or traditionalists became active in various groups. Some scholars maintains the BJP as a political party, which identified openly with the values of Hinduism “is denounced as a Hindu party by its enemies and is assumed to be a Hindu party by its voters though it never calls itself a Hindu party. When at all caught in the act of using the term ‘Hindutva’, the BJP hastens to explain that this term did not mean “Hindu religion” but “secular Indian nationalism (Elst, 1996).” It is a fact that in the political atmosphere of India, BJP is one of the most important political representative of radical Hinduism. “The BJP acts as the political wing of the RSS and is part of the RSS’s wider Sangh Parivar, which aims to penetrate all levels of Indian society. Other Sangh Parivar organizations include students and workers unions, education groups and militant wings.  As such, the RSS remains as the BJP’s ‘umbilical cord’, impacting upon its ideological content, decision-making, personnel and leadership. Reflecting these continued ties, the majority of the BJP’s members and leadership[205] are members of the RSS (Ogden, 2009).”

BJP’s internal political stands: “The BJP was founded as the political wing of the RSS, and most senior BJP figures hold posts in both organizations. Though the BJP is certainly much more moderate and pragmatic than the RSS - like Likud in Israel, the BJP is a party that embraces a wide spectrum of right-wing opinion, ranging from mildly conservative free marketers to raving ultra-nationalists - both organizations believe, as the centerpiece of their ideology, that India is in essence a Hindu nation and that the minorities may live in India only if they acknowledge this (Dalrymple, 2009).” As the BJP’s spokesperson, Nirmala Sitharaman referred to RSS that “they are our ideological fountainhead, so ideologically there are certain things that we draw from them.”[206] It show how the BJP looks to its leaders in RSS.

BJP’s other making is clear in their slogans[207] the “most prominent ‘communal’ item is the Common Civil Code demand[208] (Elst, 1996)” internally. The BJP’s “ideology is based upon a common culture, specific linguistic features and geographic unity ‘Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan’ such sentiments effectively breach India’s Constitution that celebrates tolerance and national unity through diversity (Ogden, 2009).” “The BJP’s communal politics (and hard Hindutva) reached their zenith in the early 1990s, as the party pursued their core policy of replacing a Muslim mosque (Babri Masjid) with a Hindu temple (Ramjanmabhooni[209]) at Ayodhya in northern India. On December the 6,1992, a rally at the site led to the destruction of the mosque and sparked Hindu-Muslim riots across India, which left 1,200 people dead (Ogden, 2009).” “The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government (1998-2004) and the adoption of more assertive diplomatic strategies deemed appropriate to materialize India’s national goals. BJP can be considered as successor of BJS, which took BJS nationalist politics and cadres at the service. It was a reaction to an unsuccessful three decades marginal presence of BJS in Indian politics after independence; and so BJP three decades rapid rise from 1980s till the date show that it’s emerging as principal rival for INC national power. The party also advocated a pro-capitalist stance that differed from Congress’s socialism.

International BJP’s policies: The BJP have looked to the world atmosphere, to see what position reserved for India internationally. So aside with communal acts like the Babri mosque demolition; to attract Indian national sentiment, its international policy also was in the same direction, the BJP emphasized “on making India strong (and an electoral promise to test nuclear weapons, increase military expenditure and acquire a permanent UNSC seat), the BJP slowly gained political momentum in the 1990s (Ogden, 2009).” BJP policy-makers accept “multilateralism as the ideal strategic level-playing in a multi-polar, post-hegemonic, global order; As it come in the words of BJP’s foreign minister Yashwant Sinha, that “if globalisation is the trend, then multilateralism is its life-sustaining mechanism (Efstathopoulos, Charalampos n.d., p8).” Two particular areas reflect the turn to a realist strategic culture: the 1998 nuclear tests and the Indo-US rapprochement. The nuclear tests were largely a result of the way in which the BJP interpreted the international balance of power and regional security conditions. Improving relations with the only superpower (USA) with the ultimate aim of forging a strategic partnership was perceived as the only path that would allow India to increase its diplomatic leverage on the global stage (Efstathopoulos, Charalampos n.d.,2011 p81).”  The BJP demanded that Pakistan return its territory in Kashmir.  In turn, the party appeared to avoid the idealism of Congress. Beyond of this, Hindu nationalism want to lead the world culturally it will be clear when ex-BJP’s Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee quoted “We, the Indians, as Guru[210] of all nations. Yes, I believe in that…” the ranking research comes from the 2007 Global Attitudes survey carried out “93 per cent (of urban Indian) agreed that our culture was superior to others[211] (Nanda, 2009)“

BJP’s future policies: “Ideologically, the need remains for the BJP to choose between a pure Hindutva approach that emphasizes religious difference and threats to the Hindu nation, and an approach that stresses inclusiveness, moderation and conciliation again, this choice (or balance) sums up the more hardcore ideological roots of the party courtesy of the RSS and the moderating modern face of the party as promoted by ex-prime minister Vajpayee (Ogden, 2009).”


The communal force’s election performance

Election is one of the important causes of communal riot and “the Sangh Parivar that has been associated with the most post-Independence Hindu-Muslim conflict” use this strategy when it is “the fact that Hindu-Muslim riots increases the likelihood of the BJP improving its electoral performance (Sengupta n.d., 2008).” However, INC as moderate Indian nationalist force has been the dominant in Indian politics for three decades since independence and under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru articulated a secularist ideology. Since the late-1970s, caste- and religion-based parties have become increasingly important actors in state and national politics. Apart of regional parties like TDP[212] in AP[213] and DMK[214] in TN[215], we can name BSP[216] and SP[217] in UP as caste based parties.


All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh party:

History of the BJS can be traced and rooted in the form of communal political group which founded by the HMS in 1950. In 1951-2 general election, the constitutional forces (INC) found this party in front of itself for the first time but the Congress won with large majorities and only three BJS members, including Mookerjee (its leader), returned to the Lok Sabha. The party nominated candidates in 94 of the 489 elective seats, polled 3.06% of the valid votes. In the parliament, Mookerjee tried to represent communal forces by forming an alliance with other sympathetic groups. so in May 1952 they were successful to manage, to construct a small United Nationalist Party, drawn mainly from the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Akali Dal, Ganatantra Parishad and Jharkhand groupings, and further negotiations led to the merger of this body with an Independent Democratic Party to form a National Democratic Party, consisting of 32 LS members and 10 in the Rajya Sabha. But they even could not gain at least 50 members to recognize as official opposition in the house by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. However, it plays a role as one of the anti-congress oppositions in main Indian issues like J&K matter, as a vehicle of Hindu nationalism. In the second LS General election, the party nominated 130 candidates in parliamentary contests in 1957, but it did not achieve better results than in the earlier poll. For the LS, it returned four members and obtained 5.97% of the valid votes. In the Legislative Assembly[218] elections, it returned 46 members. BJS entered the campaign for the third general elections in 1962, the party's total number of candidates rose to 196, and although it returned 14 members in 1962 compared with only 4 in 1957, its share of the valid vote increased only slightly, from 5.97% to 6.44%. In 1962 Legislative Assembly elections, the party gained 116 of seats with 6.07%. Madhok as the president of BJS was thus able to build up good relations with the other Non-Communist opposition parties, and with the Swatantra Party[219] in particular, and thus placed the party in a good position from which to contest the fourth general elections in 1967 for the LS, it won 9.35% of the votes and won 35 seats in LS, and in the assembly elections also it obtained 8.77% of the votes and 268 seats, from these, BJS emerged with increased numbers in LS and the northern Legislative Assemblies, and after that the poll joined a number of coalition governments at the state levels.


Bharatiya Janata party (BJP):

 Based on this fact which “political propaganda is widely perceived to play an important role in shaping public opinion and political and policy outcomes. Ethno-religious themes have played a substantial role in the design of such campaigns (Blakeslee, 2013);” BJP which had been formed in 1980 and “was in many respects a continuation (Graham, 1990)” of BJS, targeted Indian ethnic-religion heterogeneity as a capacity for attracting Hindus and mobilizing them with waking up their ethno-religious identities for gaining party’s political goals[220]; consequently Hindutva became a household word during the 1980s, when nationalist politics became visibly heightened. At this time the BJP appeared on the scene, first organized in 1977 from a reassembling and crystallization of the less successful BJS party of the 1970s. Led by L.K Advani, who by his own admission was not so religiously Hindu as much as nation- ally Hindu, the BJP organized itself against the backdrop of the tumultuous last years of the prime minister ship of Indira Gandhi[221]. Her assassination in 1984, led the sympathy generated toward her family and Indira’s INC and the backlash against other parties yielded a mere two seats to the BJP in parliament, with less than 8% of the votes, in the LS elections in 1984. “Moderation had not paid off in the 1984 general elections (the BJP had only two seated member of parliaments in the Lok Sabha). Why not then return to the former Jan Sangh's militancy regarding the ‘Hindu Nation’ (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b).” In ninth LS, election in 1989 BJP won 86 seats. Giant Yatra were organized so that the 500,000 villages of India would participate in the event: each of them was supposed to send or to carry a shilanya (sacred brick) to build the formidable Ram Temple in Ayodhya. In 10st LS election in 1991, the BJP emerged as the leading opposition party against INC by winning 120 LS seats. In this election, the leader of BJP toured northern India on a pilgrimage[222] to the city of Ayodhya, holding many rallies along the way to uphold the construction of a ‘Hindu Ram temple’; this strategy resulted in an increase in “the BJP’s vote share by 5-9 ppts[223] in the constituencies through which it passed. The campaign increased the probability of riots by 9 ppts, and the associated riots in turn increased the party’s vote share by 3.5 ppts. The improvement in the BJP’s vote share translated to a 10-20 ppts increase in the probability of victory for the BJP in visited constituencies (Blakeslee, 2013).” By Rajiv Gandhi's tragic assassination in May 1991, by the LTTE[224], “the nation was deeply shocked, and this helped the Congress party to win a thin majority at the polls in the 10st LS elections. The BJP had won in UP but also in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. Violence diminished, then resumed in various places (Saharanpur, Varanasi, Meerut in UP, and even Badhrak in Orissa and Trivandrum in Kerala, among others) (Graff & Galonnier, 2013b).” In 1996, they were the single largest party in parliament, with 161 seats. In western India, the same BJP was progressing rapidly: it enjoyed an undisputed victory in the Gujarat assembly elections (1995), and engaged in power sharing with the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra (1995). The BJP popularity peaked in 1998 with an impressive 180 LS seats and 26% of the vote. In a very close 14st LS general election in 2004, overall BJP seats fell from 182 to 138. In 15st  in 2009 India election the BJP remains the dominant opposition party, with 116 LS seats (Kaminsky 2011,p88).” “Of possible successors, Narendra Modi has been the most prominent, although despite a high profile with Indian business, he failed to make a significant impact as a campaigner in the 2009 general election. His association with the 2002 violence in Gujarat also makes him an unacceptable figure among several of the BJP’s regional allies, India’s public at large and various international actors and governments (Ogden, 2009).”


New communal and Hindutva forces

Projection of hate against Muslim and other minorities in India is so high and is going to be deep that “a relatively new, deeply Islamophobic and anti-Christian faction is emerging within the Hindutva camp” with cruelties which had been imposed and done against them till now, but “it accuses the RSS of being soft on Muslims and Christians (Nanda, 2009).” the earlier generation, justified their hatred of minorities on the foreign origins of their religions but the new generation of hindu extremists is not satisfied with merely decrying Indian Muslims and Christians as aliens. They go on to condemn the monotheistic God that Muslims and Christians worship; According to this school of thought, Hindus can only acquire self-confidence vis-à-vis the West and Islam when they begin to openly criticize monotheistic religions from the perspective of hindu or yogic spirituality in order to ‘save’ Muslims from the ‘disease of Islam… and help them realize how false and diabolical is the creed of Muhammad, how it is holding them prisoner and how it deserves not their loyalty but their contempt’. The newer generation uses the liberal vocabulary of tolerance and reason: it sees monotheistic religions as being ‘innately’ intolerant and irrational because of their conception of divine as one true God. Only Hinduism, with its many gods and respect for many levels of truth, can be truly tolerant and respectful of difference. Only Hinduism that does not remove God from nature (the way monotheism’s do), can combine science with spirituality. However, what it remarkable is that it foments intolerance against Islam and Christianity in the name of the superior tolerance of Hinduism. this kind of thinking is described as ‘designer fascism’ which uses the language of tolerance and enlightenment, but considers these values to be the exclusive and innate virtue of only one kind of people—the Hindus in this case. They prefer to call themselves intellectual warriors[225]. They stand on the right of the RSS. their main complaint against the RSS is that it has not openly renounced the Gandhian ideal of sarva dharma samabhav[226] and that it continues to try to prove that it is more authentically secular as compared to the ‘pseudo-seculars’ (Nanda, 2009).”

“Islam and Christianity follow a path of adharma[227] sink the society to the lowest depths of viciousness and moral bankruptcy (Nanda, 2009).” “In their mind, just as ‘the West’ is defined by Christianity, the civilizational core of India (or ‘Greater India’ which extends over all of South Asia and much of south East Asia) is defined by hinduism. As L.K. Advani put it recently, hinduism is the ‘cultural life current’ that animates India and that ‘words like hindu and Bhartiyata, hindu Rashtra and Bharatiya Rajya are synonymous’ But while Huntington sees the major clash of civilizations as taking place between the ‘Christian West’ and Islam (aided by the Chinese), hindu triumphalist[228] one-up Huntington and pit hinduism against both Islam and Christianity. The real source of intolerance and other evils in the world, they insist, is not Islam alone but rather monotheism of the ‘Semitic’ type (i.e., of West Asian origin) which includes Christianity and Judaism as well. Their claim is that because Semitic monotheistic religions believe in only one true God for the whole world, they are innately intolerant of diversity and pluralism. In this reading, the clash between monotheism and polytheism is the most fundamental clash in the whole of human history (Nanda, 2009).”



“India is trying to live up to its reputation as the world's largest integral democracy while powerful new fundamentalist parties like the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, along with nationalist assassins, are imperiling its hard-won unity (Barber, 1992).” Official data has announce nearly 80 per cent of Indian[229] as Hindu; that its ancient cultural classification divided them to high and low castes; but historical process related to education, modernity, reforms, globalisation … and also human mental development has led Hindu society to social changes, which one of them is improving and relaxation of some inhuman Hindu rule like social classification and subsequently decline of unnecessary position for high Hindu caste especially Brahman among other castes. This and other changes were to follow a kind of reactions that show itself in the shape of traditionalism approach within high casts to restore the previous position. Aside this movement, for few centuries, colonization of India by British had led Indian to a national movement from late 19th to early 20th to release India from British imperialism; this movement added a national character to their traditionalism. At the time that was expected nationalism will be reduced as a result of independent India in 1947, but during the freedom struggle and after that, a kind of ethno-religion nationalism which “enacting an outside/inside division that became the basis of nationalist difference (Rajagopal, 2001)“ shifted the otherness from British occupier to Indian minorities by radical Hindu organizations that most of them led and founded by high Hindu castes. They have also given a cultural aspect to this nationalism and change it to Hindu nationalism, and start to fight and make some limitations for minorities. Consequently during independent and later on, communal riots have taken lives till now, and in most of them Indian Muslims were target of Hindutva forces; the Babri mosque case in 1990s, 2002 Gujrat and 2008 Orissa communal riot can be named as examples in this regard.

 Most of this communal riots were led by the Sangh Parivar’s Groups, which at the head of them RSS and its religion-cultural wing VHP, its political wing BJS and now BJP has led the battleground. From 1950s till 1970s they followed political end by using BJS political capacity and form 1980s the BJP became Sangh’s political end provider and communal goal combined with communal riots to gain power for them and BJP used Babri communal operation to increase Hindu sentiment and attract their votes for instance. As “religion in India is a cover for ‘power and pelf’[230] (Nanda, 2009)“ but it is not all the story and as result of pressure on Muslim, they “had become the new untouchables in India (Nanda, 2009).” As in the US the concept of “separation of church and state” comes into direct conflict with conservative politicians who like to declare that America is a “great Christian nation (Blanco, Leyva, Nicklaw, & Winton, 2006).” In India, also hardliner of right wing Hindu nationalism speak of Hindu nation and puts secularism under direct conflict.



Chapter Three : Globalisation



It’s about three decades that humanity has been experiencing rapid changes; the world is shrinking, “computer, television, cable, satellite, laser, fiber-optic, and microchip technologies combining to create a vast interactive communications and information network that can potentially give every person on earth access to every other person (Barber, 1992).” Scientists believe that the world is going through globalisation process, which has become a key research field in the social sciences and continues to be a hot debated topic to discover its impacts.  As the beauty of plural, diversify, secular India, the container of 17% of the global population is threatening by brutality of communal forces and it shows dark side of violence in non-violence Indian culture.

This chapter will study the effect of globalisation on India, when the cultural and technological forces now reshaping the world; and complex multi-level process of mediation between the global and the local, is under the process, “India is where modernity is meeting tradition head on. The globalisation as a phenomenon that “generally considers inevitable and beyond anyone’s control (Benoist 1996, p117)” is a trend that is breaking or is going to break all political, cultural, social, religious and economic world’s borders; and nowadays with or without permission of all those border’s guardians, it has infiltrated in different independent units all around the world; and it is laying its impacts on them. So somehow, because of the shrinking time and space, the world has become so small and the relationship between its players has expanded and fasted. Indeed, a kind of closeness is happening; as a result, this process is termed the world as global village. The trend has been started since the “technical progress in the 20th century has revolutionized the transport of people, goods and information (Beese & Fraedrich, 2000),” this is evaluated as the grounds of globalisation.

From a historical perspective we can distinguish different stages of globalisation namely, ancient, modern and contemporary ones. Contemporary globalisation as the most accelerated one is the subject of this study which “differs from that of earlier times in four ways: the volume of materials (information, matter, energy) moved is larger; the speeds with which they are moved are faster; and the diversity of materials moved is greater (Pieterse, Jan Nederveen 2000, p388).” But it can say the “economic globalization has accelerated in the post-Cold War era (Salzman, 2008)” and “globalisation refers to the growing integration of economies and societies over the past two decades (Boccara 2006).” Some commentators locate the origins of globalisation “in the early 1970s (Benoist 1996, p118).” However, from 2000 world has been shrinking more and more, the process that has continued until now. Although a lot of scientists dated globalisation process to the last two decades of 20st century but some dated it to 1950s that “India tried to integrate with the world economy as soon as it became a sovereign state; the roots of the present globalisation process in India lies way back in the l980s. India started to liberalize trade in 1977-7 (Nalyan, Amar K J R, page 14).” However, as it is clear the globalisation process accelerated in early 1990s by economic reforms and generalized to other fields later on.


Definition of globalisation

 A feeling of ‘uniqueness of the world’ people can be the outcome of globalisation. However, the question remains is, what is globalisation? researchers in this field do not agree on a common definition of the key concept globalisation; but Arie M. Kacowicz (1998) supposed globalization as “a short form for a cluster of related changes: economic, ideological, technological, and cultural (Kacowicz, 1998).” According to Holm and Sorensen (1992), “globalisation can be defined as the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders.”[231] “the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole[232] (Movius, 2010).” Or Anthony Giddens (1990) define it as “the intensification of worldwide social relations, which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”[233]  and Ulrich Beck[234] also thought “globality means nothing which happens on our planet is only a limited local event; affect the whole world, and we must reorient and reorganize our lives and actions, our organizations, and institutions along a local–global axis (Nanda, 2009).” globalisation  as “the most abused word of the 21st century”[235] has some characters like Internationalization which refers to increasing cross-border activities, liberalization that refer to world markets, Universalization which refers to a homogenization of cultural values worldwide, Westernization or Americanization that refers to internationalization of their values like individualism and capitalism. ‘Internationalization’ and liberalization are related to the economic dimension; whereas universalization and westernization are linked to the cultural dimension. Globalisation sometimes has been defined with primacy given to no specific geographic location. Globalisation as a fact and as a value are different; as value refer to cultural and social integration. Information technologies, such as the world-wide web and other communication technologies, have transformed economic and social relations to such an extent that cultural and economic barriers are minimized; information and communication technologies shape cultural and civic discourse (Kluver, 2000). Globalisation sometimes defined as “the sharper and continuing integration of the world (Nayar, 2006)“ as economic liberalization, that refers “to deregulation and decontrol in a national economy, an economic process inextricably linked with globalisation (Nayar, 2006)“; Globalisation also is considered as ‘girdle’ which “binds the world and the nations of the earth together (Fletcher, 2008).” However, globalisation is the concept that remains unclear for some, “it is a development beyond the nation-state. Some see it as the expansion of world-trade with the inclusion of new players from the ‘South’. while others emphasize the broadening of exchange caused by the ‘Information Revolution’; globalisation is simply part of a long term dynamic of capitalism (Benoist, 1996).” Some believe “this is a long term, uneven and paradoxical process in which widening social cooperation and deepening inequality go together (Pieterse, 2000).”


Globalisation: a positive or negative impact

This study argues that globalisation is a positive process and movement toward moderation of cultures and its radical elements. However some thinkers like Jeremy Seabrook believes that globalisation, itself “is a declaration of war upon all cultures[236]” and some of the social scientists like N. Boccara speak of its great impact on culture, and pessimistically believes “It destroys local traditions in order to create a homogenized world culture (Boccara 2006, p2).” Some scholars as Samuel Huntington puts great emphasis on cultural aspects of humanity and believes that the “great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural”[237].  It has a “significant impact on matters such as local cultures, matters which are less tangible and hard to quantify, but often fraught with intense emotion and controversy (Institute, 2013)” so believe on 19th and 20th change along industrial revolution and then IT, which “physically and psychologically uprooted, dislocated and marginalized millions of people (Salzman, 2008)”, push them to rise of religious fundamentalism. Lee (2000)[238] expresses of the post-Cold War era when “new categories of winners and losers have been produced along with a rise in fundamentalism, hyper-ethnocentrism and the proliferation of neo-fascist and right-wing extremist organizations (Salzman, 2008).” It is clear that based on this theory, RSS[239] itself is as an outcome of globalisation and as a reaction to these changes, it has shaped, and its elements gathered on a feelings of a sense of belonging to exact Hindu culture.

 “The interdisciplinary aspect of globalization and religion can be seen in the increasing use of communications technologies to bring religious values either into harmony or direct clashes (Blanco et al., 2006).” “Globalisation has brought a radical change not only in the economic and technological order, but also in the mentalities and the ways of conceiving the world (Stenou & Keitne, 2004).” “An in-direct result of global transport, global business and global information is that the ‘Western’ life-style is leaping borders rapidly. Many traditional cultures are either being suppressed or are disappearing altogether. Religions, art, handicrafts and languages are particularly affected, but ultimately every variety of social norm and value is influenced (Beese & Fraedrich, 2000).” The “concerning issues of the global economy and global security, raise some critical questions about the nature of the global in the contemporary world (Muppidi, 2004).” Because this situation threated world old identity, they start to react to it, so this is a fact that local or indigenous cultural values conflict with the forces of globalization to protect itself; but “globalisation can also be a profoundly enriching process, opening minds to new ideas and experiences, and strengthening the finest universal values of humanity (Institute, 2013).” The theological construction of religion as container of identity in a society is being threated by the world process and rise the reaction of individual as well as communalists, who formed in boundaries of religion framework as Linell Elizabeth Cady[240] writes: “Indeed a major response to the increased pluralism and globalisation of life in the late twentieth century has been a reassertion of tightly bounded personal and communal identities, what some have called tribalization (Fletcher, 2008).” According to Badie[241]: “globalisation destroys sovereignties, cuts through territories, abuses established communities, challenges social contracts and renders obsolete earlier concepts of international security (Benoist, 1996).” Globalisation and homogenization are likely to come together; and some are on this view that “Today a homogenization of cultures is taking place (but) Homogenization is contrary to the natural impulses of mankind. Existing cultures are threatened by the rapidity of change and there is no time to assimilate and integrate and yet retain individual regional identities and cultures. (Bhela ,2011).” Some evaluate globalisation as positive process, “the homogenizing influences of globalization that are most often condemned by the new nationalists and by cultural romanticists are actually positive; globalization promotes integration and the removal not only of cultural barriers but of many of the negative dimensions of culture. Globalization is a vital step toward both a more stable world and better lives for the people in it.”[242] “globalization can also reinforce local cultures (Institute, 2013).”


Cultural globalisation and India

Cultural[243] globalisation refers to “the emergence of a specific set of values and beliefs that are largely shared around the planet[244] (Movius, 2010).” Kacowicz (1998) includes, ideological and cultural changes and said it “include investment and trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and the adoption of political democracy in the institutional realm. Cultural changes involve trends toward harmonization of tastes and standards, a universal world culture that transcends the nation-state.” Cultural globalisation is going to be important, when India as diverse country with deep rooted traditions, and deep rooted culture and religion faces with the question that “whether or not cultures flourish as a consequence of cultural mixing.” The answer to this question by Hindu and Hindu radicalism show them how to react. “Cultural globalisation must be distinguished from economic globalisation. These two phenomena overlap, but are not the same (Benoist 1996, p117).” As UNESCO,[245] report in 2000 indicated of the cultural threats that nations such as India are facing, a report states that rapid globalisation “has brought a radical change not only in the economic and technological order, but also in the mentalities and ways of conceiving the world. This new dimension requires a redefinition of the type of actions and strategies to be established in order to preserve and promote cultural diversity, in particular at the time when new global markets are being formed and the statute of cultural goods compared to that of ordinary consumer goods is being debated (Stenou & Keitne, 2004).” In this atmosphere that “cultural globalisation can appear to act as a solvent, dissolving cultural differences to create homogeneity across the globe (Movius, 2010).” Hindu selflessness raised against western selfishness and is going to promote itself and showing reaction; “Capitalism, the dominant socioeconomic system in every Western country, supports a highly individualistic, self-centered ideology. Indian myths, legends and stories, on the other hand, stress that good human beings think of the welfare of others before their own. A Hindu's prayers are not only for himself/herself but also for the peace of all nature, the whole world, and even the cosmos. The Indian tradition in fact considers those who think only of themselves and their self-interest as demonic and those who think of others' wellbeing as divine in disposition (Bhela 2011, p95).” At the time that India is opening doors in cultural exchange “from a cultural standpoint, critics worry about globalisation leading to homogenization (Acharya, 2006)” “The cultural imperialism thesis argues that media globalisation will lead to a homogenisation of culture, identity and locale.” The thesis has long been a central, as well as problematic, element of political economy approaches to global media. The theory that after colonialism area speaks of neo-colonialism in Asian, African and Pacific’s states. “The school of thought identify the dominance model, which proposes that globalisation leads to homogenization of culture through media and cultural imperialism (Movius, 2010)“ as Indian local entertainment industries that named Bollywood[246] “are overrun by those of the developed nations, in particular Hollywood.” It was not just India; as 2000, for example, “the market for domestic cinema in France fell to 30% and in South Korea to 33% with Hollywood films accounting for the largest share of the box office in both countries (Acharya, 2006).” About media “most theorists agree that there is practically no globalisation without media and communications”[247] “the Frankfurt School saw media communication as the ‘culture industry’, which reinforced in its audience the ideology of the dominant culture (Movius, 2010).” We should know that “In 1976, Doordarshan, still the only television station in India (Acharya, 2006)“ the rise in information technology, wireless telephones, satellite television, and the Internet were all made available in India during this period in part due to the new economic policies which adopted in 1990s. The roots of cable TV in India can be traced to the late 1970s that world and India process in 1990s add other countries TV channels like the CNN to normal service of cable TV later. The launch of Zee TV and Star TV in 1992 and making their programming free and available on satellites was the next crucial step. “In January 1992, there were an estimated 412,000 urban Indian households with cable. By 1999, that number had swelled to 22 million.”[248] The cable subscribers in India from 83 of 126.8 million homes in 2008 will raised to 102.8 of 165 million homes in 2014 in India.[249]

he market for English language features in India has traditionally been small amounting to no more than 2-5% of the country, but in 1992, the government liberalized the requirements, so resulting in a great increase in foreign films being released domestically, not only by Hollywood based companies but also a number of domestic importers. As a result, revenues from Hollywood fare jumped from Rs. 38 million in 1992 to Rs 400 million in 1999-2000[250]. Attendance shot up from 8 million in 1992 to 47 million in 1998 and 50 million in 2000. “The share of Hollywood productions is, however, growing at a pace that is beginning to be perceived as a possible threat to the local industry, in a market that is projected to grow from $3.2 billion (Rs. 17,660 crore, at current prices) in 2010 to $5 billion (Rs. 27,600 crore) by 2014.”[251]

Internet is a globalized world communication media. Internet Usage in 1998 was just 0.1% that increased to 11.4% of 1.2 billion India people in 2012[252] (about 150 million). While “The Web in India has been dominated by English language content”[253]  “The Internet is perhaps the single most important factor that has shrunk the globe (Bhawuk, 2008)“ “It is cultural globalisation that occurs through the media (Movius, 2010).”Although some believe that “there is evidence of the continued diversity of culture and identity, despite global media and cultural globalisation (Movius, 2010)" and some surveys support this idea that “national and regional identities remain far stronger than a cosmopolitan identity.”[254] In front of homogenisation theory, “the heterogeneous school of thought suggests that media in fact extends communication” and “culture and leads to enhanced understanding and democracy” And “promote ethnic and cultural diversity (Movius, 2010).” Any way at the time that “culture has become more potent than armaments (Barber, 1992),” so Hindu cultural system threated from globalisation process, especially cultural aspects of it and start to react toward it.



with integration process as a result of globalisation “the world would look like one big state, as networks of interdependence (Muppidi, 2004)” units, that they are “extends not just across the economic realm but also into environmental, military, social and political ones (Muppidi 2004, p3)“ the results would be “shrinkage of distance on a world scale (Muppidi 2004, p3).” But the problem will be “the absence of a strong sense of political community at the global level (Muppidi 2004, p4).” “One of the most obvious features of economic globalisation is the explosion of financial exchange. The other important factor is obviously the growing role of computers and electronics, another novelty is the universalization of the market (BENOIST 1996, p117).” Therefore, the world is going to bind its people together and close them to exchange human values and their culture and taking effect more effectively and swiftly.


India joining the globalisation process

“Globalization in India has been accepted, indeed embraced by a burgeoning middle class in a mutated form resulting from a hybridization between global definitions of progress and a peculiar sense of respectability (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” India’s entry in globalisation process had been boosted with economic intention, when some influenced Indian politicians in local and national level felt necessity of globalized-India and “ability to be globally competitive (Muppidi, 2004)“, by the use of “international investment as the prime engine of growth (ibib);” so based on Nayar’s definition (2006) of globalisation, at least India have been stepped in globalisation process since early 1990s; when its policy-makers “after many years of protectionism (Acharya, 2006)“ did some reforms in its socialistic controlled economic policies in 1991 “to accelerate technological change and modernize the Indian economy in order to make it efficient and internationally competitive[255] (Muppidi, 2004); and whereas “modernization, linked closely to globalisation is a concept that operates on two levels: the economic and the socio-political (Karolak & Etzrodt, 2010)“. So by these reforms, India faced with a kind of paradigm shift in the realm of foreign capital[256] and investment as economic element and social changes also. Although it was an economic reform and it was a “call for a greater hospitality toward private foreign capital; and changed definition of the historically institutionalized  meanings of Indian “self-reliance”(Muppidi, 2004)“, but it was a new start in other fields, like cultural aspects also; “in 1991, the pace of globalisation in India suddenly accelerated, as economy opened. Within a decade, satellite-television and Hollywood movies became wildly available. (so) many commentators expected that exposure to new cultural models would lead to changes in family and gender arrangements in India (Derne, 2005).” So based on the ground facts “Despite a widespread effort by policy makers to present Indian economic liberalization as primarily an issue of technically desirable changes, opponents of the process have insisted on politicizing it as an issue of national identity. It has quite often strayed, even among the economists, into questions about the nature of the Indian self, about Indian national identity, and about the desirable relation to the rest of the world, particularly the West (Muppidi, 2004).” Therefore even Rao’s[257] statements to articulate “of economic reforms as a technical issue of efficiency, modernization, and competitiveness was not a very successful enterprise initially and not very effective in hailing their audience (Muppidi, 2004).” Hence, globalisation in India starts with economic policy and expands to other field like cultural and social aspects later on.


The effects of globalisation process on India

Although during 19st-century industrialized Europe, organized religion began to decline, the experience of South Asia has been more or less the reverse of this trend. “Across the subcontinent, faith has been growing and religion becoming stronger as the region develops and reinvents itself (Dalrymple, 2009).” Meera Nanda has evaluated that “India is becoming increasingly hindu as it globalizes (Nanda, 2009).” It has been shaped in engagement with different waves of globalisation, historically; from Aryans to British colonists and now, the chosen accelerated-globalisation process during last 2-3 decades; in which new era of globalisation starts with liberalization process that decided in last 20th century’s decade by Rao’s government. From this time Indian life influence through the powerful images created by TV channels and print media… which controlling and shaping people culture, common sense and beliefs. The media that promotes the dominance of a ruling-class ideology, especially by establishing a hegemony. “Having grown up on a steady diet of religious, media, and other cultural discourses that constantly package Hindu signs and symbols[258] as the essence of Indian culture, it has become almost second nature for educated Indians to conflate the two (ibid).” The 2009 survey show that “newspapers are able to maintain their dominance, with over half (53%) of all literate youth, or 177 million, exposed to them[259]. About 68 million people read the 6,000-odd magazines in India[260]. There were just about 50 TV channels in 1996, but the number is more than 500 in 2010. The impact of new technology on human desires and human relations has also led to what Singh[261] termed as “de-contextualization and displacement of meaning and values of cultural objects.‟ ‘Cultural globalization’ does not refer to the possibility of a single global culture; it rather signifies the spread of plural cultural elements across the globe (Ghosh, 2012).” Although Hindutva has taken strong roots within the Indian imagination; but the reaction of them has depended on area and time. Globalisation has been brought qualitative and quantitative changes or shifts for India, “globalisation will open up societies to democratic tendencies (Kacowicz, 1998).”[262] When ‘Integration in the world’ was considered as the main character of globalisation, expanding world communicating system will be the main goal; and the main base-provider for it, will be various communication system for this trend; like developments in information communications technologies, transport[263] and communications. Although the process of world communicating have been started by traders and later on explorers, historically; the process has a long history; but globalisation is refers to a revolutionary in accelerating in this regard. Past three decades have been growing to the highest pick. Accordingly, at this time broadcasting facility (or media), printing and publishing affaires, communication services, cinema[264] and so on, will be the main players that the whole were started and expanded during colonial time; and IT and World Wide Web[265] as the last one after liberalizing India is expanding until now.  As a result of economic liberalization, global companies and their procedures have entered in India; Now IT (service and software) sector as technological-based phenomenon presence in India; that its “technological leadership[266]“ is in the hand of its producers; so it is a good example for a globalized India in this regard. Hence, naturally, the strong effects also will be in this direction; and India will take its effects strongly; though with regard to communication field and media India have also been stepped in globalized era perfectly. “Since 1991, India has witnessed explosion of new media. 1991-9 access to television grows from 10% in urban area to 75%; cable television and foreign movies became widely available for the first time (Derne, Steve, 2005).” As this statistic shows, during this period in every year the access to Television had become double, the process that did not end in 1999[267] and continued until now. So as the situation evaluated by Indian scholar  “in India today, the new dominant culture is that of the urban rich, whose ways of dressing, speaking, and thinking are promoted in newspapers, magazines, television, movies and now the Internet. As any casual observer to India will note, this urban culture is based on the values of the modernized west. Indian culture in this regard is being continually bombarded by an alien culture, one that is fixated with body image, fashion, and symbols of economic status. As Indians conform to the processes of globalisation  imposed on them in the name of progress, they are increasingly losing their identity along with their rich heritage and traditions (Bhela, 2011).” One of the Indian cultural value is family pattern, which is going to change and shifting from collectivism to individualism so Indian joint family[268] is going to change to nuclear family and “the youth is far more individualistic than before (Overgaard, 2010).” The caste system as one of the Hindu cultural values is becoming a system of class[269] instead. “Technology and globalisation have made their inroads into rural India as well. Even rural people in many parts of India have given up their traditional way of life and replaced it with the culture of American fast food, blue jeans, and MTV[270]. In such an environment, the ability to speak English is prized while local languages are viewed as impediments to success (Bhela, 2011).” Therefore it faces with reaction of internal Indian forces that felt threat form this process and as the Indian left front points “greatest criticism of liberalization centered on reading it as a political move away from the process of the Indian nation’s continued decolonization, a move away from that independence, and fail to protect the interests as well as the economic sovereignty of the country (Muppidi, 2004)“ but it was not the left, and also the Indian right wing as well as Hindutva forces had reaction to it and for instance the “SJM[271] sees the global as a strong danger to the autonomy of the Indian nation and state; and seeing it as a loss of the nation’s sovereignty (ibid).” Both (the left and right) have made otherness outside India, that threat to their Indianness, and liberalization “is articulated as a process that would make the state more responsive to the outside, threaten its internal autonomy, and hurt its capacity to look after domestic interests (ibid).” “Both were united in refusing to concede any primacy to economics over politics. The left privileged politics as the autonomy of the state over specific social forces, while the right privileged national culture over the state and the economy (ibid).” Although there are various voices in the Indian debate over globalisation, it was not just the left and right and “other public voices expressed similar concerns. Some feared that liberalization would swamp India with western commodities and values. Liberalization was seen as a process that would deprive people of control over resources and security of food and livelihood (ibid).” Also many prominent industrialists in India that banded together in federations and clubs also “stunned the Indian government by strongly criticizing the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) in India (ibid)“ as a result of 1990s reforms. At the same time, it can be recognized a kind of accepting globalisation by Hindu nationalist group like BJP that has engaged with globalization in a sophisticated manner. The BJP government whish came to power in 1998 (until 2004) actively promoted the IT sector by providing strong incentives for foreign investment. For these reasons, the BJP has historically drawn from the strong support of the Indian middle classes. Hindu nationalism was also ‘global’ in its success in mobilizing Indian diaspora. Even transnational Hindu organizations, such as the VHP, were funded in large parts through the support of Indians living abroad, which in turn fuelled the rise of the BJP and a right-wing Hindutva agenda in India. Nanda researches shows open to the ideas of Hindu nationalist groups as globalization ‘winners’ (such the RSS organizes regular IT-Milans[272]), at what time their technical professionals can “meet like-minded people and get a sense of participating in something bigger than just punching keyboards all day”[273] (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” Globalization’s facilities as well as Hindu Gods, rituals and sacred texts, the dominant political-economic institutions are using to mobilize action of religious majority in favor of Hindu nationalism’s agenda; because of this Hindu, nationalism cannot evaluate as just religious force based on religion idea but they are based on several aspects of Indian life.  On the other hand according to Nanda, “As the national history, culture and destiny of India gets to be told and ritually enacted - over and over again, everyday - through the medium of Hindu Gods, the line between the worship of God and the worship of the nation is getting fainter by the day (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” At the time that globalisation make some problems which lead to the reaction of Hindutva; at the same time political Hinduism used this opportunity to vast their domination among Indian middle classes, who are the basis for radical Hindu force. they are modernizing himself and using global technologies; and by this strategy they make their influence deeper among them and win Indian liberal force’s attention inside and outside, strong effective economic forces, like public/private corporations owners as well; and also global foreign players; at this time the unification of cultural, political and economic Hindu nationalism forces come together and make a strong triangle to win the goal; therefore it can be said “Hindu nationalism does not exist in the realm of ideas alone (Gangopadhyay, 2010)”, and it related to so many player inside and outside India who are working together. The outcome of this strategy during the time when BJP was in power, resulted in a kind of closeness between NDA-led government of India and some religious-based countries like Zionist government in Jerusalem and later on its backer in Washington; so it’s potency to say Hindu nationalism with a tactical cooperation with them, follows the strategy of “Hindu superiority against Semitic monotheistic civilizations (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” The recent concept of ‘superpower India’ brings the necessity of establishment of pan-Indian identity that Hindu nationalism considers himself as capacity provider for it. Now Radhakrishnan (2008)[274] speaks of “strong sense of Indian identity stems (is come) from a Hindu nationalist movement”, accordingly have been “received significant financial and symbolic support from the diaspora.” Some like Castells (2004)[275] also believes that “the rise of religious and ethnic fundamentalisms as well as identity politics can be linked to the prodigious entry of globalization. As globalization and nationalism clash, it is essentially referred to as a battle between tradition and modernity (in Gangopadhyay, 2010).” And in this battle “contrary to classical theories of secularization, scientific, technological, and economic development does not invariably lead to a decline of religiosity[276] (Nanda, 2009),” and India not only doesn’t show decline but also show “growing religiosity (that) at least in part, a response to new socio-psychological needs created by neo-liberalism and globalization.” globalisation loose some traditional Hindu culture but the demand of continuation of some of it, is alive and want to have compromised living with global values so as Radhakrishnan (2008) researches find demanding of “the continuation of the Hindu family structure from professional Indian women, both in India and the diaspora. And within the upwardly mobile class of Indians, the concept of Indianness and Westernness are no longer oppositional with “a sense of ‘‘Indianness’’ (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” But Nanda believes that “while the rest of the world might be expected to become less religious with modernity, India will always be religious; that the rise in hindu religiosity can be explained by the emergence of the ‘state–temple–corporate complex’[277] (Nanda, 2009).” About HDI[278] India have long way to go and although among 177 countries it’s ranking fallen to 132 in 2008 but its counterparts in BRICS[279] have better ranking than India. About poverty also “The most respected studies by Angus Deaton and Jean Dreze (2008)[280], ‘the broad picture emerging…is one of sustained poverty decline in most states and also in India as a whole’. However, it appears that the poor only move from being ‘extremely poor’ and ‘poor’ to joining the sea of hard-working poor who make up the unorganized sector of the economy. Two of the most vulnerable and large segments of the Indian population—Dalits and Muslims—are a case in point: as many as 88 per cent of Dalits and 84 per cent of Muslims make a living in the informal or unorganized sector. even the government admits that ‘they have remained poor at a bare subsistence level without any job or social security, working in the most miserable, unhygienic, and unlivable conditions throughout this period of high economic growth since the early nineties’. In many ways, Muslims in India are faring much worse than even the Dalits. They are largely self-employed—only 13 per cent of the entire Muslim population has salaried jobs in public or private enterprises, with barely 5 per cent of public sector jobs going to Muslims. The recent ‘Sachar Committee’ report found that globalization has hit the Muslim workers harder than other communities (ibid).” Moreover, so many job and productivity that Muslims lost during communal riots against their Hindu rivals “Many of the traditional occupations of Muslims in industries such as silk, weaving, leather, and garment making have been hurt by cheaper imports from China. There are industries like gem cutting and brass work which are experiencing large growth in exports, but the benefits are mostly going to the Hindu owners of these enterprises (ibid).” “Indeed, the public sphere is replete with these messages of becoming more Hindu in order to become more successful in the global race for money and power; temples are getting renovated and together with worshippers, they are remaking old gods and rituals and inventing entirely new ones altogether (ibid).” Globalisation process helps Indian state and corporates to have access to more capital and wealth and they use it to propagate Hinduism so “the explosion of popular hindu religiosity is the result of years of the open and often hidden support hinduism has received—and continues to receive—from the supposedly secular Indian government and India’s corporate elite (ibid).” Under influence of globalized media, spiritualists of Hindu are not limited to some people in India and they can take relation to vast member in India as well as world people. In addition, if any of them can attracts the global political economy, can interact more effective and vastly. State and private sector in education and religious tourism are working together to promote Hinduism now. “Economic globalization and neo-liberal reforms have created the material and ideological conditions in which a popular and ritualistic Hindu religiosity is growing. The three-sided partnership between the state, the temples, and the corporate interests is working in harmony to promote Hinduism in the public sphere. Popular religiosity, in turn, is being directed into a mass ideology of Hindu supremacy and Hindu nationalism. This trend is a symptom of a deeper, more fundamental malaise, namely, the failure of secularism. For all its professions of secularism, the Indian state has developed neither a stance of equal indifference, nor of equal respect, for all the many religions of India. It has instead treated Hinduism, the religion of the majority, as the civic religion of the Indian nation itself. The result is a deep and widespread hinduization of the public sphere, which is only growing under the conditions of globalization (ibid).”


Radical Hindu’s reaction to globalisation

“Educated, urban Hindu reformers moved away from ritualized expressions of faith, and early leaders constitutionally formed India as a model secular state with no official faith: this was to be a nation where, in the words of Nehru, ‘dams would be the new temples’. But over the past 20 years, just as India has freed itself from the shackles of Nehruvian socialism, so India has also gone a long way to try to shake off Nehruvian secularism, too. The revival of religiosity and religious extremism in Pakistan, happening in India is equally remarkable and in many ways surprisingly similar. Globalisation may be making India richer, and arguably more materialistic, but it is also making Indians more religious, and at the same time making religion more political. a new Hindu religiosity is getting more deeply embedded in everyday life, in both the private and public spheres (Dalrymple, 2009).” Hindutva has taken strong roots within the Indian imagination; but the reaction of the Hindutva forces to globalisation process in India depends on area, time, subjects and scholars. At the beginning of the 21st century, it can be recognized that the BJP approaches to globalisation in direction of Indian elites who stopped worrying about Nehru–Gandhi ideas of national self-reliance and came to love the global markets. Nationalism pride leads them to the India ‘superpower’ concept which talking about was started after nuclear tests in 1998, by BJP-led government generally. It was related to globalized-India perception as some of hindutva proponents like Subramanian Swamy[281] prescribes Indian in this way that for creation of superpower India, it should “dismantle all aspects of Nehruvian socialism and secularism, reduce the state to merely providing the infrastructure and the policies for private sector to flourish at the rate of 10 per cent GDP growth per year, and align their interests with the strategic interests of the US and Israel. All these economic and foreign policy reforms are not sufficient. What is needed is a ‘re-throning’ of Sanskritic hinduism in the hearts and minds of the masses (Muslims and Christians included), schools, government, and business enterprises of Hindustan (his preferred name for India). Economic superpower-doom will only come if it is accompanied with a hindu renaissance (in Nanda, 2009).” Nanda (2009) believes  that “In BJP’s vision…globalization became the site in which India will take up her rightful place in the international community” when Jaswant Singh[282] said “Look at what is happening in the knowledge industry…we are reaching out the world and registering our presence through globalization. Today the Indian entrepreneur is celebrated (ibid).” Among Hindu hardliner who are in favor of globalisation, some prominent like Narendra Modi[283] are pro-free market and “supporting an individualistic interpretation of Hinduism; (he) has become the darling of industrialists and businessmen from the world over; (he) can be called hindutva neo-liberals.[284] The second group is made up of those trying to stake out a secular (or at least non-hindutva) right-wing party which would eschew the divisive anti-Muslim and anti-Christian agenda of the BJP and the RSS and popularize classical liberal positions on individual rights and freedoms, small government and religion – state separation - a sort of modern-day Swatantra party, those who share this orientation can be safely described as non-hindutva neo-liberals (ibid).” Hindutva neo-liberals want the state to use public resources to actively promote a renaissance of hinduism; to have a minimal role in economic affairs, but maximal role in propagation[285] of hinduism (ibid).” The BJP “subscribes to the kind of philosophical liberalism based upon respect for the rights-bearing individual (ibid).” So as a result “the Indian state and its functionaries operate on the unstated assumption that hinduism is not merely one religion among other religions of the Indian people, but rather the national ethos, or the way of life, that all Indians must learn to appreciate, if not actually live by. As a result, politicians and policymakers of all political persuasions think nothing of spending taxpayers’ money and deploying public infrastructure for promoting Hinduism in the guise of promoting Indian culture[286] at home and abroad (ibid).”

On the other hand the RSS active forces has been appeared on-the-street in Maharashtra, Gujarat and parts of South India and their grassroots level work in the villages and small towns all across India has far-reaching impacts. The large-scale migration area, rural to semi-urban areas to urban centers like New Delhi as like. On the other side some pro-hindu culture forces had reacted to the changing in its follower’s behaviors and mentalities and some of their radical reactions was so violence that lead to the warning of “Hindu Talibanization of India (Gangopadhyay, 2010)[287]“, and clash of the two seemingly oppositional ideologies of conservative religious nationalism, specifically, Hindutva, and globalization. Hindu fundamentalists now speaks of cultural foreign ‘invasion’ and loose of Indian cultural traditions, so in some areas which Hindu extremism is more active they start to react to them as example it can be named Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka. “In Madhya Pradesh, Moral Police against Lingerie Ads, Window Display”[288] to reduce anti public modesty. “Rightwing activists in the city of Bhopal were offended by an obscene hoarding displaying the bare back of a woman” that was advertising a day spa near a woman’s college as well as undergarment displays in window shops.  According to the leader of the local manch (group), “Your mannequins should wear Sarees, not underwear. From now on, keep all undergarments inside…[or] we will light a bonfire of the lingerie (Gangopadhyay, 2010).” In Karnataka, also objections against other “invasions” include protests against Valentine’s Day as a “vulgar festival” of “western culture” from which, nationalists needed to “save the future generation from degeneration and the country from disintegration”[289] show their sensitivity. The effects of using Hindu symbol and rituals in politic is so strong that now “mass pujas (prayers) and public yagnas (fire sacrifices) have become an important part of political campaigning for all parties, not just the overtly Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Globalisation is welcomed by Hindu radicalism like BJP, VHP, RSS as alarm that “the modernization of the RSS is certainly one of the more worrying trends in Indian religiosity (Dalrymple, 2009).” “The RSS’s campaigns against foreign investments in the consumer goods sector and foreign fast-food chains which are “contaminating Indian culture and food habits,” and the restrictions on foreign investment to high-technology sectors (Hansen, 1999).” Hindu nationalists feel ‘India’s spiritual superiority’ over the world and consider “the universal mission of Hindu philosophy to be a ‘spiritual corrective’ to a materialistic and overly rationalist western world remains a cornerstone in contemporary Hindu nationalism (ibid).” “The world mission of the Hindus—to save the world from military aggression, excessive consumerism, and exploitation of natural resources—can only be achieved through a proper development of Hindu nationalism in India itself.” They announce 21th century as a “ ‘Hindu century’ based on holism and integralism (ibid).”



As recent sharp-accelerated globalisation, process is going on; India as a one of the biggest member of the shrunk world organs is being effected by globalization’s negative and positive consequences. This country and its people during not only ancient and medieval eras, but also now (accelerated globalisation time) have been under the special cultural effects which came from its neighbor’s civilizations like Iran (in the West and North West) and China (in the North and North East). Additionally during past decades, Islam and European civilizations also effected them. Therefore, some Indian cultural elements such as the cast system, polygamy[290], sati[291] … that were incompatible with human values disappeared or diminished. Different waves of globalisation trends affected Indians; for instance Islam that arrived in India during globalisation process, was an Iranized Islam, which was more respectable with indigenous Indian culture’s elements like non-violence, tolerance and Indian theosophy so it was established there well. But the Islam which is coming from Wahhabi approaches is promoting violence and extremism in South Asian countries now and consequently the Muslims in India now are considers as ‘others’ and face several kinds of problems. Although “the world we live in today has changed in many ways that calls for a better understanding of each other (Bhawuk, 2008)“, but Muslim suspects globalisation as Tun Mahathir Mohamed[292] warns “Muslim countries and Muslim governments have a duty to ensure that globalization will not result in the marginalization of their countries as happened with the Industrial Revolution and Industrial Age (Razak, 2011).” It is the reality that “globalisation reconstructs the world as shared social space (Mcgrew, 2008)“ and the world is facing with common problems and humanity as well as common values, so the necessity of globalisation process with the character of interaction among people is going to be clearer. However, it is the fact that some cultural forces, which have more capacity, appear more attractive and offensive to other cultures, and an atmosphere of fear separated among and separated them from each other; and challenging of diversity in world cultures will be appear, and as a result will rise the reaction of them. In India, Hindu nationalism or political right wing at the same time even though fighting with some cultural effects of globalisation, but they use its capacity to increase their influence among Indian middle class as their main basis. Accordingly, Indians as a religious people are not distancing from religion, but also their attention to their culture and religion is going to be stronger; as contemporary studies also show “India is not only witnessing a resurgence of popular religiosity, this religiosity is becoming indistinct from national and even civilizational self-glorification (Nanda, 2010).” Increasing respectability of far right wing hindu organizations like RSS in the eyes of the urban Indian middle class and increasing religiosity among Indians which governmental and public – private economic enterprises plus technology are at their service shows a dark future for Hindu radicalism’s ‘others’ in India. Another fact is exist there that increasing radical hindu organization position among Indian middle classes and even lower classes and even coming to power of the BJP not radicalize Hinduism, as N. Modi has shown, the radical Hindu will form an economical, developmental and integrational in global economy instead of promoting violence and sectarian conflict; in other ways globalization has positive effect on radical Hinduism to give up extremism when they come to power. Mr. Narendra Modi just two months after coming to power on 15 august 2014 during his first national day speech is announced communal violence as ‘too long’ and ‘stalling the growth of the nation’[293]  and asked for a ‘ten-year moratorium’ on all forms of sectorial violence has muddled the civil discourse[294].


Chapter Four:   Indian Voting Behavior


As a parliamentary federal democracy, India general election for Lok Sabha[295] is the determinant of India’s rulers, its policy-makers and as a result, policies. India as “the largest democracy in the world is also a land of diversities, have to ensure adequate representation to all majority and minority communities through the electoral processes (Sivan, 2010).” The course that is a “complete balance between a citizen’s rights and duties. Choosing the representative is a citizen’s right and choosing the ‘right representative’ is a citizen’s duty (Sivan, 2010)” and the constitution of India guarantee both; but in practice some Indian have not sufficient representatives in parliament based on their population in society for instance. Every five years directly or indirectly, India’s democratic secular constitution gives this capacity to its society[296] to renew its leaders and policies, by voting in general LS elections. None of the Indian rulers have right to rule India lifetime and they serve just for exact period of time; and the law says how many years they can be in charge, as a result “electing the representative periodically, electoral process works as an agent of social change[297] (Sivan, 2010),” because of this Indian political or social forces who want to be in power chose this way to go into it and Indian voting behavior and their elected representative in somehow can be considers as people’s approaches; because they vote based on the parties’ slogans, manifests, activities, leaders and their practice outcome and “political parties[298] are central to the election process (Sivan, 2010)“ in India. History of India after independent shows 16 Lok Sabha[299] general election[300], which ten[301] of them are located in the last three decades, which is indicating instability and transitional period in political areas the concern of this study also; and the Indian voting behavior and approaches in these elections will be studies of the following pages. INC as secular, non-communal force was the favorite party for decades, which was appointed by voters to rule India but communal forces also have been started to take share in power from 1950s by organizing BJS party… and then in 1980s this process was continued by BJP that now is in power in India. “The BJP – and its predecessor, the BJS – has always oscillated between two types of strategies. One based on ethno-religious mobilizations, such as the movement to build a temple at Ayodhya; the other, a more moderate strategy based on coalition making which stresses socio-economic and patriotic issues. The first strategy is the most preferred choice[302] of the RSS.”[303] However, the BJP realized that “a strategy based on moderation appeared to be necessary to win power – especially to make alliances – when circumstances did not enable the Hindu nationalist forces to resort to the ethno-religious repertoire.”[304] However, the BJP especially during Vajpayee time tried to be moderate, so this strategy was criticized by Hindutva hardliner[305] but some NDA partner like the JD (s) in Bihar or TDP in Andrea Pradesh were attended to this coalition based on the BJP moderate approaches.[306] In the following lines, this thesis will review Indian voting behavior toward BJP and its allies, National Democratic Alliance (NDA).


Radicals’ representative vote gaining in Lok Sabha during the last 3 decades


Seventh Lok Sabha (1980 –1984)

The Janata Party which came to power as a result of the 6th LS election by using the ‘emergency’ announcing by Indira Gandhi and riding the public wave of anger against this policy of Congress, was a mixture of socialists and Hindu nationalists. It was the first coalition government, which ruled India, and although it had 270 LS seats, but its position was weak and finally it collapsed. It never quite had such a strong control on power but this alliance torn apart in 1979 when BJS leaders[307] and several others quit and withdrew support of the government, and its Prime Minister Morarji Desai resigned after losing a ‘trust vote’ in LS and so Charan Singh was sworn in as Prime Minister in June 1979. INC promised to support him in LS but later on backed out so he called for new election in January 1980. In the seventh Lok Sabha general election in 1980, the BJP again just gained 2 seats, but INC by achieving 353 seats formed the government and Indira Gandhi ruled India till her assassination in 1984. In this era, the Jan Sangh tasted power at the center, and leaders such as L. K. Advani and A. B. Vajpayee gained visibility as senior cabinet ministers, of Information and Broadcasting and of External Affairs ministries in that order. The Bharatiya Janata Party was formed in 1980 after the breakup of the Janata, as the successor to the Jan Sangh, and it was an important change in radical’s political approaches. The Janata Party’s emergence was represented the first unification of the anti-Congress opposition, despite many previous attempts, and signaled a moment of some transparency in Indian politics. However, the lack of unity on more substantive issue than opposition itself and the faction-riven nature of the party made it short-lived. The government did not last its full term, and the Indira returned to office in 1980.


 Eighth Lok Sabha (1984–1989)

The BJP in eighth Lok Sabha general election in 1984 attracted 7.74% of voters and again it just increased four seats. This election was held after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’ assassination, so it created a sympathy vote for the Congress… and with 414 LS seats and near 50% of the popular vote, Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as interim Prime Minister.


 Ninth Lok Sabha (1989–1991)

“The Ram Temple issue, led the BJP increasing its parliamentary seat total from two (increased to 4) to eighty-eight in the 1989 general elections (Rajagopal, 2001).” The BJP was the bigger gainer in the elections increasing its total to 88 MPs from just two in the 1984 elections by attracting 11.36% of the voters. In many ways, the ninth LS Elections were a watershed in Indian electoral politics. The elections changed the way politicians would approach the voters, with caste and religion not far from the average Indian voter at any point in time, becoming the axis. The 1989 general election gained victory with the young Rajiv cornered with numerous crises; The Bofors[308] scandal, rising separation movement in Punjab[309], the civil war between LTTE and Sri Lankan government[310] were just some of the problems that stared at Rajiv's government. On October 11, 1988, merger of Jan Morcha, Janata Party, Lok Dal and Congress (S) formed the Janata Dal, in order to bring together all the parties opposed to the INC (Rajiv Gandhi) government. Soon, many regional parties rallied around the Janata Dal including the DMK[311], TDP[312], and AGP[313] and formed the National Front (NF). The five-party NF appeared in 1989 after joining hands with the BJP and the two communist parties[314]. The NF managed to secure a simple majority in the Lok Sabha and formed the government with the outside support of the Left Front and the BJP. Janata Dal, NF's largest constituent, won 143 seats with CPI (M) and CPI securing 33 and 12 respectively. Independents and other smaller parties managed to win 59 seats. However, the Congress was still the single largest party in the Lok Sabha with 197 MPs. Vishwanath Pratap Singh became the 10th Prime Minister of India. He held office from December 2, 1989, to November 10, 1990. After BJP leader L. K. Advani started the Rath Yatra on the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri-Masjid issue and was arrested in Bihar by state chief minister Lalu Yadav, the party withdrew support to the V.P. Singh government. Singh resigned after losing the trust vote. Chandra Shekhar broke away from the Janata Dal with 64 MPs and formed the Samajwadi Janata Party. He got outside support from the Congress and became the 11th Prime Minister of India. He finally resigned on March 6, 1991, after the Congress alleged that the government was spying on Rajiv Gandhi.


Tenth Lok Sabha (1991–1996)

The BJP in 10th Lok Sabha general election in 1991 attracted 20.04% of voters and gained 120 seats. The Election was a mid-term one as the previous Lok Sabha had been dissolved just 16 months after the government’s formation. It were held in a polarized environment and are referred to as the 'Mandal[315]- Mandir[316]' elections after the two most important poll issues; the Mandal Commission fallout and the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue. The election was a three-cornered fight between the Congress, the BJP and the National Front[317]. But a day after the first round of polling took place (on May 20), former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE[318] while campaigning, the remaining election days were postponed and finally voting was the lowest ever in parliamentary elections with just 53% of the electorate exercising their franchise. As the results came out, the Congress emerging as the largest party with 232 seats, while the BJP was second with 120 seats. Janata Dal came a distant third with just 59 seats. Finally, Narasimha Rao of the Congress was sworn in as the Prime Minister. Rao was the only second Congress PM from outside the Nehru-Gandhi family[319].


Eleventh Lok Sabha (1996–1998)

The BJP in 11th Lok Sabha general election in 1996 gained 161 seats, 20.29% of whole voters, plus its others allied parties had 213 seats. This election resulted in a hung Parliament and two years of political instability during which the country would have three Prime Ministers. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao Congress (I) government had implemented a series of reforms, which opened up the country's economy to foreign investors. Rao's supporters credited him for saving the country's economy and energizing its foreign policy but his government was weak and unsure before elections in April-May. Some scandals had damaged the Rao government's credibility. The BJP and its allies and the United Front, a coalition comprising the Left Front and the Janata Dal, were the Congress' main rivals in elections. During the three-week campaign, Rao promised voters with the economic reforms he would implemented and the BJP with Hindutva and national security. Voters did not seem impress with either party. The BJP won 161 seats and the Congress 140-the halfway-mark in Parliament was 271. The President invited BJP leader A.B. Vajpayee to form the government, as he was the chief of the single largest party in Parliament. Vajpayee took over as Prime Minister on May 16 1996 and tried to get support from regional parties in Parliament. He failed and resigned 13 days later. In fact, it was first BJP government with 13 day ruling over India. Janata Dal leader Deve Gowda formed a United Front coalition government on June 1. His government lasted 18 months. I.K. Gujral, Gowda's Foreign Minister, took over as Prime Minister in April 1997 after the Congress agreed to support a new United Front government from the outside. However, Gujral was a temporary solution arrangement. The country would go to elections again in 1998.


Twelfth Lok Sabha (10 March 1998 - 26 April 1999)

In the general elections in February 1998, the political wing of the Hindu nationalist movement, the BJP, polled more than a quarter of the popular vote in India and emerged as the largest party in the LS. The BJP with attracting 25.59% of voters in 12th Lok Sabha general election in 1998 gained 182 seats and plus its others alliance parties made group with 254 LS’s seats and formed a fragile government for a while and formed a government with the aid of 13 parties. Nevertheless, this incomplete parliament did not fulfil its term and finished on 26 April 1999 and India went to have new election. A coalition led by BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in. The 12th Lok Sabha had a life span of 413 days, the shortest to date. The 13-month-old BJP-led government was ousted by one vote on April 17. This was the fifth time the Lok Sabha was dissolved before completing its full tenure. On April 17, 1999, Vajpayee lost a ‘confidence vote’ in the Lok Sabha and consequently tendered the resignation of his coalition government. He cited a lack of cohesion in his 24-party National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as the reason. The BJP fell short of a single vote due to the withdrawal of one of their coalition partners, the AIADMK led by Jayalalithaa. It was the second time the BJP came to power.


Thirteenth Lok Sabha (10 October 1999 – 6 February 2004)

The 13th Lok Sabha general election in 1999 bring a good victory for BJP, which gained 182 seats and 23.75% of the whole voters. However, it was not enough seats to form government by own. So the BJP forced to make a collation with other NDA alliance with 270 seats and formed the government in New Delhi for third time. While the BJP was headed the NDA, “forming a government in 1999 was seen by many as the harbinger of a systematic onslaught on the status and dignity of India’s minorities.”[320] “The ability of the 24-party NDA[321] to govern for the whole of its elected term is one of the most remarkable contemporary events in the history of post-independence politics in India (Adeney & Saez, 2005)“ because after collapsing coalition-governments which formed in 1980s and 1990s in their early age[322]; it was the first time that a complete full time coalition-government was happened; and it was for first time that the short-lived nature of governing coalitions was reached itself to its end.  Therefore, coalitions in India before 1999, especially at the national level, which were historically evaluated as unstable, were changed. It “is also significant because ‘Hindu nationalism’ as an ideology does not command majority support among the Indian population, although it has been growing in popularity in recent years (Adeney & Saez, 2005)“ till that election. During the lengthy election campaign, the BJP and the Congress generally agreed on economic and foreign policy issues, including the handling of the Kashmir border crisis with Pakistan. Their rivalry only boiled down into a personal confrontation between Vajpayee and the Congress President Sonia Gandhi[323]. The entry of Sonia Gandhi, a relative newcomer having been elected to the party presidency in 1998, was challenged by then Maharashtra Congress leader, Sharad Pawar[324], on the grounds of her Italian birth. This led to a crisis within the Congress and the BJP effectively used this as an electoral issue. Another issue running in the BJP's favour was the generally positive view of Vajpayee's handling of the Kargil War[325], which had ended a few months prior to the polls and had affirmed and strengthened the Indian position in Kashmir. In addition, in the previous two years, India had posted strong economic growth on the back of economic liberalization and financial reforms, as well as a low rate of inflation and higher rate of industrial expansion. The 1991, 1996, and 1998 elections saw a period of consistent growth for the BJP and its allies, based primarily on political expansions in terms of cultivating stronger and broader alliances with other previously-unaffiliated parties; and regional expansion which had seen the NDA become competitive and even the largest vote takers in previously Congress-dominated areas such as Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Assam. These final factors were to prove decisive in the election outcome of 1999. The outcome which began on October 6 gave the NDA 298 seats, 136 to the Congress and its allies. Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister on October 13. “One of the key characteristics of Hindu nationalist militancy in India is the presence of overlapping, but highly disciplined, organizations that promote different facets of a unique interpretation of Hindu nationalism called Hindutva. Within this framework, the BJP is associated with a network of organizations, often referred collectively as the Sangh Parivar. In this sense, the successful maintenance of a coalition led by an explicitly religious nationalist political party has a direct bearing on the literature on coalition formation and maintenance (Adeney & Saez, 2005).”


Fourteenth Lok Sabha (17 May 2004 – 18 May 2009)

“When Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced the holding of a fresh election much before the term of his government expired, it surprised many politically informed and interested persons (Roy, 2006)“ maybe he didn’t think that his party will lose in the new election. They were so proud of their victory in the last election and stayed fulltime in power that Mr. Venkaiah Naidu were so proud of his party win that announced “the Congress era in Indian politics is over. The era of the BJP has begun.”[326] In this election most of Hindu nationalism strategies, key Hindu nationalism concern, the other Sangh’s tough plans and long-term strategies for India’s development under BJP rule like commitments to the construction of a ‘magnificent Ram temple at Ayodhya’, banning religious conversions ‘through fraudulent and coercive means’, and working for consensus on a ‘Uniform Civil Cod’[327] were demanded[328] to mobilizes mob in the election and the BJP played a dual game and while they were looking for gaining this goal,  but formally the BJP came in this election under the manifesto of NDA that emphasizes on “The Agenda for Development, Good Governance, Peace and Harmony mentions neither conversions, nor the Uniform Civil Code, and its reference to Ayodhya is pitched only at the level of calling for ‘dialogue... in an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill’, and that all should accept the judiciary’s verdict on this matter (Adeney & Saez, 2005).” Therefore, the emphasis was on economic and governmental rather than cultural regeneration and this slogan was core in this and other upcoming election and under the shadow of this maybe the BJP is looking its nationalism goal. In 14th Lok Sabha general election in 2004, the BJP just gained 138 and poisoned as opposition and 22.2% of Indian whole votes and with 181 seats plus other NDA in Lok Sabha waited for next election campaign. It was the defeat for them after the victory of 1999, 13th LS general election. Although most analysts believed the NDA, riding high on the feel-good factor and its promotional campaign 'India Shining', would beat anti-incumbency and win clear majority. The economy had shown steady growth during the BJP rule and the Foreign Exchange Reserves of India stood at more than $100 billion[329]. The service sector had also generated many jobs.

These elections, compared to all the other LS elections of the 1990s, saw more of a head-to-head battle between personalities[330] as there was no viable Third Front[331] alternative. The fight was between the BJP and its allies on the one hand and the Congress and its allies on the other. However, regional differences emerged on the national scene. The BJP fought the elections as part of the NDA, although some of its seat-sharing agreements were made with strong regional parties outside of the NDA such as the TDP in Andhra Pradesh and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu. Ahead of the elections, there were attempts to form a Congress-led national level joint opposition front. At the end, an agreement could not be reached, but on regional level, alliances between Congress and regional parties were made in several states. This was the first time that Congress contested with that type of alliances in a parliamentary election. The left parties, most notably the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India, contested on their own in their strongholds West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, confronting both Congress and NDA forces. In several other states, such as Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, they took part in seat sharing with Congress. In Tamil Nadu, they were part of the DMK-led Democratic Progressive Alliance. Two parties refused to go along with either Congress or BJP, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP). Both based in Uttar Pradesh, the largest state of India. Though pre-poll predictions were for an overwhelming majority for the BJP, the exit polls (immediately after the elections and before the counting began) predicted a hung parliament. However, even the exit polls could only indicate the general trend and nowhere close to the final figures. There was also the general perception that as soon as the BJP started realizing that events might not proceed entirely in its favor, it changed the focus of its campaign from ‘India Shining’ to issues of stability. The Congress, who was regarded as ‘old-fashioned’ by the ruling BJP, was largely backed by poor, rural, lower-caste and minority voters that did not participate in the economic boom of previous years that created a large wealthy middle class and thus achieved its overwhelming victory. The reverses in the pre-poll predictions are ascribed to various reasons depending on the point of view. People were more concerned about issues of their immediate environment such as water scarcity, drought, etc., than national issues and the anti-incumbency factor was at work for the BJP allies. On May 13, the BJP conceded defeat and the Congress was able to put together a comfortable majority of more than 335 members out of 543[332] with the help of its allies and under the direction of Sonia Gandhi. This post-poll alliance was called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). However, Sonia Gandhi surprised almost all observers by declining to become the new prime minister. Instead, she asked former finance minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to take up the mantle. Dr. Singh had previously served under Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in the early-1990s, where he was seen as one of the architects of India's first economic liberalization plan that staved off an impending national monetary crisis.


Fifteenth Lok Sabha (18 May 2009–18 May 2014)

In 15th Lok Sabha general election in 2009, the BJP just gained 116 seats and 18.80% of Indian whole votes and situated as opposition with 159 seats plus other NDA in Lok Sabha. It was the second defeat for them after 14th in 2004 LS general election. So after 2009 defeat in the election campaign, now this question raised that “does the BJP decline from 182 seats in 1999, to 138 seats in 2004, and now to 116 in 2009 indicate a continuing slide to its becoming a minor party? (Sage, 2011).” The answer to this question cleared, when the next election’s results in 2014 were announced; and the BJP change the direction and by achieving 282 seats in LS, won the election.


Sixteenth Lok Sabha (16 May 2014–16 May 2019)

BJP head in this election as main challenger of INC and its ruling during six decade after independent who “In a highly mobile and globalized world, failed to rekindle the spirit of India,[333] to keeping the Indian ways and thoughts in the center of their action, and made India one country, one people, and one Nation, (they) lost the spirit and the vision, which the freedom movement had evoked; in spite of being the oldest civilization and a young republic, we are engulfed by a multi-dimensional crisis. The present crisis is the result of this confusion and disconnect from the seekings and sensibilities of the people. This is worse confounded by the weak and spineless leadership of the UPA Government. The tragedy is further heightened by their failure to diagnose the malady and find the remedy. Instead of creating a socio-economic and political paradigm of governance drawn from the civilizational consciousness of India, the leaders tried to follow whatever was being practiced in this or that western country. The so-called 'liberalization' came in 1990s, was half-hearted. It did not work because the rest of the eco-system remained the same. Let keep the windows open, have a clear understanding of the global scenario and how without destroying our uniqueness we can assimilate the best of the technological advancements. The country that was once under the NDA regime called the 'Emerging Superpower', Congress-led UPA has made India a global synonym of Corruption, Scandal and Stagnation. Sluggish economic growth, unprecedented price rise and unstable currency are its most visible facets. (Joshi, n.d., 2014).” This is the picture of India in the eye of BJP, but although in the last election which Narendra Modi[334] as prime ministerial candidate appeared and propagated more as an icon of Hindu nationalism, but in this election he propagated as a symbol of prosperity and economic changes, which is favorable to bright economic future. So his electoral slogans divert from emphasizing to ‘Ram Janmabhooni’ and building Ram temple in Faizabad to the 5-Ts, talent, trade, tradition, tourism, technology. Or work on a seven-point ‘Rainbow of India’ principle including: ‘India's Culture’, ‘Youth Power’, ‘Women Empowerment’, ‘Agriculture’, ‘Natural Resources’, ‘Democracy’, ‘Knowledge’ (BJP, 2014). He promises ‘For a Better Tomorrow’ by “riding a wave of public support for his message of jobs and development that has drowned out his past as a religious right-winger. While his focus on the campaign trail has been jobs - he has said that his only religion is ‘development’ - his desire to push through his party's core Hindu nationalist agenda remains an open question (Plowright, 2014).” So commentators believe that “he has to succeed on the economy and that's the thing on which he will be judged; but what if he fails to re-launch the economy? The Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) plank is the plan B.”[335] 16th LS election bring the biggest victory for BJP that gained 280 seats by own with its 31% attracted voters who vote in favor of them, to fail INC and put BJP programs for future and also Modi’ successes in developing Gujarat… on top. The BJP with 334 NDA’ seats in LS is in power now for fourth time and it has 5-year long opportunity to show its capacities again.



 Lok Sabha Election duration

The BJP Seats gaining

The BJP Alliance Seats gaining

Percentage of whole votes

INC Seats gaining

Percentage of whole votes


7th Lok Sabha general election, 1980


The BJS has two seats




BJS changed to BJP with same leaders

8th Lok Sabha general election, 1984


No alliance





9th Lok Sabha general election, 1989






Opposition was INC

10th Lok Sabha general election, 1991







11th Lok Sabha general election, 1996






Opposition was INC

12th Lok Sabha  general election, 1998






Opposition was INC

13th Lok Sabha general election, 1999






Opposition was INC

14th Lok Sabha general election, 2004






Opposition was BJP

15th Lok Sabha general election, 2009






Opposition was BJP

16th Lok Sabha general election, 2014






No official opposition

Figure 7   The BJP performance in different general elections for LS during last 3-decades







While there is a lack of certainty about Hindutvas position and status in Indian contemporary politics and a kind of under-cover working process and organized operation in the Sangh Parivar’s line that they are passing through, but building the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, anti-converging policy and civil code in law are core demanded of the Sangh Privar in the field of interim Indian policy, and such goals were the election’s slogan of the BJP in different elections with up and down intonation as mid-term goal for “shaping Hindu society into a form that reflects the perceived glory of the Hindu ‘race’”[337] as long-term strategy. As the performance of Indian main players’ outcomes in the recent three decades’ Lok Sabha elections have shown, instability and changing in power line surprised Indian politic process’ observers several times. Because of this election INC that had been ruling India singlehandedly for several times, was forced to took back from other parties and obligated to form some coalition-types of ruling which has become common for INC and others; but most of the time the main ruler’s determiners was INC and BJP to rule the India central government. It also shows that Hindu Nationalism “has been growing in popularity in recent years (Adeney & Saez, 2005)“ so commentators believe that “recent manifestations of Hindu nationalism (e.g., between 1987 and 1993) lay at the intersection of the efforts of Hindu Nationalist, to mobilize and consolidate a Hindu vote, and the increased assertiveness of a variety of new claimants to political power (Rajagopal, 2001).” The BJP came to power four times; first time for 13-days in 1996, in 1998 the BJP for 13-months came to power for 2nd time, for 3rd time in 1999 the BJP came to power for five years for almost full-time, the fourth times was in 2014 during 16st election that the BJP has just started ruling India from 26 May and continues to date. The BJP’s outcomes in these 3 decades from two seats in seventh LS increased to 282 seats in the 16th Lok Sabha election[338]. The tendency that shows improving in their position in the political parties’ battlefield in India. On the other hand, by looking at the voting the BJP’s share in this 3 decades from 07.74% in the 7th LS increased to 31% in the 16th Lok Sabha election[339], so as it is clear the changes in its voter-bank is not the same as the changes in its seats. The highest performance was in the 16th LS with 31% and 282 seats, but the BJP’s rival, the INC had increased its record to near 50% of the whole voters in the eighth 1984 LS election, with achieving 414 seats. As commentators believe, the election slogans which increased the BJP position in the election except 9th, 10th and 11th LS election that was under the influence of the Babri mosque’s demolition by the Hindutva forces, that BJP had ridded the waves of Hindu sentiment to gain power and it was successful to increase its position, in other election ‘better life’ for Indian was the core BJP’ elections slogan. Even in some election using the Hindutva factors evaluated as its defeat cause[340] when in 2004 quoted “the BJP had lost partly because of the mismanagement of the Gujarat riot by Modi (Adeney & Saez, 2005)“ so the BJP realize that it should distanced from hardliner ship of Hindutva to find a basement to form government, also “the Sangh Parivar knows that any return to a radical brand of Hindu nationalist politics by the BJP would alienate its allies and postpone the party’s return to power (Adeney & Saez, 2005).” The BJP frankly declared, “a country as vast and pluralistic as India cannot be ruled only by an ideological party such as the Jana Sangh. It has to be an aggregative party [...] I (Advani) propounded that either we limit our objectives as an ideological party and fight election in some states or corporations, but if we aspire to become a ruling party in India, we cannot be limited as an ideological party [...] To rule India, we have to be inclusive.”[341] In the last election in 2014 also there is no sign of communal-political rallies (as they had previously) and slogan by the BJP; although the BJP used Narendra Modi who is famous as a Hindutva icon which Vajpayee was quoted as having said that “Modi needed to be removed if the BJP was to win national confidence (Adeney & Saez, 2005).” But they emphasize on his economic success in Gujarat than its profile in communal riots in his economy successful prosperous Indian state which was ruled by him for a long time. However, it is a fact that the BJP is between Nationalism and Hindutva and so it can be played with both to attract Indian votes, but the structural problem facing the BJP is whether a party based on Hindutva, which can command a large voting share to come to power on its own?

Chapter Five: Conclusion

Globalisation trend provides vast ‘integration’ among nations (Internally and externally) as a result; Hindu political radicalism of the BJP is moved towards moderation. The BJP is openly distancing itself from its previous communal slogans and practicality the Ayodhya communal operation of early 1990s against Indian Muslim minority, massacred a big number of Muslims in the incident.

  Although Indian Muslims had experienced 2002 Gujarat communal riots done by Hindutva forces in smaller. These incidents against Muslim community by Hindu extremists indicate that the potential threat of repetition of such massacres are still around and every time can be repeated in larger or small size.

The reality is, although the Gujarat fatal casualties’ size was almost near Babri mosque communal riots number; but its geographical cover was not as vast as those communal riots, so it shows that other Hindu people did not do the same as they did in Babri case against Indian Muslims.

The Christian also has witnessed the Orissa communal riots in 2008. This study finds that under the effects of globalization’s waves, although the Indian are not showing the distance from the BJP; and the BJP also is not losing its political base; but it also expand its position. The BJP has changed its election slogans from communal factors, such as building Ram temple (in 1980s and 1990s), to anti-corruption, good governance and better economic situation for Indian (in 2000s and 2010s). And inside the BJP shows the domination of moderate Hindutva discourse and the forces who control some extremist icon like ‘Modi’ and changed them to an economic heroe, than a RSS ‘organizer’ or communal extremist rioter. Therefore, it can be said, the BJP has been expanding its base among Indian by distancing from communal slogans during near last two-decades and because of globalisation, the Hindu radicalism of political BJP is moving towards moderation and by changing its electoral slogans and changing its leaders’ approaches after gaining power. Moreover, because of globalization’s impacts, people are not distancing themselves from radical Hindu parties like the BJP because of its efforts to show itself effective to solve weak points of ruling INC to control inflation and corruption.

India as one of the important units of the globalized shrunk-world, faced with both, radicalism and globalisation trend. Radicalism is rooted not only in injustice and inequality (at world or local level), but also is a reaction to cultural offences toward old-civilized cultures during last recent centuries. Feeling of defenselessness by such cultures, forced them to use every tool to save themselves. Radicalism can be considered as a radical reaction and response in this regard. Hinduism at least has been facing with two strong cultural waves of Islam and the West during the last centuries and occupation of its territories by British colonialists. Subsequently freedom movement and nationalism were raised in India and it gained momentum during the early 20st century and succeeded in mid-20st to put an end to the British occupation. Nationalist movement by attaining India’ independence and introduction of a new Indian constitution bore fruit. But, nationalism did not end and changed its otherness from colonials to Indian minorities especially Muslim who have been struggling to save their Identity inside independent India; and Hindu nationalism used this capacity to strengthen itself and get unified by defining a new ‘other’ for itself and fighting with it. From then on minorities (Muslims, Christian…) are under attacks of radical national Hinduism under the doctrine of Hindutva, which is led by the Sangh Parivar, especially the RSS that wants ‘saffronise[342]’ Hindu nationalism.

Consequently fighting against minorities’ right and position became so common by Hindu radicalism that “the minority communities face institutionalized discrimination and they have gone through a phase of self-hatred, low self-esteem, low self-confidence, insecurity and socio-economic, political and educational backwardness. The unequal status in the name of religion, gender, caste, region and language is much embedded in the Indian society. The hierarchy and inferior social order in the name of ideas and identity exclude the minorities from the larger society. The state’s efforts to protect the lives and the rights of the minorities are not satisfactory. The threat to minorities in India arises from the situation in which mechanisms of state power has been over shadowed and over-ruled (Sivan, 2010).”

Radical Hinduism shows capacities and potential to threaten diversified-secular Hindu communities, as well as other Indian but also other world communities. In fact, anti-minorities communal operation is going on at India-level by Hindutva forces now can be considered as a practice to be ready to continue toward other majorities at the world level. Therefore, some scholars like R. Carrier (2012) warn the world “to be ready to confront Hinduism; when Hindu nationalism is on the rise there, not in decline.” It can be said that radicalism as one of the ‘world threat’ has a branch among Indian Hindus also; which is growing and vesting its influence, by using the capacities which provided by globalization. This is threatening diversified, secular, non-violence, plural, democracy of India, as well as non-radical Hindu religion and ultimately world peace.

The Sangh Parivar’ Hindutva doctrine is lunch and following organized, cruel and painful communal operations against minorities in large organized scales, put the Indian innocent minorities in a disastrous situation, especially Muslim minority which were mascaraed, lost their properties, opportunities and social role...

This cultural-based political front led by the RSS workers, who following the style of the organization, like a Brahmin-silent work, no attack, goal achievers. It is following ‘Hindu race hegemony’ over India internally, and establish Hindu Nation (Rashtra). In this regard, RSS workers, as tools of the front try to mobilize their followers, unified mass Hindu sentiments to reach their goals.

 Based on the needs in this direction they make and define ‘the others’ for itself, to target them, mobilizing its followers, unified mass Hindu sentiments around its goal and take them at it service in this regard. Therefore, the minorities (especially Muslim) have been targeted massively under the impacts of exclusion policy by the Hindutva forces, resulted Indian minorities to be marginalized in their homeland.

The saffron forces argue that Hindu culture should be positioned as a hegemonic discourse, and to reach to this hegemonic level, they have to form a huge confrontation with other communities, especially Indian minorities (with huge numbers in India); especially the Indian Muslims, and the Western culture, referring to Indian Christians.

Hindu radical nationalists are trying to control and limit the ‘others’. So communal operations against Indian minorities was started during ‘partition’ and it increased, especially during the last three decades. Regardless of the huge Indian minorities’ population, Hindutva is pointing to rule India as a one of its main middle target, but they faced with a political-cultural obstacle in the shape of ‘moderate Hinduism’, which has been heading by INC and other secular force, politically.

INC with a big popular approach, has been ruling India after independence a long time. Hindutva by misusing communalism as a double-edges knife wants to disarm INC as political rival and minorities as an appointed ‘others’ as well. They have been cueing communal riots against minorities as a mobilizer of ‘Hindu sentiment’ against moderate forces who are following interaction policy toward minorities and as a mobilizing national feeling of Hindu people to vote in favor of the Saffron forces, to gain political power in federal, parliamentary, democracy of India at state/central levels in this regard.

 Today, most of the political Hinduism-based movements, spiritually (directly or indirectly) headed and related to a kind of the Brahamanical traditional leading of RSS in general, and other main Sangh’s groups. It  is leading Hindu nationalism movement of the ‘saffron[343] wave’ that from the late 1980s onward appeared “as a logical outcome of decades of disciplined, well-planned organizational and ideological expansion of the Sangh Parivar (Hansen, 1999).” The BJP as obvious political wing of the Sangh and the replacement of the BJS, by using the articulation of ‘conflicts’ and the mobilization of Indian in its first phase of 1980s work start to touch the power at central level, and it was in 1999 that formed an almost fulltime government by using coalition method, for the first time. The second major phase was in 2014 when the BJP gained 282 out of 543 LS’s seats and by taking a small help from its allies, captured the central Indian leadership for 5 years. “The rise of the BJP as a major party at the national level has been slow but steady since its appearance in the political firmament of India as a serious and determined contender for power in 1950. In the 1952 election to the Lok Sabha, it could capture only three of the 94 seats it contested. However, since then, it has been steadily improving its position going, however, through the process of difficulties. Since 1989, the BJP made advances on the national stage partly through raising its vote share incrementally, but even more through its success in striking alliances in every region with parties big and small (Roy, 2006).” Regardless of the BJP’s victories or defeats to gain power, as the figure 2 obviously shows, the BJP attracted votes have been rising during last three decades, and in the latest 2014 LS election reached to more than 30 per cent of whole voters the process which started from near 8% at first. Hence, regardless of the voters’ aims to vote in favor of the BJP, it showed improvement of attracting Indian voters toward the BJP.   

But while, communal forces are against "the Nehruvian state as the embodiment of modern rational governance of the ‘masses’ by the ‘educated sections’; secularism as the condensed signifier of tolerance and ‘communal balancing’(Hansen, 1999)", most of the times, because of general Indian cultural characters (non-violence, pluralism…); the BJP also "attempted to recover and save the moral and secular legacy of the Janata party[344]; and attempt to display secular tolerance (Hansen, 1999)."

By this strategy, the BJP wanted to attract Indian voters to choose the BJP candidates, and during its government in New Delhi (1999 and 2014) it tried to show more flexibility on core radical Hinduism agendas. Therefore, Vajpayee as the first BJP’s prime minister showed a moderate face and followed more moderation approaches toward minorities than his colleagues. The second BJP Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi is accused of 2002 Gujarat communal rotes, which left more than 2000 Muslim fatal casualties, now speaks of development agendas than radical Hinduism agendas.

This was the poles apart point among Hindu hardliners in Hindutva forces front and a source of conflict and political rivalry among BJP members or between RSS and other Saffron forces like the BJP; and a risen “considerable debate arose within the Sangh Parivar on this issue”[345]. But some leaders like Vajpayee were sure to pave “a moderate Hindu nationalist ideology (Hansen, 1999);” so apart of this strategy “the new central party document, entitled ‘Our Five Commitments’, enshrined both a basic commitment to the Nehruvian development model[346] and logic of opposition (Hansen, 1999).” Distancing from communal operations or “radical anti-Muslim discourse (which) had coexisted with political pragmatism within the Sangh Parivar (Hansen, 1999)“ in central leader’s strategy[347] “become part of conventional political wisdom in India to attribute the gradual turn of the BJP toward a clear-cut communal strategy from 1986 onward to L. K. Advani’s election as party president in 1986 (Hansen, 1999).” To get a political gain in the election, the BJP is ready to scarify its ideal points of Hindutva, resulted a source of conflict between the Sangh’s members.

For the BJP as the political wing of the Hindutva forces, the priority of gaining  power is more important than following Hindu radical agendas, therefore after coming to power they tactically leave their hardline attitudes. For example, Mr. Modi, as the most extremist figure in BJP started to portrait himself as a moderate and a ‘business friendly’ or ‘development icon’ than a ‘hindu nationalist icon’ and they prefer to be more moderate than radical. This is an obvious indication of globalisation effect that promote ‘integration’ among people (Internally and externally).

As a result radical icons who have enough wisdom and have look to the future, in official position forced to speak and act moderately.  By facing the realities of the Indian society and fabrics, the BJP realized that they have to abandon their radical approaches toward other Indian cultures and minorities and specially the moderate and secular views among the Indians during the elections and they started to observe the idea of integration as a globalization reality.

consequently an inside challenge is started, so a kind of semi-moderate Hindu nationalism by some of the Sangh’s icon is coming to exist; that Vajpayee’s approaches can be named as an example in this regard. Therefore “there was, indeed, a clear change of accent from Vajpayee’s tempered condemnation of the ‘Shah Bano’ agitations and defense of the principle of a ‘uniform civil code’ in January 1986 in the name of modernity and equality. This argument became in the following years, a standard element in the building of the specter of a threatening Muslim menace of destabilization; job snatching, and exploitation of ‘goodhearted Hindus’, which other parts of the Sangh Parivar had been building up for years. The Ramjanmabhoomi/Babri Masjid issue, for long staged and fermented by the VHP and RSS, only became part of the official ideological inventory of the BJP from July 1989 onward, however, not as a front issue. the dominant theme of the 1989 election became primarily related to high-level corruption in Congress, which was also a main target of the BJPs manifesto (Hansen, 1999).” so, the Ram temple issue and its related operations like ‘Ram shila puja’[348] have done by VHP and RSS activists. In this atmosphere the BJP by using anti-corruption, better economy situation, economic development… slogans “carefully built image of providing ‘clean government’ (Hansen, 1999)“ for himself and try to disarm its serious political rival, the INC than following Hindu nationalist slogans.

 As it is clear that communal features were not used by the Saffron forces and its political wing, the BJP. In addition, sometimes these communal factors evaluated as obstacle to gain political ends. For example 16st LS’ election was free of such communal elements; except ‘Modi’ factor who is famous as an icon of Hindu extremist communal guilty in one of the last important communal organized operation in Gujarat which left thousands of Muslim minority deaths in 2002. But he appeared as an economic growth, industrial expanding… icon than a communal icon in this election battlefield. The BJP propaganda machine, try to say that he came to release Indian from corruption and inflation than to build the Ram Temple in Faizabad (Uttar Pradesh); and reduced him from and communal icon to an economic rescuer and hero.

On the other hand, a king of coordination in action can be seen among the Sangh branches; which overlap and correspond most variety of radical forces’ demands. “Within the past decade, the Hindu nationalist movement in India, led by the militant organization of RSS, with branches and subsidiaries in many fields of life in contemporary India, has grown into the most powerful cluster of political and cultural organizations in the country. Hindu nationalist agendas, discourses, and institutions have gradually penetrated everyday life and have acquired a growing, if not uncontested, social respectability in contemporary Indian society (Hansen, 1999).” In September 1990, Advani launched the ‘Rath Yatra’ that again BJP come to stage in this regard and the reaction of V.P Singh broke the BJP alliance with them. The 1991 election campaign became the most expensive, the most violent, and the most brutal election campaign in the history of independent India. In early December 1991, BJP president Murli Manohar Joshi commenced an ambitiously designed ‘Ekta Yatra’[349] about Kashmir. “The ‘Ekta Yatra’, like the ‘Rath Yatra’, was designed to acquire nation-wide dimensions through extensive press coverage, and was clearly targeting a middle-class audience supposed to be concerned with matters of national unity rather than religion (Hansen, 1999).” Hence the Saffron groups can use their member’s capacity regarding to situation’s ought and needs.

As negative result of missusing of Indian religion sentiments in favor of political gains by the Sangh is, the Hinduism which, traditionally has been viewed as a tolerant religion and accommodative of a plurality of views, Hindutva is going to change this common sense and such an intolerance will damage co-existence in diversified Indian community and it is going to say that, “Hinduism is not as tolerant as it is often portrayed; [or] Hinduism itself lends itself to intolerance and violence (Adeney & Saez, 2005).”

Hindutva forces by missusing the internal warning of separatists, converting from Hindu to other religions and connecting of Muslim to external powers; try to mobilize Hindu vote bank in favors of Hindu nationalist groups like the BJP and in somehow it was successful to achieve power and attract Hindu sentiments.

As the performance of Indian main players’ outcomes in the recent three decades’ Lok Sabha elections has shown, ‘Hindu Nationalism’ has been growing in popularity in recent years. The BJP’s outcomes in the last 3 decades show it’s successful work to increase its parliamentary seats from two seats in seventh LS to 282 seats in 16st, 543-seats Lok Sabha election, the tendency which shows improving in their position in political parties’ battlefield in India.

Taking religion at service of political gain by Hindutva forces in the country, which the relationship between religion and politics is highly contingent; resulted that “in recent decades, religion has had much greater impact upon politics than it did in the early years following Independence. India’s main ruling party has been the Indian National Congress, a secular (non-religious) political party, which was the dominant party for over four decades after Independence. Apart from 6 years of the BJP-led coalition government in Delhi, India has never been governed by a political party or a coalition of parties that make explicit appeals to religion. Nevertheless, religious and identity politics is an important force in India’s public life (Sica, 2012).”

Therefore, although a “secular state was set up in India despite the massacre and displacement of millions of people on ethno-religious grounds, and that it has survived in a continuing context in which ethnic nationalism remains dominant throughout the world (Sica, 2012)” but India’ secular, plural governing system which is came to exist after its independent, although have such problems, but in comparison some of its neighbors has the best capacities and practices; and although everyone is allowed and respected for showing its own, peculiar identity but the constitution which adopted in 1950 “guaranteed certain fundamental rights, including the right to private property, freedom of religion, assembly, movement, and association (Sica, 2012).” post-independent political process showing not safeguarding India’s extraordinary pluralism practicality and discrimination against minority has been going on and their life and properties are under organized attack by some majority in the name of Hindutva and it make an insecure society for minorities and its future; and “secularism as the responsible approach to ensure the protection and equality of all religions[350] and provide for regulation and reform, rather than the strict separation or religion and state”[351]  was not work properly.

 “The fact that Indian voters have delivered the Hindu communalists a resounding defeat in two general elections in a row (2004, and again in 2009) is a cause for hope that the communal virus has been contained. But electoral trends don’t always reflect the changes in mentalities and attitudes. People may not vote for the BJP for many reasons having to do with calculations about political stability, continuity in governance, economic policies, and similar secular issues. But that does not mean that they don’t see eye to eye with the BJP and Hindutva allies on matters related to religion and religious minorities. However, developments on the ground jolted the critics of secularism out of their romantic reveries. In India, as in many other parts of the world, religious nationalists and conservatives began to gain political power. the rise of the BJP showed that the religious idiom resonated well with the electorate (Nanda, 2009).”

On the other hand, although some characters like moderate or radical in religious matter… is important for Indians; but there is an important factor, which is very fundamental for them, and it is the economic factor. This item played a central role in determination of loser or winner of some LS elections. For instance, “the BJP has lost two general elections, largely for economic reasons, and perhaps especially their neglect of India's farmers; the ability of the religious right to mobilize votes by exploiting communal religious grievances seems, thankfully, to have diminished, But as large-scale anti-Christian riots in Orissa last year showed, it doesn't take much to wake the sleeping dragon of communal conflict from its slumber, and Ayodhya remains an emotive and divisive issue. If religion is no longer a vote-winner for the BJP, it is largely because other parties have found more subtle ways to use its ever-growing power (Dalrymple, 2009).” For INC also the case is the same, the biggest lose happened when it lost 2014 LS election under the pressure of alleged corruption and the rise of inflation during the Manmohan Singh as prime minister ship of India under the banner of INC.

It is a fact that India appeared as a country with growing religious sentiment and Indians as a religious people who are not distancing from religion. Their attention to their culture and religion is going to be stronger; as contemporary researches also shows “India is not only witnessing a resurgence of popular religiosity, this religiosity is becoming indistinct from national and even civilizational self-glorification (Nanda, 2010).” Therefore “the Hindu nationalists could be successful because they were drawing on older reserves of ‘religious nationalism’ that always were central to most forms of Indian nationalism (Hansen, 1999).” Increasing respectability of far right wing hindu organizations like RSS in the eyes of the urban Indian middle class and religiosity increasing among Indians which governmental and public-private economic enterprises plus technology are at their service make a dark future for Hindu radicalism’s ‘others’  in India. In addition “political parties use religions as a political weapon, they actually do not do anything to give adequate representation to the religious minorities. There is not even a single year in India without the communal peace disturbed in a small or large scale in some part of the country. If they (Hindutva) are not able to find any reason, they go back to history - find the reasons and fight for it. In various pockets of the country, the education and literacy rates of Muslims are much worse than that of SCs and STs. The condition of Christians in India is also not very different from that of Muslims. (Sivan, 2010).” Moreover “regardless of which side starts the riots (this is often impossible to determine objectively), the Muslims (minorities) are generally the relative losers in terms of lives lost and property destroyed”[352]

While the BJP and Sangh Parivar have realized that their way and goals are against Indian diversified, plural, non-violence culturally; and democratic, secular politically, but they believe that they should do as they think, it will be clear when have a look to prominent BJP scholar, Jay Dubashi[353]’s statement that “Leadership does not mean giving people or promising people what they want; it means leading people where they do not at first want to go. Let BJP tell people that this country will never be great unless people make sacrifices, that they must be prepared to accept change, and they can never get anything for nothing. Let the critics say that it is a right-wing party, that it is reactionary and communal. Dogs bark but a party that believes in itself goes on.”[354] So regardless to Hindu religion, humanism and secular-democracy of India’s values; the Indian Muslim minorities are under endless and potential-unexpected, every-time attacks by communal forces.

 From the other side, although under the coverage of huge presence of all kind media forms in India; open policy which adopted in early 1990s by Indian policy-makers, is resulted an expanding Indian relation with rest of the world; globalization waves have been affecting India strongly during past decades.  In addition, because of this, some negative Hindu’s cultural elements such as the cast system, polygamy, sati … that was unaccommodated with human values have disappeared or reduced; but it did not have adequate effect to stop cruelty and discrimination process against minorities and the communal process against minorities’ life, properties and position in Indian community are going on. Discrimination against them is going on and the minorities’ life and situation is worse and is showing dark side of radical Hinduism domination over Indian society; and shows the insecure position of every minorities’ member all corner of India more and more; and by the looking to Indian approach to radical Hindu forces in the elections, assurance that the Indian’ minorities’ future is also insecure and unclear.

Another effect of globalisation is “the emergence of a new form of globalized Hinduism (Dwyer, Rachel, 2006)” that can be visible at the beginning of first decade of 21 century’s phenomenon, which as expansion wing of Hindutva, activate its branches around the world; and globalization as a transnational dynamic has brought religious difference and its potential threats close to home for all.



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جهانی شدن و رادیکالیسم هندو در هند

رادیکالیسم مذهبی امروزه به یکی از مصائب جهانی تبدیل شده است و هند به عنوان یک کشور فدرال-دمکراسیِ مبتنی بر سیستم سکولارِ پارلمانی نیز از این مساله تاثیر گرفته و بیش از نیم قرن است که ناظر بر پیامدهای پدیده رادیکالیسم هندویی است؛ که بروز ظاهریش در شکل درگیری های خشونت بار فرقه یی توسط رادیکالیسم هندویی علیه اقلیت های دینی این کشور و متعاقبا فراز و فرود این گروه ها در صحنه انتخابات مختلف، خود را نشان داده است. کشتار میلیونی و مهاجرت های عظیم که در نتیجه درگیری های فرقه یی در حول سال های استقلال هند و جدایی پاکستان و بنگلادش اتفاق افتاد، پایانی بر پدیده درگیری های قومی نبود و این روند همچنان ادامه دارد و آخرین آن در سال 2013 در شهر مظفرنگر (ایالت اتارپرادش هند) رخ داد که به کشته و زخمی شدن ده ها تن از اقلیت مسلمان این کشور انجامید. طی سه دهه گذشته حوادث فرقه یی ریز و درشت زیادی در هند اتفاق افتاده است و به گفته  Sivan, D. (2010) حتی یک سال را نمی توان یافت که حادثه یی ریز یا درشت فرقه یی در هند اتفاق نیفتاده باشد. که بر اساس گفته (1976) D.E.Smith  "بدون توجه به اینکه کدام طرف (اکثریت و یا اقلیت) به آغاز خشونت های فرقه یی اقدام کند، این مسلمانان (اقلیت ها) هستند که بازنده نسبی در تلفات جانی و ویرانی اموال شان خواهند بود."

سرمدار جریان رادیکالیسم هندو گروه های مختلف هندویی عضو سنگ پریوار (خانواده انجمن های مرتبط) می باشند که وجوه مختلف این جامعه رادیکال را راهبری می کنند؛ حزب مردم هند (BJP) بخش سیاسی –  حکومتی این جریان را دنبال می کند و شاخه مذهبی و تبلیغی آن، گروه شورای هندو (VHP) است که اجتماعی سازمان یافته از روحانیون مذهبی هندو را تشکیل می دهند و شاخه نظامی و تروریستی آن که تحت نام "بجرانگ دال" و... مشهور می باشند؛ و زیر مجموعه ها و گروه های محلی دیگر که جمعا به گروه های "زعفرانی" نیز شهرت یافته و تحت دکترین "هندتوا" حرکت منسجم اما مستقلی را تحت رهبری مستقیم و یا غیر مستقیم گروه "داوطلبان خدمت ملی" (RSS) دنبال می نمایند. حرکت، اهداف و همچنین پیش بینی آینده این روند افرادی همچون R.Carrier  را بر آن داشته است تا جهان را نسبت به خطر هندویسم متذکر گردد زیرا "در زمانی که ملی گرایی هندو در هند درحال رشد است و نه کاهش، باید آماده برای مقابله با هندویسم شد (Carrier, 2012)" نکته دیگر این که این ملی گرایی هندو کاملا در راستای اهداف سیاسی انتخاباتی و مقابله با گروه های رقیب از جمله حزب کنگره مورد استفاده این جریان قرار گرفته است که نمونه بارز آن سوار شدن بر موج ایجاد شده در خلال درگیری های ناشی از ویران سازی مسجد بابری و ساخت معبد رام (خدای هندو) بر ویرانه های آن بود که گروه های سنگ پریوار با استفاده از این حرکت خشونت بار و عظیم فرقه یی علاوه بر گسترش تفکر هندوتوا، اقدام به تهییج افکار عمومی و جلب آرای مردم هندو به نفع حزبBJP در انتخابات مجلس عوام هند موفق شد.

گرچه عمده ی گروه هایِ گفتمان ملی گرای هند و از جمله گفتمان ملی گرایِ هندو ریشه در مبارزه ملی هند علیه استعمار و حاکمیت بریتانیا بر این منطقه دارند و در واقع ملی گرایی هندی در همین زمان شکل گرفت و این ملی گرایی عنصر "دگرسازی" (Others) خود را عناصر انگلیسی حاکم بر هند قرار دادند، ولی در حین و بعد از استقلال هند از انگلیس، برخی عناصر ملی گرای هندویی "دگرسازی" گفتمانی حرکت ملی گرایی مذهبی خود را به سوی اقلیت های مذهبی پرتعداد هند تغییر جهت دادند. اقلیتی که آمار رسمی دولت هند جمعیت کنونی تنها مسلمانان آنرا که بزرگترین اقلیت هند می باشند را بیش از سیزده درصد از جمعیت دومین کشور پرجمعیت جهان یعنی هند اعلام کرده است؛ ولی برخی آگاهان این آمار تا حدود بیست درصد جمعیت بیش از یک میلیارد و صد میلیونی هند نیز برآورد کرده اند که بعد از کشور مسلمان اندونزی بزرگترین اجتماع مسلمانان در جهان تلقی می گردد.

سیاست ها و تحرکات فرقه گرایانه ی ملی گرایی مذهبی هندویی تنها علیه اقلیت مسلمان هند نبوده و گرچه بیشترین تمرگز آن بر علیه مسلمین است، لیکن اقلیت های مسیحی، سیک، بودایی و... هم از این قاعده مستثنی نشده و تاریخ تحرکات فرقه یی ملی گرایی هندو موارد زیادی را علیه آنان نیز به ثبت رسانده است. تنها در سه دهه گذشته سه حادثه مهم فرقه ایی یعنی تخریب مسجد بابری در دهه هزار و نهصد و نود میلادی که به یکی از درگیری های دهشتبار فرقه یی تقریبا در سراسر هند تبدیل شد و جان و مال هزاران تن را مورد تهدید و خطر قرار داد، و یا واقعه حملات گسترده فرقه یی ایالت گجرات در سال 2002، که این دو علیه مسلمین برنامه ریزی و به اجرا در آمد، و نهایتا حوادث فرقه یی ایالت اوریسای هند که علیه مسیحیان هند در سال 2008 برنامه ریزی و به اجرا در آمد، تحرکات شاخص فرقه یی بودند که در این رابطه توسط فرقه گرایان افراطی هندو برنامه ریزی و انجام گردید.

همین روند باعث ایجاد نوعی تقسیم دو قطبی در جامعه سیاسی- فرهنگی هند گردید که در یک سر از این تقسیم بندی، جامعه میانه روی هند قرار می گیرد که سردمدار اصلی این گفتمان حزب کنگره هند (INC) و دیگر احزاب همسو و سکولار آن قرار دارند و طبق نظریه "تحلیل گفتمان لاکلو- موفه" گفتمان هندویسم میانه رو که از سوی حزب کنگره نمایندگی و رهبری می شود، دال مرکزی (Noble Point) خود را بر تکثرگرایی و تعامل قرار داده و در نتیجه مدلول این جریان نیز تعامل مثبت با اقلیت های مذهبی هند است که نهایتا منجر به یک جامعه تکثرگرا و متعامل اکثریت-اقلیت در هند منجر می شود. در سوی دیگر این روند، قطب هندویسم رادیکال قرار دارد که شاخص آن گروه های هندوتوا (Hindutva) و مشخصا حزب BJP که "به عنوان بازوی سیاسی RSS سعی می کند از طریق اهداف و خط مشی دکترین هندوتوا کشور را به سوی تشکیل ملت هندو (Hindu Rashtra/Nation)  هدایت کند (Puniyani n.d., 2013)"، ابعاد سیاسی – حاکمیتی این گفتمان را نمود داده است که دال مرکزی این گفتمان بر تعارض و چالش با اقلیت های دینی قرار داده شده که عمدتا زادگاه آن مذاهب و سرزمین های مقدس آنان در خارج از سرزمین هند قرار دارد و لذا "دگرسازی" این گفتمان نیز همین اقلیت ها خواهند بود که مدلول آن یک جامعه غیر تکثرگرا با محوریت و هجمونی گفتمان هندوتوا و یا جامعه هندو خواهد بود و جایی برای اقلیت ها و دگراندیشان در این جامعه نخواهد بود.

از سوی دیگر گفتمان جهانی شدن نیز به عنوان یک گفتمان سوم که از خارج هند و در وسعت جهانی بر روند داخلی هند در حال تاثیر گذاری است، دال مرکزی خود را بر تکثرگرایی قرار داده و هند و متعاقب آن هندویسم افراطی و... که در معرض روند جهانی شدن بوده و می باشد در مواجهه با امواج مختلف این روند، از آن تاثیر گرفته و در اثر تاثیرات این امواج، رادیکالیسم هندویی تا حدودی به تعدیل خود اقدام کرده و همین روند آنان را به سوی میانه روی و تعامل بیشتر در خصوص اقلیت های هندی سوق داده است و از سوی دیگر بر اثر روند جهانی شدن و الزامات و تاثیرات آن اقبال مردم هندِ تحت تاثیر جهانی شدن نیز به شعارهای گروه های هندویسم افراطی و مشخصا حزب BJP کاهش یافته و رادیکالیسم هندویی را به سوی مشی میانه روی و دوری از روند تخاصم با اقلیت ها رهنمون کرده است. لذا در این سه گفتمان، دو گفتمان هندویسم میانه رو و گفتمان جهانی سازی همسو و به هم نزدیک بوده و در مقابل گفتمان هندویسم افراطی قرار می گیرند.

از آنجا که مذهب به عنوان عنصر معنی دهنده بُعد معنوی زندگی انسان، هویت بخش و ایجاد کننده ی وجوه وفاداری و تعلق در زندگی انسان است، اهمیت زیادی دارد (Desker et al. 2005) و این خود در جامعه و مردم مذهبی هند که فلسفه، فرهنگ و روند تاریخی آن مدیون و در ارتباط تنگاتنگ با وجوه مذهب هندو و تاثیرات بنیادین آن است، اهمیت خاصی می یابد و به مذهب هندو در جامعه نقش محوری و هویت بخش می دهد. به طوری که طبق گفته مرا ناندا (Meera Nanda) عمق مذهب هندو در بین فرهنگ و زندگی و ذهنیت هندی ها به قدری است که علیرغم انتظار موجود مبنی به غیر مذهبی شدن در برابر امواج جهانی شدن، "هند در همان حالی که در فرایند جهانی شد تاثیر می گیرد و جهانی می شود، در همان حال و به موازات آن در حال هندو شدن بیشتر است (Nanda, 2009)." و یا علیرغم این تصور که رشد و توسعه به کاهش اعتقادات مذهبی منجر می شود افرادی مثل Dalrymple معتقدند که "در سراسر شبه قاره اعتقادات در حال رشد می باشد و همچنان که منطقه در حال رشد می باشد مذهب نیز درحال قدرتمند شدن و باز سازی خود است (Dalrymple, 2009).

هندویسم افراطی که به نوعی حامل تفکر ملی گرایی هندو است، در مواجهه با دیگران که در روند تاریخ هند در چند قرن گذشته از جمله تسلط فرهنگ فارسی- اسلامی و متعاقب آن تسلط چند سده یی استعمار مستقیم سیاسی، فرهنگی و اقتصادی خارجی به رهبری بریتانیا بر هند، به نوعی سرخوردگی و احساس تهدید نسبت به هویت خود مبتلا گردیده، در واکنش به این جریان و احساس نامناسبی که به جامعه هندو دست داد، از اواخر قرن نوزدهم و بالاخص اوایل قرن بیستم که ملی گرایی هند به وجود آمد و توسعه یافت، عملیات خود را علیه تسلط خارجی بر خود آغاز کرد، و در زمانی که عده یی از جریانات هندو به ایجاد اصلاحات اساسی در عقاید و فرهنگ هندو مشغول بودند، شاخه یی از این ملی گرایی مذهبی سعی در باز تعریف و همچنین بازیافت جایگاه قدرت و تسلط هندویسم بر شبه قاره بر آمد. آنان حاکمیت "آشکوکا" امپراتور مقتدر باستان هند را در نظر گرفته و آن را "دوره طلایی" هند نامیده و بعد از روندی از اصلاح در سنن و اعتقادات مذهب هندو که از جمله به سست شدن ساختار نامتعادل و تبعیض آمیز "سیستم طبقات کاست" و باز تعریف سیستم چند خدایی به یک خدایی و... شد؛ عده یی از آنان بر تفوق فرهنگ هندویی (Sanskritya) بر فرهنگ دیگر ملل رای داده و دکترین هندوتوا را بعنوان "دارویی موثر بر مشکلات ملت هند و جهان معرفی کردند (Bhagawat, 2013)" تحت دکترین هندوتوا "هسته اصلی ملت هند بر هجمونی ساختار خالص هندو (Gangopadhyay, 2010) قرار داده شد" و به دنبال این تفکر تحت یک هدف وحدت گرایانه بر پایه عقاید ملی گرایانه هندو، تمام مذاهب متولد شده در هند اعم از بودایی، جین، سیک و... و پیروانشان را که اگرچه در بسیاری از اصول خود با مذهب هندو متعارض بودند و تمام معتقدان به مذاهب تولد یافته در خاک هند را "هندو" معرفی کرده (Deoras, n.d.,2006)  و آنان را در جامعه هندوتوا ملحق کرده و باقی پیروان مذاهب دیگر از جمله مسلمانان، مسیحیان، زرتشتیان (مشهور به پارسیان هند) و... را که زادگاه، ظهور و اماکن مقدس آنان در سرزمین هایی خارج از خاک هند قرار داشت را غیر بومی و خارجی اعلام (Aoun et al. n.d., 2012) و عنوان داشتند، هندی هایی که به این مذاهب گرویده اند یا باید دوباره هندو شده و یا هند را ترک کنند. بدین وسیله جریان هندوتوا سعی دارد با "زایل کردن تفکرات و بدنه ناخالص دیگران از پیکره ملت هندو  (Gangopadhyay, 2010)" به خالص سازی جامعه و در نهایت هند و هندوها را به جایگاه افتخار آمیز نسل آریایی- هندوی خود بازگرداند و در اینجاست که سخن از حکمداری هندو (Hindu raj) به میان آورده می شود که در حین و بعد از استقلال این تفکر با مخالفت سردمداران هندویسم میانه رو از جمله رهبر استقلال هند آقای مهاتما گاندی مواجهه گردید که "هند را متعلق به همه کسانی می دانست که در هند متولد و رشد یافته اند" و اعلام کرد که "هند آزاد، هند حکمداری هندو نیست ((Chaturvedi n.d., 2013." و یا یکی از نویسندگان اصلی قانون اساسی هند مستقل، آقای اِمبادکار، که در واکنش به این نظریه هندویسم افراطی و فرقه گرا عنوان داشت "به هر قیمتی باید از تشکیل حکمداری هندو جلوگیری کرد (Ambedkar, 1940)". ولی تفکر هندوتوا در نهایت هندی را مد نظر داده که در آن فرهنگ و سنن هندویی (Bharatiya Sanskrit) و مذهب هندو اساس آن و کشور هندوستان با تعریف ملی گرایی آن که حکمداری هندو بر آن حاکم شده است، نهایت هدف خواهد بود. با همین استراتژی است که در قدم اول چالش برنامه ریزی شده، منظم و سازمان داده شده یی توسط گروه های معتقد به دکترین هندتوا علیه اقلیت های مذهبی در هند آغاز و سیاست انزوای آنان و تبدیل شان به شهروندان درجه دوم جامعه به منصه ظهور در آمد. کشتارهای فرقه یی هدفدار و برنامه ریزی شده تحت رهبری متمرکز این تفکر، اکثر نقاط هند را فرا گرفته و به بهانه ها مختلف افراد، جایگاه، اماکن سکونت، کار و مذهبی و... اقلیت های دینی مذکور علی الخصوص مسلمین مورد تهاجم مداوم قرار گرفته و این روند همچنان ادامه دارد به طوری که طبق اعلام نماینده حزب کنگره در مجلس لوک سابها که تاریخ سیزدهم آگوست 2014 جناح مقابل را متهم کرد که در دو ماهه گذشته که حزب BJP قدرت را در هند بدست گرفته است، اقدامات فرقه گرایانه نیز افزایش یافته است[355] ولی نخست وزیر هند آقای "نارندار مودی" از حزب BJP در عین حال در اولین سخنرانی خود در روز ملی هند (پانزدهم آگوست 2014) خشونت های فرقه یی را خیلی طولانی توصیف و آن را به عنوان مانعی برای رشد ملت دانست.[356] ولی آنچه مسلم است جریان هندویسم افراطی با توسل به این خشونت ها و بر انگیختن احساسات ملی - مذهبی هندی ها هم در تحریک احساسات هندوها بر علیه اقلیت ها کوشیده و هم یک بانک رای خوبی را در میان اقشار متوسط جامعه هندو برای خود تدارک دیده و آرا آنان را از سوی جریان میانه رو دور و به سوی خود جلب نموده است. این روند طوری رقم خورده است که حزب کنگره که در چهار دهه اول بعد از استقلال، که از دهه پنجاه میلادی آغاز گردید، به صورت بلامنازع حاکمیت را در هند در دست داشت، به وضعی دچار آمده است که در دهه ی اخیر تنها با کمک ائتلاف های جریان سکولار و میانه رو توانست در حاکمیت قرار گیرد و جریان هندویسم افراطی که جایگاه مناسبی در افکار عمومی هند نداشت و نتوانسته بود آرای آنان را به سوی شعارهای خود جلب نماید، به تدریج و در طول نزدیک به هفت دهه بعد از استقلال در یک فرایند بالا و پایین و ادامه دار که با حزب BJS حضور خود را در صحنه سیاسی – حاکمیتی هند آغاز کرد و جایگاه خود را گسترش داد و در ابتدای دهه هشتاد میلادی نیز در ادامه با تشکیل حزب BJP به تکمیل این روند پروژه یی اقدام و به مرور در به دست یابی جایگاه قدرت مرکزی در دهلی و ایالتی هند قرار گرفت به طوری که تشکیل دولت مرکزی توسط این حزب در دهه ی نود میلادی به وسیله تشکیل ائتلاف با جریان های همسو بود که قویا این حزب را باید در ابقا در قدرت کمک می کردند. این حزب که در اولین انتخابات بعد از تشکیل خود در دهه هشتاد میلادی تنها دو کرسی بدست آورد، با افزایش تدریجی اقبال مردمی توانست در جایگاهی قرار گیرد که با یک حضور قوی در پارلمان هند در انتخابات 2014 توانست برای اولین بار در تاریخ حضور هندویسم افراطی در انتخابات های شانزده گانه مجلس عوام هند، 282 کرسی از 543 کرسی این مجلس را به خود اختصاص دهد و با جلب سی و یک درصد کل آرای ماخوذه در جایگاه بزرگترین حزب این کشور قرار گرفته و با گرفتن کمک مختصری از احزاب همسو، دولت مرکزی هند را تا پنج سال آینده از آن خود نماید.

اما نکته یی که در این زمینه وجود دارد این که با توجه به گرایش این جریان به سوی رادیکالیسم و تعارض رادیکالیسم را روح عدم خشونت و تکثرگرای مذهب هندویی و همچنین تعارض سیاست های این حزب با قانون اساسی سکولار و تکثرگرای هند، چطور می شود چنین حزبی به این حد از اقبال مردمی دست یافته و علیرغم عقبه خشونت باری که بر آن تکیه زده، به چنین جایگاهی دست یابد. روند سه دهه گذشته این جریان نشان می دهد که گرچه اوج گرفتن حزب BJP در اثر حرکت فرقه گریانه حمله به مسجد بابری که به عنوان یکی از اولین بناهای تاریخی مسلمانان در منطقه آیودیا از شهرِ فیض آبادِ ایالت اتارپرادش، و سوار شدن جریان هندویسم افراطی بر موج ملی گرایی مذهبی هندوها که متعاقب جدایی پاکستان و بنگلادش از هند و بر افروخته شدن تحرکات نظامی و تروریستی گروهای اسلامی و یا خواست جدایی طلبی مسلمانان در کشمیر و... باعث گردید، این حزب در ابتدا به موفقیت های بسیار بزرگی دست یابد به طوری که چهار کرسی حزب در انتخابات لوک سابهای هشتم در انتخابات مجلس نهم در سال 1989 به ناگهان به هشتاد کرسی افزایش یافت و این روند با لوک سابهای دهم به یکصدو بیست کرسی و یازدهم به یکصدو شصت و یک کرسی و نهایتا در لوک سابهای دوازده و سیزده به یکصدو هشتاد و دو کرسی افزایش یافت، تا این که این روند سیر کاهشی به خود گرفت و در لوک سابهای چهاردهم به یکصد و سی و هشت و در لوک سابهای پانزدهم به یکصد و شانزده کاهش نشان داد، اما به ناگهان این تعداد کرسی ها برای اولین بار در تاریخ این جریان، رقم دویست و هشتاد و دو کرسی را رقم زد. گذشته از این فراز و فرود ها باید گفت که اقبال مردمی به حزب BJP که در انتخابات هشتم مجلس لوک سابها که نزدیک به هشت درصد کل آرای رای دهندگان بود با روند افزایشی که طی کرد، خود را به رقم سی و یک درصد کل آرا در سال 2014 افزایش داد. حزب  مذکور که در طی سه دهه گذشته چهار بار در قدرت مرکزی هند قرار گرفته دوره های سیزده روزه حاکمیت، سیزده ماهه و نزدیک به پنج ساله را در کارنامه خود دارد که اولین دوره نسبتا کامل آن در سال 1999 بود که تا سال 2004 دولت ائتلافی NDA به رهبری حزب BJP ادامه یافت، ولی در ادامه ناکامی به سراغ این حزب آمده و در انتخابات های لوک سابهای چهاردهم (2004) و لوک سابهای پانزدهم (2009) این حزب صحنه را به حزب حریف (INC) واگذار کرد. آنچه در این بین اتفاق افتاد دوری حزب BJP از شعارهای فرقه گرایانه و اعمال فرقه یی بود که با به وجود آمدن جریان میانه رو هندویی به رهبری اتل بیهاری واچپایی (نخست وزیر اسبق هند) در این حزب در دوره حاکمیت حزب (1999-2004) و قبل از این انتخابات رشد یافت و روند اصلاحات او در حزب BJP که به تعدیل دیدگاه و روند حرکت این حزب در قبال اقلیت ها انجامید و این حزب شروع به عضو گیری از بین اقلیت ها کرد و مواضع خود را در قبال آنان متعادل تر کرد و شعارها و مانیفست های انتخاباتی خود را تعدیل کرد و از این پس بیشتر بر بهتر حکومت کردن، بهبود وضع اقتصادی، ارتقا جایگاه هند در منطقه و جهان و همچنین در بعد خارجی به نزدیکی به غرب و اصلاح روابط با همسایگان علی الخصوص روابط با پاکستان و چین اقدام نمود و در این روند کارنامه نسبتا خوبی را نیز بر جای گذاشت. همین عامل باعث شد که این حزب بتواند در سومین دور به قدرت رسیدن خود در سال 1999 شرایطی را ایجاد کند که ائتلافی را که با دیگر بازیگران حزبی منطقه یی هند تشکیل داده و دولت ائتلافی مذکور را تقریبا تا پایان مدت حاکمیت خود در سال 2004 حفظ و احزاب همسو را با خود همراه نگهدارد؛ لیکن باز مشکلات اقتصادی مردم هند خصوصا در بخش کشاورزان که مهمترین نیروی کار هند را به خود اختصاص می دهند و برخی تندروی ها توسط اعضای حزب BJP در ایجاد و رهبری تحرکات سازمان یافته ی فرقه گرایانه که مهمترین آن کشتار عظیم و سازماندهی شده ی اقلیت مسلمان هند در ایالت گجرات که تحت کنترل حزب BJP شاخه ایالتی به سروزیری آقای نارندرا مودی در سال 2002 بود و...، باعث گردید این حزب قدرت را به حزب رقیب در انتخابات 2004 واگذار نماید. در عین حال ترمیم صورت گرفته در حزب و تعدیل مجدد جریان تندروی حزب که اینک مودی را باید عنصر اصلی آن دانست، باعث شد که گرچه دو دوره شکست را به این حزب تا سال 2014 متحمل نماید؛ ولی BJP با تمرکز بر شعارهای اقتصادی، بهبود وضع معیشت و همچنین ارتقا وضع زندگی هندی ها و با استفاده از جریان به راه افتاده علیه حزب حاکم کنگره در زمینه فساد اقتصادی و اختلاس و همچنین افزایش بی رویه قیمت ها در دو دوره زمامداری حزب کنگره و شکست های سیاست خارجی آن و...، دوباره این حزب مورد اقبال عمومی هندی ها قرار گرفته و قدرت را در دهلی نو در سال 2014 مجددا به دست گیرند و در حالی که فردی بنیادگرا همچون مودی سکاندار تبلیغات انتخاباتی حزب بود که در آخرین تحرک فرقه یی بزرگ و سازماندهی شده هندوتوا، متهم اصلی کشتار سازماندهی شده اقلیت مسلمان و حتی مسیحی ایالت گجرات محسوب می گردید و قبلا نیز به عنوان یکی از عوامل شکست حزب در انتخابات 2004 ارزیابی شده بود، ولی در کشاکش رقابت های داخلی جریان هندوتوا و از جمله حزب BJP در این انتخابات نهایتا آقای نارندرا مودی با همه خصوصیات برشمرده شده، به عنوان کاندیدای نخست وزیری انتخابات لوک سابهای شانزدهم معرفی و به سردمدار تبلیغات انتخاباتی این حزب تبدیل و معرفی گردید؛ ولی با این تفاوت که در انتخابات لوک سابهای شانزدهم دیگر نشانی از یک سردمدار فرقه گرایی در سخنانش از خود به نمایش نگذاشت و از سوی ارگان تبلیغاتی حزب به عنوان یک فرد معتقد به توسعه اقتصادی و صنعتی دوستدار اهل تجارت و اقتصاد و صنعت معرفی گردید که البته یک وجه کارنامه موفق او در زمان حاکمیت طولانی اش بر ایالت مهم گجرات همین امر بود و آن را تا حد نسبتا مناسبی به اثبات رسانده بود و اینک می آمد تا در سطح کشوری، هند را نیز به این سمت رهنمون نماید. لذا مجموع شرایط مذکور به پیروزی شگفت انگیز حزب BJP و شکست فاحش حزب کنگره انجامید و حیرت بسیاری را برانگیخت و به لحاظ اعداد و ارقامِ کسب شده توسط پیروز و شکست خورده در این انتخابات شگفتی آفرین ظاهر شد به طوری که بزرگترین شکست تاریخ حزب کنگره و در مقابل بزرگترین پیروزی تاریخ احزاب فرقه گرا در این انتخابات رقم خورد.

در کنار این پیروزی استثنایی، باید گفت که روند افزایش اقبال مردمی به حزب BJP که حرکت رو به رشد تدریجی را نشان می دهد و تاکنون بدین جا ختم شده است، نشان می دهد که با اولا گسترش طبقه متوسط جامعه هند که در اثر تجربه رشد اقتصادی در دو دهه اخیر و بعد از اصلاحات اقتصادی به منصه ظهور رسید و در دولت های کنگره و BJP ادامه یافت، این طبقه ی نوظهور را که خواستگاه و پیاده نظام تفکرات هندویسم افراطی می باشد را گسترش داد لذا در همین حال به توسعه آرای این جریان منجر گردید، و از دیگر سو، تعدیل سخنان و حرکت افراطی جاری در حزب BJP نسبت به دهه هشتاد و نود میلادی، همراه شعارهای ملی گرایانه جذاب توانست عده یی از هندی هایی که هویت هندویی خود را در خطر می دیدند به خود جلب نماید و همچنان آرای این حزب را افزایش دهد و در نهایت ضعف های آشکار جریان هندویسم میانه رو در رهبری و عملکرد حزب کنگره و... باعث شده که با ریزش آرای این جریان میانه رو کفه رای به سمت حزب BJP روند رو به رشدی را طی نماید. لذا مجموع این شرایط به وضعیت کنونی تعادل قوا در بین جریان میانه رو و تندرو هندوها در هند تبدیل گردید.

اما تغییرات به وجود آمده در شعارها و روند حرکت جریان هندویسم افراطی که در روند و موضع گیری ها و تحرکات حزب BJP خود را نمود می دهد، هم بر روند تاثیر جهانی شدن که بر تعامل و تکثرگرایی تاکید دارد، و هم تغییر ذائقه هندوها در دوری از حجم وسیع خشونت ها که در دهه 1990 انجام گرفت و هم اقتضای سیاسی کار حزبی و قرار گرفتن در اپوزیسیون و هم همراه داشتن گروه های همسو و موتلف در سطح ملی و ایالتی موثر بوده است، چرا که روح و اساس تعالیم و فرهنگ هندو نیز بر عدم خشونت و تکثرگرایی استوار است و تنوع کاملا در این شیوه نگرش به جهان و خالق آن جا افتاده و موجه است و لذا سردمداران سیاسی جریان هندوتوا نمی توانند بیش از این در جریانی مخالف ذات فرهنگ هندو مانده و دم از دفاع از آن بزنند و لذا تغییرات در شاخه سیاسی هندوتوا می تواند آغازی بر این روند باشد که نوعی تغییر گفتمان را نوید می دهد.

بنابراین می توان گفت که روند موجود که روند اصلاح را به نوعی نشان می دهد هم در اثر امواج قوی جهانی شدن است که حامل آن ارتباط بین هندی ها و جوامع دیگر را به همراه داشته و در داخل کشور نیز حجم وسیع وسایل ارتباط جمعی جهانی شدن آنان را تسریع بخشیده است و الزمات سیاسی نیز باعث شده است که جریان سیاسی سنگ پریوار خود را اصلاح کرده و از شعارهای افراطی تا حدی دوری کند تا بتواند به نوعی نیروهای وفادار به جریان میانه رو و مردم مسالمت جوی هندو را به خود جلب و در قدرت مانده و آینده خود را تضمین کند.

اگرچه جریان هندوتوا را می توان به دو شاخه تقسیم کرد که در یک شاخه آن بعد سیاسی تفوق دارد که این جریان در جبهه ی حزب BJP تبلور می یابد و طبعا سیاست ها و کادر آن نیز سیال خواهد بود و تغییرات سریع اتفاق می افتد و جریان دیگر گروه های هندوتوا که بعد مذهبی- فرهنگی در آن قوی تر بوده، با حضور شاخه های اساسی این جریان مثل RSS و VHP خود را نشان می دهد که اگرچه در نهایت خواست های سیاسی از جمله تشکیل "ملت هندو" و یا "حکمداری هندو" از وجه هدف سیاسی تفکر آنان نشات می گیرد، ولی بعد مذهبی و فرهنگی در اولویت اول و زیربنا می باشد که حاملان آن همین گروه های مذکور هستند و لذا ممکن است به صورت تاکتیکی با پایین کشیدن فتیله شعارهای سیاسی – مذهبی موافقت کنند لیکن در اصول و پایه این جریان، اهداف بنیادی خود را دنبال خواهند کرد و از جدایی و تقسیم بندی صوری موجود بین گروه های هندوتوا استفاده کرده و می توانند این تغییرات اصلاح گرایانه و یا تاکتیکی را به سیاسیون هندوتوا نسبت داده و آن را نهایتا به سیاست بازی انتخاباتی آنان نسبت داده و خود را از اتهامِ دوری از اهداف و آرامان ها مبرا نمایند و در فرصت مقتضی از این حرکت و سردمدارانش دوری کنند و این که کادر و اهداف این نوع گروه ها در مقایسه با شاخه سیاسی آن سیال و تغییرات شگرف را تجربه نکرده است.

گروه RSS نشان داده است که این پتانسیل و نفوذ در گروه های سیاسی همچون BJP دارد که آنان را به مدار لازم خود بازگرداند، همچنان که تجربه گروه BJS نشان داد نهایتا در وزن کشی سیاسی بین جریان نزدیک به گروه RSS و جریان مخالف، نهایتا پیروزی و تفوق به جناح حامی RSS ختم شد و جریان مقابل را مغلوب و مجبور به خروج از حزب نمود.

گروه های سیاسی – مذهبی، از جمله اعضای زیر گروه های هندوتوا که بر امواج گرایش مذهبی هندوها سوارند قاعدتا به آنچه در افکار و خواست های درونی مردم هند می گذرند آگاهند و لذا نتایج تحقیقات انجام شده توسط دانشمندان علوم اجتماعی همچون مراناندا (2009) برای آنان نیز مد نظر بوده که "در حالی که در باقی قسمت های جهان ممکن است با حضور پدیده مدرنیته، گرایش مذهبی کاهش نشان دهد، اما هند هموار مذهبی تر شده است و همچنان که هند جهانی می شود به صورت افزایشی، هم زمان هندوتر نیز می شوند و با توجه به این که نود درصد هندوها مذهبیند، لذا نیروهای هندوتوا سعی می کنند این پتانسیل را به بانک رای خود تبدیل نمایند."

 لذا جهانی شدن برای هندویسم افراطی این امکان را پدید آورده است که شبکه های تبلیغی و جمع آوری اعانه خود را در جهان گسترش دهد و به نیروگیری از جهان تشنه معنویت و عرفان در خارج از هند اقدام کند و وسایل ارتباط جمعی که جهانی شدن برای شان فراهم کرده است، به وسیله یی برای نیروهای این جناح سیاسی – مذهبی فراهم کرده که اعضای آن بهتر بتوانند در ارتباط با هم بوده و به تبادل افکار بپردازند. در عین حال در مواجهه افکار عمومی جهان که از طریق تعامل جهانی و در اثر جهانی شدن فراهم شده است به تعدیل شعارهای سیاسی – رسمی خود اقدام نمایند.




[1] - Young India, Sept. 25, 1925.

[2] - Sebastian Vempeny, Minorities in Contemporary India (New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2003), p.186.

[3] - The vast majority of communal violence in post-Independence India has been perpetrated against Muslims.

[4] - based on 2001 census, Hindus accounted for 80.5 per cent of the Indian population.

[5] - 2001 census constituted Muslims 13.4 per cent, the third largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia and Pakistan, with large concentrations in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar states.

[6] - Christians were the third largest religious community in India, with 2.3 per cent

[7] - Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains together accounted for 3.1 per cent of Indian population.

[8] - 0.6 per cent of Indians belonged to other religions or persuasions.  0.1 per cent did not state their religion.

[9] - Islam, Christianity , Jewish, Hinduism, Buddhism …

[10] - India is neighboring with Muslims from many sides; it connected to the Muslim nations around it from the West and East. India connected to the Muslim nations by land in West (Pakistan) and North-West (central Asian or historical, cultural, geographical Iranian plateau). In addition, by sea routs it is connected to some Muslim nations like Maldives and Arab nations and African Muslim nations, Southeast sea routs connects it to the Malaysia and Indonesia... and, the Northeast by land is connected to Bangladesh and other Muslims communities there. From inside also Hindus are neighboring with Muslims all around India and Indian Muslims are the second most populated Muslim community in the world, after Indonesia. 

[11] - contain 17% of world population

[12] - Gross Domestic Product

[13] - “Indians have never been, and will never be “other worldly”. Their spiritualism, though lofty in its metaphysics, is mostly a means to harness divine support for power and pelf.” Pavan Varma (diplomat- writer politician Bihar CM’ adviser; the author of Being Indian (3.64 avg rating, 262 ratings, 35 reviews, published 2004), )

[14] - different religious thoughts, customs and religious sects

[15] - Religious freedom, while officially guaranteed in the Republic of India, is seriously threatened by violence targeting minority religious groups.

[16] - Article 25 provides for “freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate religion” Article 26 guarantees the rights of religious groups to manage institutional and religious affairs, and to acquire and administer property, while Article 27 establishes that “no person shall be compelled to pay taxes” for the promotion or maintenance of any religion. Articles 29, 16 and 15 protect against discrimination of the basis of religion, while Article 28 mandates that no student attending a state-funded or state-recognized school be required to participate in religious instruction or worship, and that no such instruction or worship occur in fully state- funded schools, while Article 30 established the right of minority religious groups to operate their own educational institutions.

[17] - South Asia comprises the countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

[18] - “Human security as a community of Ideas that include human development, human right, good governance and morale philosophy. Three fundamental features define it, refers to safeguard individuals from critical, pervasive threats.”  (Mashru, 2013)

[19] - A national level party in India is 1-The party securing at least 6% of the valid votes (this means total votes polled) in favour of more than 4 states in Lok Sabha and Assembly Elections. 2- It has to win at least 4 seats in the Lok Sabha in one or more states.3- 2% of seats in Lok Sabha are elected from at least 3 different states.

[20] - a scholar of University of Delhi - India

[21] - Meera Nanda, the writer on science and religion. She is a philosopher of sciences from JNU in India. She wrote Award-winning book prophets, facing backward: postmodernism, science, and hindu nationalism

[22]- Ashtosh Varshney, Ethnic Violence and Civic Life, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 2002), p.309

[23] -the ideological father of Hindu nationalism, Savarkar’s text Hindutva/who is a Hindu was to emerge as a significant articulation of Hindu nationalist thought.

[24] - Peterson, V. Spike. (June 1999). “Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism.” International Feminist Journals of Politics. Volume 1, pp.34-65.

[25] - the positive association of nationalism with self-determination and democratization

[26] - the promotion of group homogeneity and ‘difference’ from ‘others’

[27] - the negative effects of suppressing difference within the group and/or domination of ‘outsiders’ in the name of the group

[28] - Hindu nation

[29] - Hindutva elements Family

[30] - The World Hindu Council or Vishva Hindu Parishad - has its origins in the 1964 to spread Hindu values and strengthen links among Hindus in India and abroad, but from the 1980s it took on a more aggressively political form, actively mobilising volunteers for Hindu political action, particularly around the issue of reclaiming mosques alleged to have been built on sites formerly occupied by Hindu temples. Unlike traditional Hindu nationalist groupings, the VHP also harnessed resources from prosperous Indians resident in the West. The VHP and some others have a well-funded efforts now to spread Hinduism into other countries. In contrast to the RSS, the VHP worked using the leadership of traditional religious figures, inserting popular Hindu symbols and practices into its political mobilization. It presented itself as a purely cultural organization, without political interests, while the BJP was supposed to remain respectful of the strictures on political parties, of avoiding the use of religion for electoral campaigning. The VHP described itself as the organizational representative of Hindu society as a whole.

[31] - Das, Runa. (2004, March 17). “Religious Nationalism, Brahamanical Patriarchy, and the Politics of Hindutva: Does Ideology Matter in International Relations?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

[32] - Minorities under international law: Who are minorities under international law?  Available on Sep. 25 2014 the site address is:

[33] - drama, poetry, music, dance and painting

[34] - Hinduism is not only the dominant religion of the Indian subcontinent, but of many Indians living in the diaspora. Today, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica Online (2010), there are about 840 million Hindus in 144 countries, which comprises, in accordance with the CIA World Fact Handbook (2010), approximately 14 percent of the world's total population.

[35] - هندو

[36] - Now is located in modern Pakistan

[37] - The people who came to Indian subcontinent about 1100 to 1500 BCE and settled themselves around Indus river plain and other place in India like Gangetic plain…

[38] - The caste is related to occupations. In India 3,000 castes and 25,000 subcastes exist. The castes are divided into four main Hindu socio-economical different varnas; Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudra and the “outcast”, the Untouchables.

[39] - The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) or in English “National Patriotic Organization” or “the Association of National Volunteers” is Hindu hardliner group that is founded in 1925 with the goal of Supporting Hindu nationalism and upholding Hindu Traditions.

[40] - Since the late 19th century, Hindus have reacted to the term Hinduism in several ways. Some have rejected it in favour of indigenous formulations. Those preferring the terms VEDA or VEDIC RELIGION want to embrace an ancient textual core and the tradition of BRAHMIN learning that preserved and interpreted it. Those preferring the term SANATANA DHARMA (“eternal law,” or as Philip Lutgendorf has playfully suggested “old-time religion”) emphasize a more catholic tradition of belief and practice (such as worship through images, dietary codes, and the veneration of the cow) not necessarily mediated by Brahmins. Still others, perhaps the majority, have simply accepted the term Hinduism or its analogues in various Indic languages, especially Hindi dharma. (Britanica-p433)

[41] -  The lingayat or Veerashaivism was born in south India (Deccan) in 12th century by L.Basavanna that by borrowing some idea of Bhakti approach, confront millstones beliefs of Hinduism like caste system, the Vedas authority over religion, Reincarnation, Karma, supremacy of Brahmins over others… They reach a poison to monotheism by worship Shiva that will show itself in Linga form, or Karnataka term Ishtalinga.

[42] -  A Hindu nationalist sect that is founded in 1875 to reform some Hindu belief and re-establishing of the holiest Hindu Vedas; but this sect say that the caste system it should be based on birth rather than merit. They have no believed on animal sacrifice and untouchable people. And some Hindu traditions like Idol and ancestor worshiping, child marriage, temple offering and pilgrimage…                

[43] - The founder of Buddhism.

[44] - The incarnation of a Hindu deity, especially Vishnu, in human or animal form

[45] - one of the most important Hindu god who is consider as preserver of universe and upholder of  Dharma, he has so many Avatar in Mythology of Hinduism and stand aside of two other major Hindu gods  Braham and Shiva

[46] - Professor Sarvepalli Rahdhakrishnan (1888-1975) was Indian president (1962-1967), he was a philosopher who write many books such as Indian philosophy in two volumes; The principal Upanishads 

[47] - Jawaharlal Nehru (first prime minister of India), Letter has been written by him on 31 January 1950.

[48] - India gained independence from the United Kingdom after 190 years of rule by the British Empire and British East Indian Company

[49] - States with large Muslim populations include Bihar, West Bengal, Utter Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and the Jammu and Kashmir.

[50] - PRALAY KANUNGO - Professor & Chairperson of  Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India 

[51] - “In one sense, India does not have a middle class, new or old. It is simply misleading to call 200 million or so buyers of Western-style consumer durables ‘middle class’ because they do not represent the statistical middle of the population. They are instead what Achin Vanaik calls ‘an elite of mass proportion’—the top 20–30 per cent of the population surrounded by a sea of utter poverty. two most cited surveys put the numbers anywhere between 60 million and 300 million. According to the Indian National Council of Applied economic Research (NCAER), the term ‘middle class’ applies to those earning between Rs 200,000 and Rs 1,000,000 annually. By this definition, about 6 per cent of 1 billion Indians—about 60 million people—were middle class in the year 2000–01, while close to 22 per cent ‘aspiring classes’ were expected to catch up in a decade or so. But if middle class-ness is measured by ownership of middle-class goods—telephones, motor vehicles (cars or two-wheelers), and color TV—close to one-fifth of India was already middle class in 2007, as the state of the Nation survey by CNN-IBN revealed..  (Nanda, 2009).”

[52] - Shenoy, S. Women and Work in India: (Re) engaging Class, Careers, and Occupations in a Globalizing Economy. (2008). Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, Indiana. Retrieved March 3, 2010, from Dissertations & Theses: A&I.(Publication No. AAT 3378866).

[53] - “the major beneficiaries of the neo-liberal reforms (Nanda, 2009)” in the way of globalisation.

[54] - “Their holy land is far off in Arabia or Palestine.  Their mythology and God men, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently, their names and their outlooks smack of foreign origin.  Their love is divided”

[55] - Raj is a Hindi term means “Dominion or rule” in this case it means Hindus ruling over India as we had in “British Raj” that refers to colonized all India during 20th,19th,18th centuries by British

[56] - A great researcher and thinker of communal politics in India belong to Dalit who write the constitution of India after independent.

[57] - supreme leader of independent movement from British ruling over India

[58] - Mahatma Karamchand Gandhi’s  book, page 277-278

[59] - one of the Hindu god

[60] - Many converts to non-Hindu religions, particularly Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, are drawn from among the Dalits, adivasis and ‘low’ castes.

[61] - described by the term “ghar vapsi”, translated as ‘homecoming’, or ‘reconversion’.

[62] - based on this doctrine now they past state-level anti-conversion laws in Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan

[63] - As a reaction to Pope John Paul the II statement in the third Christian millennium that the Church would target the continent of Asia to convert it to Christianity.

[64] - Others (the West and Muslims)

[65] -“defined as whoever does not share the same worldviews or interpretation of faith as the extremists (Desker et al. 2005, p8).” 

[66] - against the west

[67] - English is the language of choice for 80 percent of web sites, and that 26 percent of Americans use the World Wide Web -- as opposed to 3 percent of Russians, 0.4 percent of the population of South Asia and 0.2 percent for Arab states (UNDP, 1999)

[68] - INC

[69] - Indian National Congress, Report of the General Secretaries Nov. 1946-Dec. 1948 (New Delhi, n.d.), pp. 22-3.

[70] - Manifesto of All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh [New Delhi, 1951], p. 2-3

[71] - Capital city of Gujarat with 81% Hindus, 14% Muslims, a textile city in Western India.

[72] - in his book “Communalism in Modern India”

[73] - when he describes the 1930 conference in London which was organised by colonisers with participants form India

[74] - Indian currency

[75] - its story will come later

[76] - An eastern state of India on the bank of the Bay of Bengal

[77] - “musalman ke do hi sthan— Pakistan ya Kabristan”

[78] - the Blue Stare Operation by Indian army in Indira Gandhi prime minister ship

[79] - three small states with Christian majorities; Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Goa, and also Christian presentation in the 7th Indian east states

[80] - who have a millennium existence history in India

[81] - the Muslim political representative in during freedom struggle

[82] - Jawaharlal Nehru First Prime Minister of India from Independent to mid-1960

[83] - with 78% Hindus, 20% Muslims

[84] - with 81% Hindus, 9% Muslims

[85] - with 63% Hindus, 17% Muslims

[86] - with 63% Hindus, 37% Muslims

[87] - with 69% Hindus, 30% Muslims

[88] - 79% Hindus, 21% Muslims 

[89] - with 79% Hindus, 16% Muslims

[90] - with 84% Hindus, 9% Muslims

[91] - with 94% Hindus, 6% Muslims

[92] - with 47% Hindus, 52% Muslims

[93] - with 48% Hindus, 51% Muslims

[94] - with 81% Hindus, 12% Muslims

[95] - with 44% Hindus, 51% Muslims

[96] - with 80% Hindus, 9% Muslims

[97] - National Herald (Lucknow), 15 June 1948, p. 7

[98] - Organizer, 26 April 1954, p. 8.

[99] - Central Working Committee, Delhi, 8 May 1954, BJS Documents, V, pp. 21-2.

[100] - “The politics of Urdu”, Organizer, 26 May 1958, p. 4

[101] - with 57% Hindus, 41% Muslims, that the Aligarh Muslim University is located there;

[102] - with 61% Hindus, 36% Muslims

[103] - with 68% Hindus, 31% Muslims

[104] - 82% Hindus, 15% Muslims

[105] - 79% Hindus, 21% Muslims

[106] - with 54% Hindus, 46% Muslims

[107] - with 50% Hindus, 49% Muslims

[108] - 78% Hindus, 20% Muslims

[109] -with 56% Hindus, 43% Muslims

[110] - 56% Hindus, 42% Muslims

[111] - with 81% Hindus, 19% Muslims

[112] - 52% Hindus, 44% Muslims

[113] - 42% Hindus, 58% Muslims

[114] - 78% Hindus, 21% Muslims

[115] -the capital of Uttar Pradesh with 73% Hindus, 26% Muslims

[116] - India Muslim population includes both Sunni (85%) and Shi’a (15%) Muslims

[117] - A term that has come to be used for volunteers for Hindu religious duties, particularly for volunteers associated with the Ram temple movement from the 1980s.

[118] - which resulted in gruesome Hindu–Muslim riots that took over a million lives

[119] - Former India prime minister of BJP ruling government, who was born in Gwalior in 1926, had been educated at Victoria College, Gwalior, and at the DAV College, Kanpur, and had joined the RSS in 1941. At various times he had been editor of the journals published by Rashtra Dharma Prakashan, with which Upadhyaya had also been associated, and he had become Mookerjee's private secretary in BJS in 1953.

[120] - Tabish Khair “stripped of my Indian Identity” Sunday times of India (10 January 1993), p24

[121] - Ram Rath Yatra

[122] - processions with religious aspects now is using with mix political-religious purpose and agenda

[123] - Television profoundly changes the context of politics (Rajagopal, 2001).

[124] - In this case, a 62 year-old Muslim woman had been unilaterally divorced by her husband, and then denied alimony under Muslim Personal Law. After the Supreme Court overturned this ruling, and required that the husband pay alimony, the Congress-led government passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, which upheld the original ruling denying the wife alimony. This law was widely perceived as a craven act of political pandering, and touted by Hindu nationalists as emblematic of the Congress party’s “pseudo-secularism,” where by the national interest had been surrendered to the parochial demands of clamorous minorities, particularly Muslims.

[125] - with 84% Hindus, 12% Muslims

[126] - 69% Hindus, 26% Muslims

[127] - 76% Hindus, 16% Muslims

[128] - 84% Hindus, 8% Muslims

[129] - capital city of  Andhra Pradesh 54% Hindus, 43% Muslims, one of the most dynamic metropolises in India, also a sensitive and riot-prone city

[130] - with 80% Hindus, 14% Muslims

[131] - Capital city of  Madhya Pradesh with 68% Hindus, 27% Muslims

[132] - with 81% Hindus, 13% Muslims

[133] - with 85% Hindus, 11% Muslims

[134] - with 51% Hindus, 46% Muslims

[135] -84% Hindus, 12% Muslims

[136] - Chandra, Bipan. Communalism: A Primer. New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2004. Print.

[137] - The Gujrat as birth place of the most non-violence, religious tolerance theorist and the Indian freedom leader like Mahatma Gandhi and on the other hand one of the most communalist Hindu leader like Narendra Modi, or within the Hindutva imaginary by Gujarati nationalist and freedom fighter, Sardar Vallabbhai Patel, Who iconized as ‘the Iron man’ and ‘the Bismarck of India’, and his public declarations that Indian Muslims pass a more stringent test of loyalty to the State than their fellow citizens. 

[138] - strike or extra-legal halt to all economic activity

[139] - they consider Indian Muslim as the Pakistani, Bangladeshi … agents

[140] - the ‘barometer’ of North Indian politics

[141] - by Praveen Swami,  Sep 9, 2013 08:24 IST, “Muzaffarnagar riots: Dear Shinde, your communal violence data doesn't add up” available in site address in October 7, 2014

[142] - available on Sep. 20014 on the - PRS Legislative Research

[143] - communalist front’ opposition, like INC and others who are committed to the India constitution and its occasions like secularism and pluralism...

[144] - lowest caste of Hindus and untouchables

[145] - Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1996) 155.

[146] - demolition of Babri mosque and building Ram Mandir there

[147] - Dalits, which first established in 1950, formed 16.2 per cent of the population. Scheduled Tribes, or adivasis, constituted 8.2 per cent of the population.

[148] - RSS, VHP, HMS, BJP, BJS, Bajrang Dal …

[149] - Brahmanism is a system of religious beliefs and practices based on the ancient texts knows as the Vedas and their associated literature. Some Indian writers and intellectuals believed that it might serve as the foundation of a reformed and broadly based faith. It enabled Hindu nationalist writers to create the commanding myths of cultural survival and revival with which they justified their political theories. (Graham, 1990)

[150] - article  “The shapes of Hindu nationalism” by John Zavos published in (Adeney & Saez, 2005)

[151] - the subsequent revival of Hinduism

[152] - all now is located in Pakistan

[153] - now is Bangladesh

[154] - K.R. Malkani (the editor of the English weekly the Organiser), Principles for a New Political Party (Delhi, [1951]), p. 5.

[155] - National Integration: Note Submitted by Sh. A. B. Vajpayee, Leader of the Jana Sangh Group in Parliament at the National Integration Conference held at New Delhi, on Sept. 28, 29 & 30, 1961 (Delhi, n.d.), p. 3.

[156] - the word (in ancient Greece) means “a group of heavily armed infantry formed in ranks and files close and deep, with shields joined and long spears overlapping. A number of persons united for a common purpose.” Lebanon Phalange primacy is “preserving the Lebanese nation, but with a "Phoenician" identity, distinct from its Arab, Muslim neighbors. A nationalistic ideology that considers the Lebanese people, particularly Maronites, a unique nation independent from the Arab nation.  

[157] - leader of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Dr. Mohan Bhagawat quoted on 2013 May 16 at Hojai, in Nagaon district of Assam

[158] - “VHP’s dharma Raksha Manch campaigned for a hindu vote bank and the BJP” (Nanda, 2009)

[159] - International Working President of VHP

[160] - Patit Pawan was started in 1967 as a street-fighter organization by some RSS pracharaks in Pune. The organization initially called itself Hindu Jajvalaya Sanghatana (the Hindu Attack Organization) and was formed in order to fight the Youth Congress and the perceived Muslim threat in the mixed neighborhoods of Pune. The working style of Patit Pawan is in several ways similar to that of Shiv Sena. Both organizations cultivate a militant, activist style, appeal to young non-Brahmin men, and propagate a very simple and highly communal version of Hindutva.

[161] - A big city in Maharashtra one of the Hindu radicalism center.

[162] - established in 1952 to counter Christian missionary influence among adivasis (low caste)

[163] - which operates among students

[164] - ‘RSS pratinidhi sabha starts at Kurukshetra’, India Today, 26 March 2010

[165] - unmarried males who promote the Hindu nationalist agenda at a local level

[166] - The RSS strategy of managing Hindu male sexuality thus seeks to exclude women—as concrete sexual beings—from the cause, and to place men in a purified, masculine space undisturbed by sexual drives, while it encourages a systematic sublimation of sexual energy into service to the abstract, generalized mother—the nation. In Golwalkar’s discourse, this operation took place with great passion, in a language of almost oedipal qualities. The conquest of India by Muslim invaders is in the RSS idiom portrayed as “rape of the Motherland” by a potent and dangerous enemy. Only if the “sons of Bharat,” the RSS cadre, Organize themselves as men along military lines can they win this oedipal battle, and become true males worthy of the love of the mother nation (Hansen, 1999).”

[167] - the second sarsangchalak, or supreme head of the RSS

[168] - Golwalkar, We; or, Our Nationhood Defined (Nagpur, 1939), p. 22.

[169] - Pradip Kumar Datta, ‘“Dying Hindus”: Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early 20th Century Bengal’, Economic & Political Weekly 28:25 (June 1993), p. 1305.

[170] - the founder of RSS

[171] - religious and legal duty

[172] - Indic branch of learning, pertaining to Hindu dharma

[173] - self-rule, home-rule,

[174] - he was an Indian warrior king, a Maratha king

[175] - Italian politician, journalist, and leader of the National Fascist Party, ruling the country as Prime Minister from 1922 until his ousting in 1943

[176] - Austrian-born German politician and the leader of the Nazi Party.

[177] -That till the beginning of 2014 is raised to 51,000 shakhas. See avaliable on 3 Sep. 2014

[178] - long bamboo sticks

[179] - Or as it name by Richard Davis “Sangh Hinduism” in his book which published by Oxford University Press, in 1996 by the title of “The Iconography of Rama’s Chariot.” In Making India Hindu

[180] - from independent till the end of1970s

[181] - from early 1980s till now

[182] - Narendra Modi: India's saviour or its worst nightmare? By Jason Burke available in  on Sep. the 3 20014

[183] - the Hindu Mahasabha (HMS) was as a party for high-caste Hindus and as one of the pillar of religious orthodoxy (Graham 1990, p27) “The Hindu Mahasabha and RSS were two Hindu communal organizations that adopted Hindutva as their guiding ideology and competed with Muslim elites to collude with the British colonial power and bargain for a greater share of political power under British patronage. The Hindu Mahasabha represented the interests of the feudal land- lords during the freedom struggle (Engineer, 2008).” “Despite the emergence of the Hindu Sabha movement in the early twentieth century in north and northwest India, the lines of opposition between Hindu nationalism and Congress nationalism remained only very vaguely drawn. The evidence suggests that there was a constant blending and borrowing of ideas. This was demonstrated graphically by the fact that many prominent figures in the INC and the Indian national movement more generally were also involved in the developing Sabha movement. For instance, Punjabis Lala Lajpat Rai and Swami Shraddhanand were important figures in both movements, as well as being prominent Arya Samajists. B.S. Moonje was involved both in the INC and the emerging Hindu nationalist movement in Nagpur. Perhaps the most famous of these ‘crossover’ figures was V.D. Savarkar, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha between 1937 and 1943 (Adeney & Saez, 2005).”

[184] - Sanatana Dharma Sabha speak of a kind of Hinduism which demonstrates its characteristics reference to specific texts and traditions 

[185] - Dayananda Saraswati used the Vedic texts to lay the foundations of the Arya Samaj movement in northern India,

[186] - former president of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Minister for Industries and Supplies, leader and founder and president of Jana Sangh party

[187] - British ruling over subcontinent till 1947

[188] -Mr. Mookerjee statement as leader of BJS in a newspaper article published in December 1951 just before the first general elections of India.

[189] - a teacher in Camp College in New Delhi who became one of the founder of BJS and then appointed as General Secretary of party in 1951, General Secretary of Punjab Jana Sangh; secretary of northern zone of Jana Sangh; returned to Lok Sabha in 1961 by- election but loses seat in 1962 elections; elected President of Jana Sangh in March 1966; heads Jana Sangh's campaign in 1967 elections; returned to Lok Sabha in 1967 elections; Party,

[190] -The principal figure amongst the RSS organizers within the AIJSP party was Deendayal Upadhyaya, who had helped to establish the Jana Sangh's unit in Uttar Pradesh and had served as its first general secretary. Born on 25 September 1916. In 1937, he joined the RSS. In 1947, he established a publishing concern in Lucknow, the Rashtra Dharma Prakashan, which issued the Hindi journals Rashtra Dharma (monthly), Panchajanya (weekly) and Swadesh (daily).

[191] - This transformation of the party coincided with a policy orientation of the Jana Sangh that emphasized campaigns on issues of national unity or anti-Muslim sentiments: the campaign for liberation of Goa (1955); the campaign against division of Punjab on linguistic/confessional lines (1955–1957); the campaign against the use of Urdu in northern India (1954–1961), producing communal tension and riots in Uttar Pradesh; the campaign for Hindi as the national language (1958–1965); and the anti-cow-slaughter campaign from the late 1950s onward.33 Al- though some of these campaigns consolidated the Jana Sangh’s local networks, they also reinforced the image of the Jana Sangh as a sectarian party.

[192] - Nehru, letter to Pradesh Congress Committees (PCC) presidents, 19 September 1951, in Congress Bulletin, September 1951, p. 176.

[193] - Nehru to Mookerjee, 10 February 1953, in Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Integrate Kashmir: Mookerjee-Nehru & Abdullah Correspondence [New Delhi, 1953], p. 60.

[194] - INC party and its allies

[195] - Jammu and Kashmir

[196] - Manifesto of All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh [New Delhi, 1951], p. 2

[197] -  an experienced Delhi politician who was one of the party founder in 1950

[198] - Statesman (Delhi), 4 June 1956, p. 3. See also his earlier speech at Meerut on 6 March (ibid., 9 March 1956, p. 9).

[199] - Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar as a Maharashtrian Brahman was the Sar Sanghchalak (chief leader) of RSS after Savarkar. He was a teacher at the Benares Hindu University, concentrated on developing the organization's philosophy and doctrine. He wrote We; or Our Nationhood Defined.

[200] - they know Communist Party as 'wholly socialist and therefore neither democratic nor nationalist

[201] - northern and some the center states of India

[202] - from 1969 to 1972

[203] - from 1973 to 1977

[204] - The Janata party, formed few months before the general election of 1977, was a direct result of years of cooperation between the Jana Sangh and other non-Congress forces in the Lok Sangarsh Samiti. The party consisted of defectors from Congress, Congress (O) headed by former Congress leader and old-style Gandhian Morarji Desai, the Socialist party, the Bharatiya Lok Dal headed by the north Indian peasant leader Charan Singh, and the Jana Sangh.

[205] - The prominent founders of BJP L.K Advani as well as some other leader of party where RSS members.  Advani was famous as a hard militant Hindutva that advocated aggressively pursuing a right-wing Hindu- dominated nationalist agenda. He became a Swayamsevak (volunteer) for the RSS in 1942 and started his political career in 1947 as Secretary of the RSS branch of Karachi, developing many RSS shakhas (units). He continued with BJS and the BJP now. Now BJP’s prime minister Candidate Narendra Modi also joined the RSS as a child. He obtained a MA in Political Science from Gujarat University, where he was an active member of the ABVP (Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, Hindu student union) as well as a pracharak (cadre) in the RSS. In 1987, he joined the BJP.

[206] - Hindu Campaigners Backing Modi Risk Spooking India Allies by Unni Krishnan available in on Sep.3 2014

[207] - The literature used by the BJP as it harnesses support within the Indian masses. Das quotes a leaflet entitled, “Hindu Bandhuon: Soncho Aur Sambhalo” (Hindu Friends: Think and Protect) that the BJP distributed in the district of Bhagalpur, India, 1989-1990 stating “The Hindu is being worsted everywhere in his own country…His women are being raped. The Hindus have been completely wiped out…their property have been looted. Their women have been raped” but Meera Nanda believes that “despite the periodic panics about ‘hinduism in danger’, and despite the often heard complaint that the Hindus face reverse discrimination in their own country, Hinduism is doing very well.”

[208] - At the time that secular, plural, democratic Indian constitution recognize and give this right to Indian minority to have own “personal law” based on their religion roles. “The constitutional bedrock of these discriminations is Article 30, which accords to the minorities the right to set up and administer their own schools and colleges, preserving their communal identity (Elst, 1996)” is faced with BJP confrontation.

[209] - birth place

[210] - In Indian culture the teacher who is a qualified and a wisdom person who is chose to lead in life

[211] -  Compared to this 93 per cent, only 69 per cent of Japanese and 71 per cent of Chinese believed that their culture was the best in the world.

[212] - the Telugu Desam Party for Dravidians who are Telugu race

[213] - Andhra Pradesh

[214] - Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

[215] - Tamil Nadu

[216] -  the Bahujan Samaj Party

[217] - the Samajwadi Party

[218] - state parliaments

[219] - The Swatantra Party, formed in 1959 offered the most effective criticism of the INC government's economic policies from the perspective of economic and political liberalism, and it was poorly organized non-partisan associations such as the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, which sustained the neglected cause of Hindu traditionalism with most credibility. In 1962 the Swatantra Party, gained 18 seats in LS with 7.89% of the votes. three intersecting sets of Indian parties (democratic, nationalist and socialist) the Swatantra Party as lacking in nationalism and compared its economic and social doctrines unfavorably with those of the Jana Sangh

[220] - Even the Left social movements, including even the Communists, are not beyond using religious rituals for political use.  Just because the BJP and the VHP use yagnas (fire sacrifices) as a tool for communalization does not mean that all yagnas are communal, (Nanda,2009)

[221] - powerful leader of INC Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) became prime minister of India in 1966–1977, 1980–1984

[222] - as they named in Hindi “Yatra” to give a holy aspect to it

[223] - A percentage point (pp) is the unit for the arithmetic difference of two percentages.

[224] - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, activists from Sri Lanka

[225] - bhaudik Kshatriya

[226] - means that all Dharmas (truths) are equal to or harmonious with each other. In recent times, this statement has been taken as meaning “all religions are the same” that all religions are merely different paths to God or the same spiritual goal.

[227] - Adharma is the Sanskrit antonym of Dharma. It means 'that which is not in accord with the law' - referring to both the human written law and the divinely given law of nature.

[228] - Triumphalism is the attitude or belief that a particular doctrine, religion, culture, or social system is superior to and should triumph over all others. Triumphalism is not an articulated doctrine but rather a term that is used to characterize certain attitudes or belief systems by parties such as political commentators and historians.

[229] - as a one the most world religious people in the world

[230]- as “Pavan Varma” quoted

[231] - Holm, Hans-Henrik and Georg Sorensen.  1995.  “Introduction: What Has Changed?” in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen, eds., Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview), 1–17.

[232] - Sociologist Roland Robertson - Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage.

[233] - Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

[234] - a German sociologist he coined the term “Risk Society”

[235] - The Economist, Chanda, N. (2002). Coming Together: Globalization means reconnecting the human community. Retrieved December 27, 2003, from Yale Global Online Magazine Web site: http:/?/?

[236] - Jeremy Seabrook, Localizing Cultures, Korea Herald, January 13, 2004.   See:

[237] - Samuel P. Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, 72 no. 3 22–49 (1993). He believe that “The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.”

[238] - Lee, M. A. (2000). The beast reawakens. New York: Routledge.

[239] - as Hindu extremism and fountainhead of Hindu right wing

[240] - Linell Elizabeth Cady, “Identity, Feminist Theory, and Theology,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition, and Norms, ed. Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997) 17–32, at 26.

[241] - “Mondialisation et Sociétée Overte,” op. cit., p. 9

[242] - David Rothkopf, "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism," Foreign Policy June 22, 1997

[243] -  Religion is a subset of culture, Culture, itself embodies the language, traditions, kinship systems, shared values, and beliefs that define a society.

[244] - Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. New York: Oxford University Press. ----- (1997). The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell.

[245] - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

[246] - The Hindi film industry that effectively encompasses the experience of the entire Indian entertainment industry. India in July 7, 1896, a few months after the Lumiere brothers introduced the art of cinematography in Paris in 1895 known it.

[247] - Rantanen, T. (2005). The Media and Globalization. London: Sage.

[248] - How Cable TV began and spread in India. (1999). Retrieved January 29, 2004, from Web site:

[249] -Steady Growth in TV Homes and Cable Homes Expected in The Next Few Years by Ashok Mansukhani available at on Sep.8 2014

[250] - Desai, M. (2000). Hollywood to dub films in Indian language. Retrieved January 29, 2004, from Indian Express Web site:

[251] - Hollywood blockbusters make big money in Indian movie market by Nandini Raghavendra, May 29, 2012, available at

[252] - Internet Usage Stats and Telecommunications Market Report available on Sep.7 20014 at

[253] - Are Indian Languages Ready to Replace English Online? by Gopal Sathe, May 23, 2014 available at

[254] - In 2002, The World Values Survey results show that when asked about their primary identification, 47 per cent of respondents chose local identity, 38 per cent chose national identity, and less than 15 per cent of respondents chose cosmopolitan identity.

[255] - the quote by P. V. Narasimha Rao, the prime minister India

[256] - Increasing capital mobility has acted as a stimulus to globalization. When capital can move freely from country to country, it is relatively straightforward for firms to locate and invest abroad, and repatriate profits.

[257] -  P. V. Narasimha Rao, the prime minister India in 1991

[258] - “so many Hindu religious signs and symbols are using and borrowing by religious-political groups and they were successful also in this regard and the history of this groups show some successes in their activity, for example BJP running national government during 1998 till 2004 and also state achievements by Shiv Sena in Maharashtra... can be name in this regards (Mostafavi, 2013).”

[259] - the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER 2009) 

[260] -  according to the Indian Readership Survey 2009

[261] - Professor Yogendra Singh worked about the sociology of culture change in globalized India, one important book of Singh, namely, “Culture Change in India – Identity and Globalization” 

[262] - Li, He.  1997.  “Democracy in Latin America: Does Globalization Matter?” Paper presented at the APSA annual meeting, Washington, DC, 28–31 August.

[263] -  Use of containerization has enabled vast quantities of goods and commodities to be shipped across the world at extremely low cost.

[264] - cinema is as an emblem of the modern: cinema has been India’s great experiment to fashion an Indian modernity (Dwyer, Rachel  2006, p4)

[265] - The internet has enabled faster and 24/7 global communication.


[267] - “This decade also saw a media revolution (satellite and cable television since 1991), a communications revolution (the mobile phone and the Internet) and new technologies (the audio cassette, the CD, the VCD and the DVD). The dynamics of the interaction of these new media with the film industry have been fast and there has barely been time to analyze them.”(Dwyer, Rachel, 2006, p162)

[268] -  where three generations live together

[269] - people in a society are divided according to their family background, education, job or income

[270] - a TV channel

[271] - The Swadeshi Jagaran Manch, affiliated to the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and RSS. It is a nationwide organization to promote the notion of Swadeshi (Indianisation, self-reliance, indigenization) and economic nationalism.

[272] - an internet program using by Hindutva to connect its fans together on web to meet and exchange idea

[273] - Nanda, Meera. (2010). The God Market: How Globalization Made India More Hindu. Random House.p.45

[274] - Radhakrishnan, S. (2008). “Global Indians” and the Knowledge Economy: Gender and the Making of a Middle-Class Nation. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. Retrieved on March 3, 2010, from Dissertations & Theses: A&I.(Publication No. AAT 3254301).

[275] - Castells, Manuel. (2004). The Power of Identity, Malden, MA: Blackwell

[276] - The available survey data supports the general impression that globalization is proving to be good for the gods in India. According to the 2007 state of the Nation survey conducted by the Centre for the study of developing societies (CSDS) for IBN-CNN–Hindustan Times, ‘Among Indians, the level of religiosity has gone up considerably during the last five years. While 30 per cent said they had become more religious during the last five years, only 5 per cent mentioned in negative.’ Hindus are not the only ones becoming more religious. the 2007 state of the Nation survey shows that 38 per cent of Indian Muslims, 47 per cent of Christians, and 33 per cent of Sikhs, as compared to 27 per cent hindus, claim to have become more religious in the last five years. Based upon the National election survey of 2004, the CSDS team reported the following: ‘We asked our respondents if their involvement with religious activity had increased in terms of attending religious functions, regular participation in prayers, temple going, etc. over one-third respondents said that religiosity had increased among their family members…Among the educated, particularly among those educated above secondary level, the proportion of highly religious is higher. Among upper castes (27 per cent) and peasant proprietary castes (25 per cent) the highly religious are in high proportions (24 per cent). Both among Hindus and Muslims, the upper class persons are more religious than the poor (26 per cent Muslim rich and 25 per cent Hindu rich are highly religious.) so religiosity may be a pastime of the high and the rich!’.  The number of registered religious buildings in Delhi grew from a mere 560 in 1980 to 2000 in 1987, with similar trends reported from other parts of the country. Pavan Varma reports that around the turn of the millennium, the country had 2.5 million places of worship, but only 1.5 million schools and barely 75,000 hospitals. He bases this observation on the data from the 2001 census. According to a recent study by the NCAER, ‘religious trips account for more 50 per cent of all package tours, much higher than leisure tour packages at 28 per cent’. The most recent figures show that in 2004, more than 23 million people visited the Balaji temple at Tirupati, while 17.25 million trekked to the mountain shrine of Vaishno Devi.

[277] - the nexus between the state, temples, and the private sector

[278] - Human Development Index

[279] - According to the 2007 Human Development Report, Brazil stood at 70, Russia at 67, and China had an HDI of 81 (an amazing improvement from 99 in 2000).

[280] - In Nanda (Angus Deaton and Jean Dreze, ‘Poverty and inequality in India: A re- examination’, Economic and Political Weekly, September 7, 2008, p. 3729.)

[281] - He is an Indian politician and economist. He was the President of the Janata Party. Ideologically a staunch Hindutva proponent, he merged his party on 11 August 2013 with BJP. In 1970s, he promises that India will become a global superpower by 2025.

[282] - BJP’s cabinet member, Jaswant Singh have served as India’s finance minister (1996, 2002-2004), foreign minister (1998-2004), and defense minister (2000-2001).

[283] - Now is the prime minister of India

[284] - Hindutva neo-liberals are the closest ideological cousins of American religious neo-conservatives—the so-called ‘Neocons’ – who justify their fervent American nationalism and their ardent admiration of capitalism in a theological world view derived from the natural law tradition of Roman Catholicism (Nanda, 2009).”

[285] -  public expressions of hindu religiosity are growing because they are being facilitated by the Indian state and corporate interests, often in a close partnership (Nada, 2009)

[286] -In recent years, direct state and corporate sponsorship of expressly religious elements of hinduism (as opposed to artistic and cultural aspects) has become more blatant, as is evident from provision of public funding for yagnas, kathas, and yoga camps; matching grants for organizing religious festivals and pilgrimages; promotion of temple tourism and pilgrimage circuits; providing land and state-financed infrastructure for temples, ashrams and priest training schools; providing funds, physical infrastructure, and official credentials for training in Vedic astrology, vastu, and other elements of hindu priest craft; and in some states, even directly paying the salaries of temple priests.

[287] - as example of it: On January 24th, 2009, a group of 40 activists of the “Shri Ram Sene”, a Hindu rightwing group, barged into a pub in Mangalore (a city in the state of Karnataka in South India), dragged out a group of young people and beat them up, claiming that the women were violating traditional Indian values by wearing Western clothes and drinking alcohol with their male friends. Shri Ram Sene chief Pramod Muthalik vowed to disrupt all future Valentine’s Day and New Year celebrations in Karnataka, calling it an “international Christian conspiracy against our [Indian] culture”

[288] - a head line in The Times of India, January 14, 2010

[289] - The Times of India, February 14, 2008

[290] - The practice or condition of having more than one spouse, especially wife, at one time.

Compare bigamy (def 1), monogamy (def 1).

[291] - an ancient Indian tradition of the immolation of a widow on her husband's funeral pyre

[292] - Tun Mahathir Mohamed, (Malaysia’s former Prime Minister), 2003. Globalisation and the new realities. Subang Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd.

[293] - India National day speech by prime minister of Indian, Red Fort – New Delhi

[294] -

[295] - Lok Sabha or Indian lower house or House of the People (In Sanskrit, "Lok" signifies "people" and "Sabha" signifies "assembly") or the parliament of India with 545 (543 elected + 2 appointed) members (MP) which are elected directly by people and the government of India is the outcome of the parliament and it will leads the country for 5 years, and it forms by the party or alliance which have the biggest numbers of seats in LS. The members of the Lok Sabha are the representatives of people who are elected directly by the people on the basis of Universal Adult Suffrage. The strength of the members can go maximum up to 552. 530 members represent the States, while 20 members represent the Union Territories. The President of the country nominates two members from the Anglo-Indian community. The Lok Sabha runs for a period of five years from the date of its first meeting. It ends in two cases only – if the tenure of the government gets completed after five years or if the Lok Sabha gets dissolved due to any political, economic or social issue.

[296] -based on the Representation of People Act, 1950. According to Art.326 of the Constitution of India ‘the election shall be on the basis of adult suffrage. i.e., every person who is a citizen of India and who is not less than 18 years of age shall be entitled to vote at the election provided he is not disqualified by any provision of the constitution or of any law made by the appropriate legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice.

[297] - Social change at the three main levels i.e., village, the state and the nation.

[298] - The total number of political parties contesting Lok Sabha elections has gone up from 55 in 1952 to 230 in 2004 and 370 in 2009.

[299] - The Indian parliamentary system of government invests executive power in a Cabinet and Council of Ministers, who have to have the support of a majority of the members of the Lok Sabha.

[300] - the first one was in 1952

[301] - General Lok Sabha election in 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014.

[302] - In August 2004, the BJP hosted a three-day chintan baithak (brain storming session) in Goa, Madan Das Devi, representing the RSS, declared that the Sangh expected the BJP to remain firm on Hindutva and propagate its ideology. (Adeney & Saez, 2005)

[303] - article “The BJP and the 2004 general election Dimensions, causes and implications of an unexpected defeat” by Christophe Jaffrelot published in (Adeney & Saez, 2005)

[304] - article “The BJP and the 2004 general election Dimensions, causes and implications of an unexpected defeat” by Christophe Jaffrelot published in (Adeney & Saez, 2005)

[305] - As the General Secretary of the VHP, Praveen Togadia declared soon after the 2004 elections, that “The Bharatiya Janata Party betrayed the Hindus. The BJP left its core ideology of Hindutva and trust on the basis of which they had been voted to power. For votes they tied up with the jehadis.” (The Hindu, 2004d)

[306] - Right after the 2004 general election, the National Executive Committee of the JD (U) issued a resolution to this effect. It declared that “We joined the National Democratic Alliance only after the three controversial issues (construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya, Article 370 and Uniform Civil Code) had been removed from the agenda of the NDA. If any effort is now made to revive them, we shall have to take another road.” (The Hindu 2004g) or another BJP ally the TDP’s spokesperson announced that ‘if the BJP chooses to adopt the communal agenda, we will sever ties with it’ (The Hindu 2004h).

[307] - A. B. Vajpayee and L. K. Advani

[308] - a corruption scandal which related to military equipment buying by India from Sweden and the Bofors company

[309] - the Sikh’s separation movement for independent Sikh territories  

[310] - and it side effect in Indian Tamil Nadu state

[311] - Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

[312] - Telugu Desam Party

[313] - Asom Gana Parishad (Assam Peoples Association)

[314] - the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) and the Communist Party of India (CPI)

[315] - The Mandal Commission report implemented by the V.P. Singh government gave 27% reservation to the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) in government jobs and led to widespread violence and protests across the country by the forward castes.

[316] - Mandir represented the row over the disputed Babri Masjid structure at Ayodhya, which the BJP was using as its major poll plank. This issue had led to riots in many party of India and the electorate was polarized on caste and religious lines.

[317] - Janta Dal (S) and Left Front coalition

[318] - the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam

[319] - The first non-Nehru-Gandhi family PM from Congress was Lal Bahadur Shastri.

[320] - article “The NDA and the politics of ‘minorities’ in India” by Subrata K. Mitra  published in (Adeney & Saez, 2005)

[321] - The 24 members of the NDA coalition included 22 formal members of the alliance and two parties that supported the NDA from outside.

[322] - The Janata Party coalition lasted only two years (from 1977–79). The National Front coalition (in power from 1989–91) and the United Front coalition (from 1996–98) both lasted only two years. Finally, a BJP-led coalition only lasted one year in power (from 1998–99).

[323] - United Progressive Alliance and INC leader who is the widow of late Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi

[324] - now is the leader of the Nationalist Congress Party his based is in Maharashtra state India

[325] - a local confrontation between Indian and Pakistani forces which happened in 1999 and the two countries even near to complete full war again but it managed politically and diplomatically by BJP’ NDA government. This confrontation was positioned near Kargil’s mountains so it is famous as the Kargil war.

[326] - BJP President in his introduction to the party’s Vision Document 2004 demonstrates the confidence with which the BJP approached the elections to the fourteenth Lok Sabha.

[327]- Same law for all (Hindu, Muslim, and Christian…)

[328] - Bharatiya Janata Party 2004: see ‘Highlights’ and ‘Our Basic Vision and Commitments’

[329] - The seventh largest in the world and a record for India at that time

[330] - especially Vajpayee and Sonia Gandhi

[331] - in Indian politics refers to various alliances formed by smaller parties at various points of time since 1989 to offer a third option to Indian voters, challenging the INC and the BJP as two big party in India

[332] - including external support from BSP, SP, MDMK and the Left front

[333] -  like the Indian freedom struggle leaders who had directed the freedom movement

[334] - a 63-year-old son of a low-caste Hindu tea seller who became the western Gujarat state chief minister for three times as chief minister of his state, was boycotted by the US and European powers for a decade over religious riots in Gujarat in 2002 which left around 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, dead.


[335] - said Christophe Jaffrelot, an academic on India from Sciences Po university in Paris and King's College London.

[336] - According to the list of national parties established by the Election Commission, except for the Congress and BJP. Source: Election Commission of India.

[337] -   - article  “The shapes of Hindu nationalism” by John Zavos published in (Adeney & Saez, 2005)

[338] - 2 seats in 7th, 2 in 8th, 85 in 9th, 120 in 10th, 161 in 11th, 182 in 12th, 182 in 13th, 138 in 14th, 116 in 15th, and 280 in 16th

[339] - 07.74% in 8th, 11.36% in 9th, 20.11% in 10th, 20.29% in 11th, 25.59% in 12th, 23.75% in 13th, 22.16% in 14th, 18.80% in 15th, and 31.00% in 16th

[340] -  In 2009 election also Narendra Modi was on of key player but he evaluated as defeat factor for BJP in that election.

[341] - L.K. Advani, March 2004 cited in The Hindu newspaper 2004c

[342] - available in refer to communalizing

[343] - "The Saffron as one of the holiest colour is strongly associated with Hinduism; it is colour of fire as the symbol of purity as fire burnt impurities. It is also symbol of Supreme Being. Fire worship is backed to Vedic era when the Aryans worship it as holly being even now fire has main symbolic meaning in Hindu prayer. This colour is used by holly men (Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism) and they wear this colour as a symbol of seeking for light. The Rajput as warrior caste in Hindu hierarchy uses this colour in war (Mostafavi, 2013)."

[344] - and also BJS

[345] - Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1993. Les nationalistes hindous. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

[346] - of strong state intervention, planning, and large-scale industry, and a commitment to small-scale and village-based industry

[347] - 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim communal riots were happened by state-BJP members and VHP and RSS and it can consider as state policy by Modi, not national level.

[348] - A nationwide procession of consecrated bricks collected from all over the country for the construction of a large Ram Mandir in Ayodhya.

[349] - (procession for unity) from Kanya Kumari on the southern tip of the Indian peninsula, winding through fourteen states, and scheduled to reach Srinagar, the curfewed capital of Kashmir, in order to hoist the national flag on Republic Day. Joshi (BJP president), in a very brief and pathetic ceremony under tight military security, hoisted the national flag at the central Lal Chowk in Srinagar. Narendra Modi, chief BJP organizer from Gujarat was the organizer of the Ekta Yatra.

[350] - “the principle of religious freedom, which covers not just the right to religious thought but every aspect of faith, including belief and rituals, and also freedom from discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, place of birth, or gender.” Cited in - Dhavan R (1987) Religious freedom in India. Am J Comp Law 35(1), Winter

[351] - Bhargava R (2007) The distinctiveness of Indian secularism events/bhargava.pdf

[352] -  D.E.Smith cited in Kamlesh Kumar Wadhwa, Minority Safeguards in India, (Delhi: Thomson Press (India)Ltd,1975),p.154.

[353] - Dr Jay Dubashi has been a leading economist of his time and associated with the BJP for decades. An engineering graduate from Bombay and a doctorate from the London School of Economics, Dr Dubashi has been a core member of the economic think-tank of the party. During the Morarji Desai government, he was an adviser to the Union Minister of Industry and later became the convener of the BJP economic cell.

[354] - Jay Dubashi, ‘‘BJP’s Unique Role,’’ Organiser, 25 June 1989, p.2.

[355] -  این مطلب را یکی از رهبران حزب کنگره در پارلمان هند به نام Mallikarjun Kharge   عنوان داشت.

[356]  - نخست وزیر این سخن (" communal violence was stalling the growth of the nation") را در مراسم روز ملی هند و در سخنرانی عمومی خود از کنار "قلعه سرخ" دهلی بیان داشت که برای اولین بار از این منصب و در چنین مراسمی سخن می گفت.


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